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ABSTRACT	
This study seeks to determine whether the regulatory basis and operational structure of the 
Islamic financial model position it as the front-runner in terms of sustainability and resilience 
to financial crises. A critical review of the extant literature reveals that Islamic banks have 
performed better than conventional banks during economic shocks because Islamic banks are 
less exposed to risks. However, this study maps the profile of financial institutions that are 
generally resilient to financial crises, and notes that Islamic banks do not match this profile. 
Nonetheless, an assessment of the risk management strategies of Islamic banks reveals that 
they are in fact less likely to trigger instability when using profit-loss sharing schemes. The 
study utilises existing statistical data as part of the inter-disciplinary understanding of the 
effects of financial crises. The data is derived from various surveys and reports that chart 
overall performance considering the stressful financial environment of 2007-09 and beyond. 
This is complemented with original qualitative data that has been collected through surveys 
that identify the perceptions of key stakeholders in the banking sector on the resilience of 
their respective banking systems and how those systems could ultimately be improved. The 
traditional tripartite analysis of knowledge is adopted. The analysis at a generic level reveals 
that banks using the profit-loss sharing schemes match the profile of institutions that are 
generally more resilient to financial crises. The analysis at the level of the State reveals that 
where Islamic banks are accommodated within the same regulatory framework as 
conventional banks, the former are more resistant to financial shock. Lastly, the analysis at 
the level of individual banks reveals that the stress testing frameworks of the conventional 
banks may be rated as less effective than those of Islamic banks.	
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Given the experiences of recent decades, a cloud still looms over the global financial market. 
The 2007-09 financial crisis and its aftermath have left institutions and national economies 
looking for ways to improve their banking systems to ensure that the failures witnessed 
during this period do not replicate themselves again in the future. As part of this exploration, 
many have questioned which banking model is in fact the most resilient, with consideration 
given to the conventional, Islamic, and various other models used around the globe such as 
the Grameen Banking model, the MC2 model, and the village banking model.1 This study 
aims to determine whether the regulatory basis and operational structure of the Islamic 
financial model position it as the front-runner in terms of sustainability and resilience to 
financial crises. Further, it seeks to ascertain whether the conventional model may 
accommodate the unique aspects of Islamic finance in their domestic banking regulations in 
order to enhance the resilience of conventional banks.  
 
The early roots of Islamic banking and finance were established in Muslim society during the 
golden age when early forms of proto-capitalism and free markets started to become key 
drivers of success and economic growth for the medieval caliphates.2 Early forms of 
mercantilism emerged between the 8th and 12th centuries which some scholars regard as the 
birth of Islamic capitalism.3 During the golden age, early economic concepts evident in 
Islamic banking emerged. Such concepts include unsophisticated forms of partnership or 
Mufuwada, capital or al-mal, trusts or waqf, ledgers, limited partnerships or Mudaraba, and 
capital accumulation or nama al-mal.4 Meanwhile, independent business enterprises also 
                                                
1 See for example, AV Vernikov, ‘Comparing the Banking Models in China and Russia: Revisited’ (2015) 26 
Studies on Russian Economic Development 178, 178-187; M Montagna and T Lux, ‘Hubs and Resilience: 
Towards More Realistic Models of Interbank Markets’ in IA Fernandes and T Ausina (eds), Banking Integration 
and Financial Crises: Some Recent Developments (BBVA 2015) 163-187; J Birchall and LH Ketilson, 
Resilience of the Cooperative Business Model in Times of Crises (International Labour Organisation 2009) 10-
13; N Krauss and I Walter, ‘Can Microfinance Reduce Portfolio Volatility’ (2008) New York University. 
Available at: https://www.microfinancegateway.org/sites/default/files/mfg-en-paper-can-microfinance-reduce-
portfolio-volatility-dec-2008.pdf  [02 March 2018]. 
2 See Z Iqbal and A Mirakhor, An Introduction to Islamic Finance (1st edn, John Wiley & Sons 2011) chapter 1. 
3 Ibid. 
4 A Alharbi, 'Development of The Islamic Banking System' (2015) 3 Journal of Islamic Banking and Finance 
12, 13. 
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developed during the medieval period in the Islamic world and later spread to Europe in the 
13th century as a result of Muslim conquests.5  
 
This development continued in the following centuries, and after periods of the emergence 
and disappearance of Islamic empires, Islamic banking evolved into the modern banking 
system that took hold in the 1960s.6 During the 1960s and into the 1970s, the principle of 
interest-free banking began to gain traction in the Islamic world.  This was a banking system 
based on the concepts of Mudaraba and the sharing of profit and loss.7 As academic work on 
the concept of interest-free banking continued to gain ground in the Islamic world, politics 
chipped in fuelled by the emergence of young economists from Muslim backgrounds.8 This 
ensured that in most Muslim societies, there were specific rules and regulations governing all 
financial transactions, bank notes and commercial papers that were widely accepted, and a 
strong judicial system capable of enforcing all contracts that comply with the regulations.9 
 
After a sustained study10 on the benefits of a banking system based on the model of 
Mudaraba, the first interest-free loan savings banks were established in 1963 in Mit Ghamr, 
Egypt. That same year, the first Sharia-compliant fund was established in Malaysia.11 The 
success of these two initiatives increased interest in the concept of Islamic banking and 
attracted institutional involvement. In 1970, Islamic countries held the Conference of the 
Finance Ministers in Karachi.12 The Egyptian study followed in 1972, and later the first 
international conference on Islamic economics was held in Mecca in 1976.13 These efforts led 
to the establishment of the Islamic Development Bank in 1975 in Dubai, making it the first 
modern commercial bank in the Islamic world.14 Since then, a myriad of Islamic banks have 
emerged in different parts of the world characterizing the rapid growth of the industry.  
 
                                                
5 M Ayub, Understanding Islamic Finance (1st edn, John Wiley & Sons 2007) section 2.3.1. 
6 S Zineb and M Bellalah, ‘Introduction to Islamic Finance and Islamic Banking: From Theory to Innovations’ 
in M Bellalah and O Masood (eds), Islamic Banking and Finance (1st edn, Cambridge Scholars Publishing 
2013) 2. 
7 Ibid, 
8 For an overview of the works of some influential scholars at the time, see M Al-Ansari, M Hasan and S 
Metwaly, Islamic Banks (Al-Ahram Establishment 1988) 24-25. 
9 A Alharbi, note 4, 13-14. See also, A Nasser, Essentials of Islamic Bank Assets and Operational Aspects 
(Appollo 1996) 15-16. 
10 A Chachi, ‘Origin and Development of Commercial and Islamic Banking Operations’ (2008) 21 Journal of 
King Abdulaziz University-Islamic Economics 3, 17. 
11 M Iqbal and P Molyneux, Thirty Years of Islamic Banking (1st edn, Palgrave Macmillan 2005) 36. 
12 Ibid 
13 B Kettell, Introduction to Islamic Banking and Finance (1st edn, Wiley 2011) 34. 
14 Z Iqbal and A Mirakhor, note 2 above. 
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Over the next forty years, the Islamic banks continued to develop and expand their offerings 
to viably compete with their conventional counterparts in a growing economy. However, this 
growth was quickly halted in the mid-2000s. The 2007-09 global banking crisis put all 
banking systems, including both conventional and Islamic models, to the test. This crisis, 
originating from the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States, extended far beyond its 
borders, impacting major economies around the world.15 It resulted in financial losses for 
banks and economic recessions in economies that affected bank financial reports. Most 
importantly, it tested the sustainability of various banking models in light of competing 
financial, economic, and consumer concerns.16 In the wake of the crisis, there was much 
speculation on the causes of the financial crisis. However, it would appear that the Islamic 
banking sector was less adversely affected by the crisis than its conventional counterpart. 
 
In attempting to determine why this was the case, many Islamic regulators such as the central 
banks of Bahrain, Iran, Kuwait, Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan along with the 
Islamic Development Bank and Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial 
Institutions (AAOIFI),17 contend that Islamic banking carries fewer risks than conventional 
banking because its products are based on real assets.18 This stems from the regulatory 
restrictions put in place to ensure that Islamic banks remain Shariah compliant. Also, some 
scholars have asserted that Islamic financial institutions are significantly less affected by 
economic volatility than conventional banks.19 Conversely, other commentators argue that 
Islamic banking is subject to the same problems as conventional banking and its unique 
structure exposes it to additional risks such as Shariah-compliance risk which do not affect 
their conventional counterparts,20 as well as to equity investment risk, displaced commercial 
risk, and rate of return risk because of the potential reduction in the fair value of equity held 
by the Islamic institution or the fact that fixed returns are not provided in exchange for 
deposits or the market rate of return may change unexpectedly.  
 
                                                
15 M Almanaseer, ‘The Impact of the Financial Crisis on the Islamic Banks Profitability – Evidence from GCC’ 
(2014) 5 International Journal of Financial Research 176, 176. 
16 Ibid. 
17 A Khan, What is Wrong with Islamic Economics? Analysing the Present State and Future Agenda (Edward 
Elgar Publishing Limited 2013) 86.  
18 M Obaidullah, Islamic Financial Services (Scientific Publishing Center 2005) 5. 
19 A Ahmed, ‘Global Financial Crisis: An Islamic Finance Perspective’ (2010) 3 International Journal of 
Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management 306, 307. 
20 T Beck, A Demirgüç-Kunt and O Merrouche, ‘Islamic vs. Banking: Business Model, Efficiency and Stability" 
(2013) 37 Journal of Banking & Finance 433, 433-447. 
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Ultimately, therefore, the goal of this research is to attempt to reconcile these differing 
perspectives. Analysing banking systems requires a detailed understanding of the regulations 
that provide for the creation and operation of banks, the risks embedded in the products and 
services offered by the banks, and the proactive measures adopted by the banks and 
regulators to minimize financial risks. The effective management of risk exposure is critical 
to the successful operation of any financial institution, and is even more important during 
periods of volatility and recession, such as during the global banking crisis that has affected 
financial markets in the last decade.21 In this regard, effective corporate governance and risk 
management have become increasingly important as financial regulators and rating agencies 
have put greater emphasis on them following the 2007-09 financial crisis.22 They have 
become an important means to differentiate a bank from its competitors and give it a 
competitive advantage by acknowledging its methods for preventing or eliminating potential 
financial risks it may face. This is particularly important in emerging markets in which rapid 
expansion is closely related to higher risks, thus, making effective governance and risk 
management crucial.23 In this context, all financial institutions, both conventional and 
Islamic, face significant challenges in managing their risk exposure across all asset classes 
and business sectors through effective evaluation, measurement, and pricing strategies. 
 
Banking institutions need to establish the best risk management process that assists in 
ensuring the achievement of value and profit maximisation and thus the bank’s success. This 
study therefore examines the performance of Islamic banks during the financial crisis and 
determines whether they were more resilient to shock than conventional banking models, and 
whether this may be explained by the risk management strategies of the Islamic banks, as 
well as the regulations in Islamic jurisdictions. 
1.2 Aims of the Thesis 
 
This thesis seeks to determine whether the contention that Islamic banks are more resilient to 
financial crises than conventional banks is justified. In this light, it ascertains what constitutes 
resilience to financial crises and attempts to demonstrate that if the above statement is true, 
                                                
21 Ibid. 
22 P Bromiley et al., ‘Enterprise Risk Management: Review, Critique, And Research Directions’ (2015) 48 Long 
Range Planning 265, 265. 
23 R Fairchild, ‘Financial Risk Management: Is It a Value- Adding Activity?’ (2012) 10 Balance Sheet 22, 22-
25. 
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then the adoption of the Islamic banking model may strengthen the resilience of conventional 
banking systems. 
 
The main purpose of this research is to establish a causal link between the principles of the 
Shariah, including good faith, mutual trust, fair dealing and profit and loss sharing, as applied 
to the banking sector, and the resilience of banks, as well as the overall perseverance strength 
of the financial system. It also seeks to establish whether follows that a financial crisis such 
as that of 2007-09 may not have been triggered by banks offering Shariah-compliant products 
and services. This thesis will also address the nuances of challenges for Islamic banks in the 
global financial sector that is overall more receptive to a conventional banking model, despite 
the observed weaknesses in the approach in light of the recent financial crises. 
 
The above goals are achieved by critically assessing the performance of Islamic banks in 
comparison to conventional banks in the regulatory environment of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia (KSA). Thus, the objective is to determine whether Shariah-compliant banks are more 
resilient than conventional banks, where they operate within the same regulatory 
environment. In the KSA, Islamic banks and conventional banks are required to comply to 
the same laws and regulations. 
 
Additionally, this thesis aims to identify the foundational underpinnings of the Islamic 
banking model, taking into consideration the greater societal and economic goals that a 
Shariah compliant banking system seeks to achieve. For this purpose, this thesis adopts a 
heuristic approach to understanding the process of risk management in the Islamic banking 
system, and the evolution of the contemporary management strategies in use by some banks 
in the KSA. By understanding the structure of the model and the goals that it seeks to attain, 
one can then effectively compare it to the conventional banking models used by banks within 
the same regulatory environment. It is only through understanding the unique attributes of the 
Islamic model that one can understand not only how this model differs from conventional 
banking systems, but why it may be more desirable. 
 
Given that each bank has a specific risk management strategy that determines how it 
identifies and manages risk, as well as underwriting standards that guide its decision to accept 
a client and credit risk, this thesis will also seek to ascertain whether Islamic and 
conventional banks in the KSA have developed specific risk management strategies that take 
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into account the unique risks embedded in their products and services. The objective of this 
comparative analysis is to determine whether the heterogeneity of each bank and effective 
prudential regulation are more important than the nature of the banking or financing activity.  
 
Finally, this study aims to contribute to the literature on the challenges of developing 
regulatory tools that capture the multifaceted nature of the banking system. This thesis 
undertakes a critical review of the orders and several pieces of legislation that regulate 
banking transactions in the KSA. It shows how the regulator has honed prescribed standards 
and approaches to enhance the resilience of both Islamic and conventional banks, as well as 
the financial system.  
1.3 Objectives of the Study 
 
To accomplish the aims of this thesis, there are a number of core research objectives that 
guide the inquiries contained within. First, this thesis seeks to understand the similarities and 
differences between the principles and practices of the conventional and Islamic banking 
systems. It is only through such an understanding that one can accurately compare the two 
systems in light of each other and distil ideal practices for consideration. 
 
Second, this thesis seeks to map the profile of the financial institution that is generally 
resilient to financial crises. This involves ascertaining the concept of ‘resilience’ in the 
context of financial system and examining the body of thought surrounding the concept. This 
will better equip regulators with knowledge of what needs to be done to become more 
resilient. 
 
Third, this thesis attempts to determine whether in cases where Islamic banks are 
accommodated within the same legal and regulatory framework as conventional banks, the 
Islamic banks are more resilient to financial crises. This involves assessing the risk 
management strategies of Islamic banks in the KSA, as well as determining whether Islamic 
banks exceeded the minimum requirements and were more profitable than conventional 
banks during the crises in the KSA. It equally seeks to explain any discrepancies in the 
performances between Islamic and conventional banks. 
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Finally, this thesis examines how Islamic and conventional banks assess their resilience to 
crises. It attempts to determine whether Islamic banks use mechanisms that are tailored to 
their unique products and services and the economic conditions in which they operate. Thus, 
it seeks to determine whether the capital structure, adequacy levels and distributions are 
assessed from an Islamic perspective.  
Financial crises are often systemic and may begin at any level in a system. The capacity of 
resilience must therefore be reinforced at the system level as well as the level of financial 
institutions. Nonetheless, it remains uncertain what are the most appropriate strategies for 
strengthening the financial environment and reinforcing the resilience of banks.24 Resilience, 
in this context, ensures the continuous provision of financial services both in good and bad 
times. It is also still uncertain what characterises a resilient bank and financial system or what 
are the predictors of resilience to financial crises. The performance of banks during crises 
may be determined by factors such as bank capital ratio, funding structure or retail depository 
finding. Some commentators have held that regulators ought to use instruments to measure 
and mitigate risk given that resiliency is a function of risk management.25 In other words, 
effective regulatory mechanisms may reduce the incentives of financial institutions to take 
risks and motivate them to manage risks better thereby contributing to their resilience during 
crises.26 Thus, this study assesses the fundamentals that have contributed to the resilience of 
Islamic and commercial banks in the KSA in order to address the problem of the uncertainty 
of the sources and determinants of resilience. 
 
1.4 Research Questions 
 
The primary inquiry of this thesis is to identify what aspects of the Islamic banking model 
and its formation laws, implementation, and regulation in the KSA position it as a more 
resilient banking system when compared to conventional banking models in the face of 
domestic economic challenges and global financial crises. 
 
                                                
24 WT Selmier II, H Penikas and K Vasilyeva, ‘Financial Risk as a Good’ (2014) 31 Procedia Computer Science 
115, 115-123. 
25 C Calomiris, ‘An Incentive-Robust Program for Financial Reform’ (2011) 79 Manchester School 39, 39-43. 
See also, R La Porta et al, ‘Law and Finance’ (1998) 106(6) Journal of Political Economy 1113, 1113-1115. 
26 L Ratnovski and R Huang, ‘Why Are Canadian Banks More Resilient? (2009) IMF Working Paper No 
WP/09/152. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1442254  [20 November 2018] 
18. 
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In answering this main question, a number of supplementary questions are also considered, 
specifically: 
 
1. What are the legal and regulatory underpinnings of the Islamic and conventional 
banking systems? 
2. What are the key differences in regulatory structure, operational practices, and risk 
management tactics between the Islamic and conventional banking systems? 
3. How sustainable are the conventional and Islamic banking models in response to 
financial crises, and what steps can be taken to improve their overall resilience? 
4. What best practices or cautionary lessons can be learned from the respective systems’ 
risk management strategies and how can these be implemented in their counterparts in 
the future? 
 
1.5 Significance of the Contribution 
 
This thesis evaluates the Islamic banking model and its resilience in the face of financial 
crisis, specifically in comparison to the performance of conventional banks under the same 
pressures. While there has been significant scholarly attention to and analysis of this 
proposition, it has been situated primarily from the financial and economic perspectives. This 
research has however taken a regulatory approach to understanding the operational aspects of 
these banking systems and how these aspects contribute to their ultimate resilience. 
 
Chapter 2 (Section 2.5) critically analyses previous studies that have collected and analysed 
empirical evidence in order to support or confute the claim that Islamic banks are more 
resilient to financial crises than conventional banks. It discusses the methodology used by 
these studies to collect and analyse data from fully Shariah-compliant banks or banks that 
offer both Islamic and conventional products and services. It then analyses the findings of 
these studies after controlling for bank characteristics. Some studies found that the Islamic 
banks performed better during the 2007-2009 financial crisis because they were more equity 
financed, and so, their performance indicators, including capital adequacy, liquidity and 
profitability, were less affected by the crisis. In the same vein, other studies found that 
Islamic banks had greater liquidity but less liquidity risk exposure than conventional banks 
during the crisis. On the other hand, other studies found that conventional banks were more 
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profitable than Islamic banks and the latter were less efficient in expense management as well 
as risk management in regard to loans. 
 
However, the majority of the studies that are reviewed in Chapter 2 conclude that Islamic 
banks are more resilient to financial crisis when compared to conventional banks. It is noted 
that they submit diverse reasons making it difficult to determine what specific features of 
Islamic financial institutions may explain under normal circumstances their resilience to 
financial crises compared to conventional institutions. Thus, it is argued that the findings of 
these studies reflect in different ways the effects of different rules and regulations in different 
regulatory environments. The prudential regulations of the countries in which these studies 
were conducted made a significant contribution to their findings. This is something that was 
generally overlooked. Regulations, which are not solely based on the principles of the 
Shariah, determine how the financial institutions operate and manage risks, and therefore 
ensure their safety and soundness. As such, although Islamic banks in a specific sample may 
have performed better than conventional banks before, during or after the 2007-09 financial 
crisis, it does necessarily imply that the principles of the Shariah (as interpreted in the 
specific jurisdiction) are causally linked to the performance of financial institutions. 
 
This thesis stands out because it is premised on the contention that there is not necessarily a 
causal link between performance during the 2007-2009 financial crisis and resilience in 
general. Hence, the fact that a bank was not as adversely affected as other banks during the 
2007-2009 crisis does not imply that the former is more resilient to financial crises. Some 
banks may have been more resilient because they were more active in the securitisation 
market and therefore enjoyed better capitalisation, higher profitability, and lower insolvency 
risk. However, the same banks may rely largely on the government which may be detrimental 
during a sovereign crisis if there is no good risk management strategy. As such, unlike the 
previous studies, this thesis places emphasis on establishing a theoretical link between 
principles of the Shariah and resilience to financial crises in order to determine whether 
Islamic banks are generally more resilient than conventional banks. 
 
 
This thesis grounds itself by providing the foundational background for the rise of the 
contemporary Islamic banking model, leading up to the current regulatory regimes in place 
that govern the formation and operation of Islamic banks within various countries. This thesis 
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consequently engages in an analysis of regulatory goals for Islamic banks and provides a 
comparative exploration of these goals in the KSA. This research also explores in detail what 
makes the Islamic banking system unique, particularly as implemented in the KSA, and what 
the Shariah underpinnings are for the manifestation of these differences. 
 
Having established the differences between these two models from a legal perspective and in 
principle, this thesis then engages with a critical analysis of how the models comparatively 
performed in light of the 2007-09  financial crisis. Using this global event as a litmus test for 
the resilience of the models, the study looks at how the performance of each system can be 
tied to the choices made from a regulatory standpoint long before the crisis came to pass. To 
demonstrate the arguably better performance of the Islamic banking system, this thesis 
contemplates the economic and financial aspects of the crisis and the relative performance of 
banks in each banking system around the globe to provide the raw data from which ultimate 
conclusions can be drawn.  
 
Finally, this thesis concludes with a unique exploration of the lessons that each system can 
learn from one another to improve their overall performance in the face of crisis and to create 
a more harmonized global banking system. This thesis proposes actionable reforms that can 
be implemented in both the conventional and Islamic banking models to bridge the gap 
between securer global banking operations and regulatory practice. 
 
1.6 Methodology 
 
Understanding and evaluating banking regulation in any single system is a large task, and to 
conduct a comprehensive and comparative analysis of two systems, i.e., Shariah based and 
conventional, and their relative performance requires employing a number of research 
methods. To explore the relative performance of the conventional and Islamic banking 
systems and how legislative reform can further enhance their sustainability, this research 
employs the following methodologies—doctrinal analysis, comparative analysis, empirical 
observations, inter-disciplinary analysis, and qualitative statistical analysis.  
 
First, this thesis engages in doctrinal analysis of the laws and regulations empowering the 
banking systems under conventional models and in Islamic states. The doctrinal method 
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involves charting the development of legal precedent, understanding the need for and impact 
of legislative reforms, and engaging in textual legislative interpretation of the laws and 
regulations and their application over time.27 A critical conceptual analysis of the 
empowering banking laws and regulations for both exemplary conventional and Islamic 
banking systems is conducted to reveal the key provisions for their creation, operation and 
ongoing risk management. The goal of this analysis is to determine the underlying 
motivations for the regulations in order to assess their effectiveness in practice.28 By 
systematically deconstructing and considering the relevant regulations governing the 
respective banking systems, one can analyse the relationship between the regulations as 
ideals for how the banks should operate and their impact in practice in light of the desired 
outcomes.29 Undertaking doctrinal research of the existing banking regulations allows one to 
effectively compare the workings of the two systems and identify their respective strengths, 
weaknesses, and regulatory gaps. This information can then be used to assess whether these 
attributes affected the system’s performance during the financial crisis and what regulatory 
reform suggestions can be made to improve risk management policies in the future. 
 
In addition to the doctrinal textual analyses of the respective regulations of the conventional 
and Islamic systems, this thesis also engages in comparative analysis of these regulations in 
light of each other. The aim of this is to determine the similarities and differences between 
the models and what lessons could be learned from them as well as to engage in a discussion 
of the systems’ respective responses to the global financial crisis. In particular, comparison is 
made with regard to how the differences highlighted in the regulatory comparison contribute 
to the system’s resilience, or lack thereof, in light of severe financial and economic pressures. 
The goal of this comparative analysis is to evaluate how the two systems responded to the 
same crisis and evaluate their respective performance and how well their regulatory structure 
prepared them to handle such matters. 
 
In conjunction with the comparative analysis outlined above, empirical observations are used 
to assess the systems’ performance during the crisis. Qualitative data was collected from 
employees of four banks in the KSA to formulate theories about the resilience of Islamic 
                                                
27 T Hutchinson, ‘The Doctrinal Method: Incorporating Interdisciplinary Methods in Reforming the Law’ (2015) 
3 Erasmus Law Review 130, 130. 
28 T Hutchinson, ‘Vale Bunny Watson? Law Librarian, Law Libraries and Legal Research in the Post-Internet 
Era’ (2014) 106 Law Library Journal 579, 584. 
29 D Pearce, E Campbell and D Harding, Australian Law Schools: A Discipline Assessment for the 
Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission (Australian Government Publishing Service 1987) 312. 
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banks. The observations were therefore used to identify discrete instances in which a 
particular aspect of the banking regulations contributed to the system’s resilience or caused it 
to falter, leading to broader economic implications for its jurisdiction. These empirical 
analyses serve as the foundation upon which the comparisons can be made and are used in an 
illustrative manner to show the pervasive implications of the financial crisis in all sectors of 
the globe.  
 
Finally, this thesis employs qualitative statistical data as part of the inter-disciplinary 
understanding of the effects of the financial crisis on both the conventional and Islamic 
banking systems. Secondary data is derived from various surveys and reports that chart 
overall performance in light of the stressing financial environment of 2007 to 2009, and the 
aftermath in the following years.30 This is then complemented with primary data through a 
survey that identified the perceptions of key stakeholders in the banking sector on resilience 
of the respective banking systems and how the systems could ultimately be improved. This 
data is also used to draw empirical observations of overall system performance that can be 
used to make actionable suggestions for legislative reform.  
 
In addition to the traditional research methodologies listed above, this thesis concludes with 
proposals for regulatory changes.  The purpose of the doctrinal, comparative, empirical, and 
statistical analyses throughout this research is to ultimately provide proactive regulatory 
reform suggestions that can be implemented in both systems to create a more cohesive global 
banking environment and improve the risk management practices of banks across the various 
regions of the globe.  
 
This thesis adopts the case study approach. It conducts an in-depth investigation of a single 
jurisdiction, the KSA. This is because it is one of the unique regulatory environments in 
which Islamic and conventional banks are required to comply to the same laws. The thesis 
also conducts a comparative case study of four banks in the KSA. This approach emphasizes 
comparison within this context and produces more generalizable findings about causal 
questions.31 In this study, the causal questions relate to how and why Islamic banks are more 
                                                
30 See for example, IMF, ‘Assessing Concentration Risks in GCC Banks’ Gulf Cooperation Council: Annual 
Meeting of Ministers of Finance and Central Bank Governors (note 5124); IMF, ‘Saudi Arabia: Financial 
Stability Assessment’ IMF Country Report (note 504). 
31 A similar approach was adopted in Delwyn Goodrick, ‘Comparative Case Studies’ (2014) UNICEF 
Methodological Briefs, Impact Evaluation No 9. Available at: 
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resilient to financial crises. This approach was adopted because of the need to understand and 
explain how features of Islamic banking enhance of the resilience of the system. Thus, the 
findings help to tailor the regulator’s intervention to help banks become more resistant to 
shocks. Comparative case studies have involved the analysis of the differences and patterns 
across the cases that share a common goal.  
 
In order to achieve the objective of enhancing the inter-disciplinary understanding of the 
effects of the financial crisis on both the conventional and Islamic banking systems, the 
description of specific features of each case is required. This is because understanding each 
case is essential for establishing a foundation for the analytic framework that is used in the 
comparison. It follows that the specific features of the four banks of the KSA are described 
before the cross-case comparison. Information about the banks was obtained from their 
annual reports of 2007, 2014 and 2016. The choice of the reports is based on the fact that the 
study sought to ascertain the risk management strategies of the banks during the financial 
crises of 2007 and 2014, as well as the strategies currently used by the banks. The most 
recent annual reports published at the time the study was conducted was the 2016 reports. 
Information was also obtained directly from the compliance units or officers of the banks. 
This was through semi-structured questionnaires as shown below. The analysis was limited to 
information about the stress tests conducted by the banks, and how their senior management 
and Board of Directors engage with institutional and systemic failures. 
 
It is important to note that some comparative case studies incorporate qualitative data because 
they focus on understanding the cases and context. Thus, the data collection method used 
includes document analysis and questionnaires. The document analysis is doctrinal as 
discussed above. The use of the questionnaire to collect data directly from banks in the KSA 
enabled the researcher to conduct a more extensive and synthesising analysis. The synthesis 
extended beyond comparing the Islamic and conventional banking products to ascertaining 
why the risk management strategies of Islamic banks are relatively more effective. Hence, the 
distinguishing feature was the ascertainment of causality: the extent to which Shariah-
compliant risk management strategies enhance the bank’s resilience to financial crises. 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
http://devinfolive.info/impact_evaluation/ie/img/downloads/Comparative_Case_Studies_ENG.pdf  [08 
November 2017] 1-2. 
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The researcher adopted a series of steps proposed by Rogers, a leading scholar on theory-
based public sector evaluation, on how to develop a theory of change.32 These steps led the 
way for collection and testing of explanatory data.33 They included as follows: 
 
• The researcher clarified the research questions or key evaluation questions in regard 
to the research’s aim and objectives. The comparative case study was deemed to be an 
appropriate design because the thesis sought to answer ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions 
about the resilience of Islamic banks when compared to conventional banks. Also, the 
understanding of the context is crucial to understanding the effectiveness of the 
regulator’s intervention.. 
• The researcher defined initial theories on resilience, financial crises, and the resilience 
of Islamic banks to financial crises. 
• The researcher defined the type of cases to be analysed and how this will be done. 
The type of cases included Islamic and conventional banks operating within the same 
jurisdiction, i.e., KSA, but in different contexts, namely, Shariah-compliant banking 
and conventional interest-based banking. The analysis was conducted at three levels. 
At the first level, this thesis critically reviews the extant literature on the resilience of 
Islamic banking to financial crises. At the second level, this thesis determines whether 
Islamic banks are more resilient to financial crises at the level of the State. The KSA 
is used as a case study because in this jurisdiction, Islamic banks are accommodated 
within the same legal and regulatory framework as conventional banks. At the third 
level, the thesis analyses the subjective experiences of four banks in the KSA, two 
Islamic banks and two conventional banks, and determines whether features of the 
experiences of the two Islamic banks provide sufficient reasons to hold that Islamic 
banks are generally more resilient to financial crises than conventional banks. 
   
• The researcher identified the data collection and analysis methods across the cases. 
This included document analysis and the use of questionnaires. 
                                                
32 PJ Rogers, ‘Theory of Change’ (2014) UNICEF Methodological Briefs, Impact Evaluation No 2. Available 
at: 
http://www.entwicklung.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Dokumente/Evaluierung/Theory_of_Change/UNICEF_Theor
y_of_change.pdf  [08 November 2017] 3-6. 
33 See also, SC Funnell and PJ Rogers, Purposeful Programme Theory: Effective Use of Logic Models and 
Theories of Change (Jossey-Bass/Wiley 2012) 264-277; JO Prochaska and CC DiClemente, ‘Transtheoretical 
Therapy: Toward a More Integrative Model of Change’ (1982) 19 Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and 
Practice 276, 276-288. 
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The researcher considered alternative explanations of the research outcomes. For 
example, Islamic banks were not as adversely affected by financial crises as conventional 
banks because of limited exposure, especially to foreign counterparties in equity-based 
transactions, and limited exposure does not have the same connotation as better risk 
management and resilience to financial crisis. Also, some of the conventional banks 
examined may be less resistant to a financial shock because they made themselves 
vulnerable through overexposure to risks embedded in asset categories such as real estate 
and equities. These alternative explanations enabled the researcher to draw broad 
inferences from the specific findings. 
• The researcher reported the findings.  Quotes that are representative of the research 
findings were selected and presented with the results of previous studies that are 
poignant.  
 
These three steps are further explained in 1.6.2 Tripartite Analysis below.   
1.6.1 The Use of Questionnaire 
 
This research used a questionnaire as a chosen method of data collection for the survey 
research. Two questionnaires (Appendices A and B) were used. They posed standardised and 
formally structured questions to a specific group of employees (compliance officers and staff 
in the compliance department) at the designated banks. They constituted a sample of the 
broader population, compliance officers at banks in the KSA. The choice of questionnaires 
was motivated by the fact that they are useful for collecting primary data about opinions, 
experiences and awareness of events.34 They therefore provide insights into the processes by 
which banks in the KSA comply with regulatory requirements and ensure that their 
employees comply with internal procedures and policies aimed at identifying and mitigating 
or eliminating risks. The questionnaire is a practical research instrument because it is cost-
effective.35 It enabled the researcher to conduct an extensive study over a geographically 
dispersed population of bank compliance officers. Also, the questionnaires allowed the 
respondents the time to consider and provide answers to the various questions. 
 
                                                
34 See J Parfitt, ‘Questionnaire Design and Sampling’ in R Flowerdew and D Martin (eds), Method in Human 
Geography: A Guide for Students Doing a Research Project (Pearson/Prentice Hall 2005) 78-109. 
35 S McLafferty, ‘Conducting Questionnaire Surveys’ in N Clifford and G Valentine (eds), Key Methods in 
Geography (Sage 2010) 77-88. 
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The questionnaires used were designed in accordance with the common principles of good 
design and implementation as specified by De Vaus.36 Hence, a critical review of the existing 
literature was conducted, alternative sources of information were considered, and in light of 
the research aim and objectives, organisational strategies were employed to design the 
questionnaires. The questions generally related to the broader research aim, as well as the 
researcher’s understanding of the relevant processes and concepts. They helped to identify 
the appropriate respondents. Each question was carefully considered in regard to the context, 
and the researcher ensured that the question had a clear role towards achieving the research 
aim and answering the research questions. Ethical concerns were also considered as shown 
below. The types of question used in this survey are behaviour and attitude questions. 
Behaviour questions seek to ascertain what the target population do (in this case, manage 
compliance issues), while attitude questions aim at discovering what the target population 
thinks is appropriate. For example, the use of Islamic portfolios in stress testing, and what 
hedging strategies are used to mitigate the risks in these portfolios. 
 
 The survey therefore involved the selection of a sample from a pre-determined population or 
population of interest (group compliance officers or heads of compliance of the central bank 
and Islamic banks in the KSA), the collection of a relatively small amount of information 
from the sample, and the use of the information to draw broad references about the 
population of interest. Such research method produces information based on real-world 
observation or the general opinion of participants in the relevant industry.37 Thus, the 
independence of the respondents that provided information enhanced the credibility of the 
results of the survey.38 The use of this method was guided by the checklist of good practice in 
the conduct and reporting of survey research provided by Kelley et al.39 The checklist assists 
budding researchers in producing work with credible results. The checklist requires a 
researcher to ensure that they are knowledgeable about the research problem, the study has a 
wide base with the exploration of related areas, the research method does not limit the 
questions that can be asked, the respondents are able to answer the questions, and the 
questions, whether open or closed, should not have been answered satisfactorily in previous 
                                                
36 See DA De Vaus, Surveys in Social Research (6th edn, Allen & Unwin 2014) chapters 7 and 8. 
37 JO Oyebanji, ‘Research and Philosophies’ in HA Saliu and JO Oyebanji (eds), A Guide on Research Proposal 
and Report Writing (University of Ilorin Press 2004) 41. 
38 MG Murgan, ‘A Critical Analysis of the Techniques for Data Gathering in Legal Research’ (2015) 3 Journal 
of Social Sciences and Humanities 266, 269. 
39 K Kelley, BCV Brown and J Sitzia, ‘Good Practice in the Conduct and Reporting of Survey Research’ (2003) 
15 International Journal for Quality in Health Case 261, 262-265. 
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studies. Kelley et al also recommend that the questionnaire should be clear and well 
presented, and clear instructions should be given to the respondents to make the questionnaire 
easier to follow and complete.40 A copy of the questionnaire used for this study is provided in 
Appendix I.  
 
The researcher also ensured that all ethical concerns were addressed. Thus, the respondents’ 
autonomy and right to confidentiality was respected. Also, the first part of the questionnaire 
used provided a description of the research aims. This ensured that the respondents were fully 
informed about the aim of the survey and their consent was properly obtained. The researcher 
also enquired from the regulator of the KSA, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), 
about legal requirements on data protection in the KSA in order to ensure that the survey 
adhered to all requirements. 
1.6.2 The Tripartite Analysis 
 
As noted above in 1.6, the analysis was conducted at three levels. The researcher therefore 
adopted the traditional tripartite analysis of knowledge that involves showing that a 
contention held by commentators is justified if it is true, the commentators believe it is true, 
and are justified in holding that it is true. In this context, what is true is epistemological, 
implying that what is true is what is known; given that not all truths are established truths. 
Hence, to ‘know’ something is factive.41 Knowledge provides access to a fact. This thesis 
establishes the truth condition by critically reviewing the extant literature on the resilience of 
Islamic banking to financial crises, and the performance of Islamic banks in comparison to 
conventional banks. Hence, at the first level of the tripartite analysis, it seeks to establish 
whether it is true that Islamic banks are more resilient. In light of the above, this may be 
understood as ascertaining the knowledge of commentators regarding the resilience of 
Islamic banks to financial crises. 
 
                                                
40 See also, T Hutchinson, Researching and Writing in Law (2nd edn, Law Book Co 2006) 54. 
41 The knowledge is based on a presupposition about the truth. See A Hazlett, ‘The Myth of Factive Verbs’ 
(2010) 80 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 497, 498. 
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At the second level of the tripartite analysis, the researcher sought to establish the belief 
condition. Belief in this context means high confidence in the veracity of the claim.42 Thus, 
knowledge does not necessarily translate into belief.43 Many commentators may know some 
Islamic banks that were more resilient than conventional banks to the financial crisis of 2007-
09. This does not necessarily imply that they believe that Islamic banks are generally more 
resilient than conventional banks, regardless of the context. Thus, commentators may see 
from their findings that Islamic banks are more resilient, but they may not believe that the 
findings are generalisable. The belief condition was established by analysing the contention 
that Islamic banks are more resilient to financial crises at the level of the State. The objective 
was to determine whether commentators are highly confident that Islamic banks may be 
accommodated within the same legal and regulatory framework as conventional banks and 
perform better with regard to risk management and resilience. 
 
The third level of the analysis requires determining whether the belief is justified. This is 
certainly the most difficult task in a tripartite analysis of knowledge given that belief might 
be true although it is formed improperly. This implies that the belief is appropriate in an 
epistemic sense, although it may not be justified under all circumstances. The belief has the 
property of being justified, regardless of whether the person who holds the belief engaged in 
the activity of justifying the belief. Alston therefore noted that ‘to turn to justification, the 
first point is that we will be working with the concept of a subject S’s being justified in 
believing that p, rather than with the concept of S’s justifying a belief.’44 However, Almeder 
argued that being justified is not something that can be separated as a matter of ordinary 
course from the activity of being able to give reasons when asked the question ‘How do you 
know?’45 This thesis adopts a more general approach to justification. Hence, it holds that 
factors that are both internal and external to the subject are relevant for justification. In other 
words, it attempts to determine whether the justification is both propositional (whether 
commentators have sufficient reasons to believe in a proposition) and doxastic (whether the 
                                                
42 See J Fantl and M McGrath, Knowledge in an Uncertain World (Oxford University Press 2009) 141; J 
Gibbons, The Norm of Belief (Oxford University Press 2013) 201; J Nagel, ‘Epistemic Anxiety and Adaptive 
Invariantism’ (2010) 24 Philosophical Perspectives 407, 413-414. 
43 See B Myers-Schulz and E Schwitzgebel, ‘Knowing that P without Believing that P’ (2013) 47 Nous 371, 
372-383; D Rose and J Schaffer, ‘Knowledge Entails Dispositional Belief’ (2013) 166 Philosophical Studies 19, 
20-48. 
44 W Alston, Perceiving God. The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Cornell University Press 1991) 71. No 
emphasis added. 
45 R Almeder, Harmless Naturalism: The Limits of Science and the Nature of Philosophy (Open Court 1999) 92. 
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belief is appropriately held).46 Given that the previous levels deal with the external factors 
and doxastic justification, the third level focuses on the internal factors and propositional 
justification. Thus, it adopts a heuristic approach and analyses the subjective experiences of 
four banks in the KSA, two Islamic banks and two conventional banks. The objective is to 
determine whether features of the experiences of Islamic banks provide sufficient reasons to 
hold that Islamic banks are more resilient to financial crises than conventional banks. 
 
1.7 Thesis Structure 
 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters, the first being this introduction that highlights the 
aim, objectives, research questions, and methodologies of the research. The following six 
chapters consist of the foundational background and substantive analysis of this thesis, 
focusing on the development, regulation, and resilience of the conventional and Islamic 
banking systems, the problems faced with the 2007-09 financial crisis in regard to risk 
management, and the lessons to be learned for future regulatory reform.  
 
Chapter two situates the reader in the global financial environment. It details the evolution of 
the conventional and Islamic banking systems, including defining key concepts, such as 
resilience and financial crises. It also briefly examines notable events including the global 
financial crisis of 2007-09, and the growing interaction between the two systems with 
increased international trade and development. This essential background information forms 
the foundation for the substantive analysis. The goal of this Chapter is to map the accurate 
profile of the Islamic financial institution that was more resilient to the global financial crisis 
in order to determine whether it matches the profile of institutions that are generally more 
resilient to financial crises. This Chapter also conducts a critical review of the extant 
literature to ascertain which institutions are generally more vulnerable. This is followed by an 
attempt to ascertain which institutions were more vulnerable during the global financial 
crisis. It analyses a wide range of studies that have compared the impact of the crisis on 
Islamic and conventional or non-Islamic institutions and synthesizes the findings of these 
studies to provide evidence to confirm or refute the argument (from a general perspective) 
that Islamic financial institutions are more resilient to financial crises than conventional or 
                                                
46 See C Wright, ‘Warrant for Nothing (And Foundations for Free)?’ (2004) 78 Aristotelian Society 
Supplementary Volume 167, 167-212. 
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non-Islamic institutions. It therefore attempts to ascertain whether there is doxastic 
justification for this claim. 
 
Chapter three tests the argument that Islamic banks are more resilient to financial crises than 
conventional banks because they have better risk management strategies. It examines the 
concept of risk management and different categories of financial and non-financial risks and 
ascertains their causal relationship with financial crises. It also considers effective ways of 
managing the risks and assesses the strategies used by Islamic banks to manage the risks. The 
aim is to determine whether their resilience to financial crises may be attributed to their risk 
management strategies. 
 
Chapter four explores the theory that financing structures set up within the Shariah-compliant 
profit and loss sharing (PLS) or profit sharing agreements enable Islamic banks to operate a 
sounder gearing process, maintain, measure and monitor appropriate credit administration, 
and ensure better risk control. The analysis is based on the contention that equity-based 
contracts, namely the Mudaraba and Musharaka, are the primary modes of financing on the 
PLS basis, supplemented by fixed-return sales-based and assets-based modes. The Chapter 
analyses equity-based primary modes of financing and discusses how the mix of risks that 
emerge from the modes are managed using sales-based and assets-based instruments. 
Emphasis is placed on the Murabaha and Ijara. It then submits that the use of the equity-
based instruments makes Islamic banks resilient to financial crises. 
 
Chapter five verifies the observation that Islamic banks using PLS modes are more resilient 
to financial crises by critically assessing their performance in comparison to conventional 
banks in the unique regulatory environment of the KSA. It analyses the legal and regulatory 
framework that accommodates Islamic banks and conventional banks, and assesses the 
measures taken by the policymakers and regulator of the KSA to ensure that regulations take 
into account specific risks that emanate from the range of Shariah-compliant products and 
services. Emphasis is placed on Basel standards and approaches. An attempt is made to 
compare the performance of Islamic banks and conventional banks during financial crises 
within this unique regulatory environment. The aim is to determine whether a financial crisis 
such as that of 2007-09 may be triggered by interest-free Islamic banks using PLS modes of 
financing. Also, a further attempt is made to determine whether the use of these modes of 
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financing in the United States would have prevented the crisis, and if so, how Islamic banks 
may also be accommodated within the regulatory framework of the United States. 
 
Chapter six examines the risk management strategies of four banks of the KSA and attempts 
to determine whether the Islamic banks of the sample manage risk better and are more 
resilient to financial crises than the conventional banks. Emphasis is placed on compliance 
risk. It examines the concept of compliance risk and the features and expectations of the 
compliance function. It shows how the four banks use risk management processes that 
involve identifying, monitoring, managing and reporting the risks. Given that the annual 
reports of the banks paint positive pictures of their ability to withstand adverse conditions, an 
attempt was made to look beyond the annual reports by conducting a survey of the stress tests 
carried out by the banks. The results of the survey of the stress tests are discussed and 
analysed. 
 
Finally, chapter seven concludes this report with a brief summary of the findings. It shows 
how the research aims and objectives were achieved, and research questions answered. It 
discusses limitations of the study and makes recommendations for further studies.  
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Chapter 2: 
Determining Whether Islamic Banks are More Resilient in the Extant 
Literature 
2.1 Introduction 
 
It has previously been demonstrated that the type of bank, the size and location of the bank, 
reliance on interbank or cross-border funding are important factors that determine a bank’s 
vulnerability during financial crises.47 Some banks are therefore move vulnerable to failure 
during crises because of the way they are structured or allowed to deploy capital or extend 
credit to borrowers in the areas in which they are located. However, all financial institutions 
of the same size or in the same location are not equally vulnerable to failure during financial 
crises. This Chapter conducts a critical review of the extant literature to ascertain which 
institutions are generally more vulnerable. This is followed by an attempt to ascertain which 
institutions were more vulnerable during the global financial crisis between 2007 and 2009. It 
then analyses a wide range of studies that have compared the impact of the crisis on Islamic 
and conventional or non-Islamic institutions and synthesises the findings of these studies to 
provide evidence to confirm or refute the argument that Islamic financial institutions are 
more resilient to financial crises than conventional or non-Islamic institutions. The objective 
is to map an accurate profile of the Islamic financial institution that was more resilient to the 
global financial crisis in order to determine whether it matches the profile of institutions that 
are generally more resilient to financial crises. The Chapter however begins with an attempt 
to circumscribe the meanings of the terms ‘financial crisis,’ ‘resilience’ and ‘Islamic 
banking’. It discusses some important categories of financial crises, factors that enhance the 
resilience of financial institutions, fundamentals of Islamic banks and how they are 
distinguished from conventional banks. The objective is to show what these terms mean 
within the claim that Islamic banks are more resilient to financial crises than conventional 
banks. 
                                                
47 See for example, P Lall, ‘Resilience of Small Banks Compared with Large Banks: Evidence from the 2007-
2013 US Financial Crisis’ (2015) 4 International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management 14; P 
McGuire and G von Peter, The Resilience of Banks’ International Operations (BIS 2016); L Ratnovski and R 
Huang, ‘Why Are Canadian Banks More Resilient?’ (2009) IMF Working Paper WP/09/152; M Adalet, ‘Were 
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(2009) Tusiad-Koc University Working Paper 0911. Available at: 
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2.2 What Constitutes a ‘Financial Crisis’? 
 
This term ‘financial crisis’ is broad and generic for it encompasses multidimensional 
situations in which financial assets lose a substantial part of their nominal value.48 It is 
difficult to characterise the situations using a single indicator. Some financial crises are 
characterised by mismatches in maturities and major currencies between bank liabilities and 
assets,49 whilst others are characterised by large off-balance sheet exposures in the banking 
sector.50 The difficulty in characterising the situations may be due to the fact that the term 
‘crisis’ is itself amorphous and simply describes the culmination of a development that 
threatens society.51  Hence, crisis does not pre-exist in society, but it is created in observation 
structures. This explains why public perception and confidence play a crucial role in 
sustaining the stability of the financial system.52 As such, where the public is optimistic about 
economic recovery, they are more likely to trust and participate in the financial market, 
thereby reducing the likelihood of a financial crisis.53 
 
Nonetheless, financial crises may be classified into two broad categories, namely crises that 
use quantitative definitions; and crises that depend on qualitative analyses.54 The first 
category of crises comprises currency and sudden stop (capital account or balance of 
payment) crises, while the second group includes debt and banking crisis. The currency crisis 
results in devaluating the country’s national currency,55 while the banking crisis diminishes 
                                                
48 See M Chanakira, ‘The Impact of Financial Crises’ in JL Leon-Manriquez and T Moyo (eds), The Global 
Financial and Economic Crisis in the South: Impact and Responses (CORDESRIA 2015) 189; AK Vaidya, 
Globalization: Encyclopedia of Trade, Labor and Politics (ABC-CLIO 2006) 25; S Claessens and MA Kose, 
‘Financial Crises: Explanations, Types, and Implications’ (2013) International Monetary Fund Working Paper, 
WP/13/28. Available at: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp1328.pdf  [16 October 2017] 5. 
49 Currency and maturity mismatches played an important role in the Asian financial crisis in the 1990s. See 
CM Reinhart and KS Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton University 
Press 2009).  
50 This is one of the central causes of the subprime crisis in 2007 and also a major cause of banking crisis in 14 
OECD countries. See D Karim, I Liadze, R Barrel and E Davis, ‘Off-balance Sheet Exposures and Banking 
Crises in OECD Countries’ (2013) 9(4) Journal of Financial Stability 673, 673-681. 
51 AJ Chournazidis, ‘The Financial Crisis and the Concept of Risk in the European Union’ (2014) 148 Procedia 
– Social and Behavioral Sciences 315, 316. 
52 D Singh and JR LaBross, ‘Developing a Framework for Effective Financial Crisis Management’ (2012) 2011 
Journal of Financial Market Trends 2, 3. 
53 JE Scalera and MD Dixon, ‘Crisis of Confidence: The 2008 Global Financial Crisis and Public Trust in the 
European Central Bank’ (2016) 17 European Politics and Society 388, 389-400. See also, TC Earle, ‘Trust, 
Confidence, and the 2008 Global Financial Crisis’ (2009) 29 Risk Analysis 785, 785-792. 
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Comparison’ (2008) 98 American Economic Review 339, 340. 
55 C Borio and P Lowe, ‘Assessing the Risk of Banking Crises’ (December 2002) BIS Quarterly Review 43, 45. 
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the value of bank assets.56 Other crises related to adverse debt dynamics such as sovereign 
crises may be classified in either category. The sovereign crisis impacts the financial and 
economic fields of a State when its banks are not able to pay debts.57 This may be because of 
the banks’ exposures to government debt, and the inability of the government to support 
troubled banks.58 Thus, other classifications are possible. It must also be noted that they 
sometimes overlap in types. For example, between 1970 and 2011, both mature and emerging 
economies were frequently exposed to currency crises that subsequently escalated into 
banking crises.59 Notwithstanding, what is important here is that the crises impact different 
financial institutions and systems in different ways. This section therefore seeks to ascertain 
the way in which different types of financial crises discussed above may affect different 
systems and institutions. 
 
2.2.1 Banking Crisis 
A banking crisis can occur when banks make themselves vulnerable through overexposure to 
specific asset categories, such as equities or real estate.60 However, the underlying cause of 
the crisis is the low interest rate policy applied by the central bank of a specific state which 
adversely affects the margin and profitability of commercial banks and increases liquidity and 
credit risks.61 There may also be a link between the banking crisis and the international 
current account imbalances. For example when account surpluses in emerging Asian 
countries matched the deficiency in the United States and other major advanced deficit 
countries, the latter started borrowing this surplus of savings in their national banks to pay 
their debts, resulting in a banking crisis in the long run.62 As such, account surpluses in 
emerging market economies may fuel risk-taking in advanced deficit markets and exert 
significant downward pressure on global interest rates.63 Borio & Lowe point out that many 
                                                
56 M Obstfeld, ‘Models of Currency Crises with Self-Fulfilling Features' (1996) 40 European Economic Review 
1037, 1037-1047. 
57 Committee on the Global Financial System, ‘The Impact of Sovereign Credit Risk on Bank Funding 
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banking crises after the Asian crisis lowered the quality of bank assets such as interest-
bearing loans, as in the case of mortgages.64 However, Borio & Disyatat argued that this 
focus on current accounts is misleading because it reflects the failure to distinguish between 
financing and saving. The financial crisis was, in their opinion, caused by disruptions in 
financing channels and not saving or investment flows.65 Notwithstanding, they posit that the 
main cause of financial crises is the failure of the monetary and financial regimes to prevent 
the build-up of unsustainable credit.66 
 
Other commentators have maintained that banking crises have become more common as a 
result of various imbalances in the way funds are distributed, and decisions made when 
granting loans.67 The lack of consistency in such decisions is believed to create imbalances in 
distributing funds.68 This leads to banking vulnerabilities in funding composition in terms of 
currency, maturity and the type of funding instrument used.69 As van Rixtel and Criado and 
Borio explain, a financial crisis often creates severe issues with the structure of the financial 
instruments and the quality of the underlying assets, including mortgage-backed securities 
(MBS) and asset-backed commercial papers (ABCP).70 In addition, van Rixtel and Gasperini 
note that most academic commentary suggests that innovations in bank funding instruments 
are a major contributor for the occurrence of global financial crisis, particularly the 2007-09 
financial global crisis.71 These innovations include reduced incentives for lenders, increased 
loan delinquency rates, securitisation undercutting credit standards, and hidden increases in 
de facto leverage.72 Financial innovations linked to financial market imperfections are also 
considered to be a major contributor to the real estate and credit booms in the US that led to 
                                                
64 C Borio and P Lowe, ‘Assessing the Risk of Banking Crises’ (December 2002) BIS Quarterly Review 43. 
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the global financial crisis of 2007–09.73 Nonetheless, all systems are vulnerable to the crisis 
caused by innovations in bank funding instruments. This is because different policies in 
different jurisdictions may reduce incentives for lenders or increase loan delinquency rates 
and hidden increases in de facto leverage. 
 
When a financial crisis occurs, a number of the loans default, and because the price of loan 
securities is then low, banks are unable to liquidate these assets without making a loss. This 
causes a vicious cycle in the operation of the banks in the midst of a crisis. Furthermore, 
throughout a financial crisis, the price of these types of asset continues to decline, with non-
performing loans wearing down the financial strength of the banking sector. Nonetheless, 
although all systems are vulnerable to banking crises, some systems are more vulnerable than 
others. Equally, some financial institutions are more vulnerable to failures during banking 
crises. Financial institutions that are exposed to liquidity and credit risk for example are 
adversely affected by low interest rate policies, which are among the main causes of banking 
crises. In the same vein, financial institutions that are prone to excessive risk taking are more 
likely to be adversely affected by global account imbalances. Even if we agree with Borio 
and Disyatat that the focus on account imbalances is misleading, it may be contended that 
financial institutions that have a serious credit exposure (with non-performing loans) are 
more vulnerable to disruptions in financing channels. It follows that the argument that Islamic 
banks are more resilient to financial crises may be interpreted as implying that Islamic banks 
manage liquidity and credit risk better and are less prone to excessive risk taking. 
2.2.2 Currency Crisis  
 
A currency crisis, similar to the banking crisis, can also result from the over-reliance of banks 
on external funding where doubt arises over the ability of the country’s central bank to cover 
the country’s fixed foreign exchange rate.74 This eventually leads to a decline in the country’s 
currency value.75 The currency crisis may damage a country’s economy where the decline in 
value means more units of the country’s currency are needed to buy a given amount of 
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goods.76 When this happens, investors in the country seek ways to withdraw their money. 
When the withdrawal results in an exodus of capital and financial assets on a large scale, it is 
known as capital flight.77 After selling their investments in the local currency, investors 
convert the local currency into foreign currency which in turn further worsens the financial 
situation.78 This occurred during the Southeast Asian Crisis of 1997,79 after a large influx in 
foreign investment led to a rapid economic growth and an increase in Southeast Asia exports. 
Countries such as Thailand then became heavily reliant on foreign investment from one 
single country, the US, as their main source of funding.80 However, when the US increased 
its domestic interest rate, the amount of funding going to Thailand decreased, plunging the 
country’s economy into turmoil as it was unable to pay off its foreign debt. The turmoil may 
therefore be explained by a variety of risks to which financial institutions in Thailand were 
vulnerable, including currency crisis risk which may result from an exchange rate 
depreciation. It may also have a great impact on a country’s banking system and lead to 
precipitating a banking crisis. 81 
 
It follows that financial institutions or systems that are over-reliant on external funding are 
more vulnerable to failure when the interest rates of the external sources are increased 
thereby reducing external funding. This aligns with the contention above that that financial 
institutions that have a serious credit exposure are more vulnerable to disruptions in financing 
channels. Apart from the banking crisis and currency crisis, there are other types of financial 
crises which may not be categorised under both groups. One of such crisis that seriously 
impacts on financial institutions is the sovereign crisis. 
 
2.2.3 Sovereign Crisis 
A sovereign debt crisis, as explained by the Committee on the Global Financial System 
(CGFS), is the failure of a State to pay its debt which may then lead to economic and 
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financial problems for the State.82 Such a crisis arises due to a combination of many factors, 
including very high debt levels, low economic growth in a country generally considered 
uncompetitive, high labour costs, and high inflation. Essentially, these factors are indicators 
of low export demand, high current account deficits and low economic growth. In such a 
situation, conventional banks in the affected country tend to hold substantial government debt 
securities because they represent lower risk. A good example of government debt securities 
that attract banks is the bond issued in the European Union (EU) in domestic currency as 
directed by the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD).83 Given that the 25% limit on asset 
holdings specified by the CRD does not apply to government bonds issued in the domestic 
currency,84 it follows that in the event of a sovereign debt crisis, a number of banks lose 
capital when the government is unable to pay its debts.85 This has a negative impact on the 
asset column of the bank’s balance sheet, and consequently affects profitability and 
funding.86 Furthermore, the sovereign debt crisis affects the ability of banks to lend money to 
cover debts because foreign entities and even other countries tend to back away from 
assisting the institutions due to the debt crisis.87 Hence, banks struggle to acquire the credit 
resources they need as their money in the government is not forthcoming and other financial 
entities are unwilling to extend a helping hand .88 This ultimately reduces the overall ability 
of the banks to secure funding. As Caruana and Avdjiev point out, a sovereign debt crisis 
influences not only the banks’ access to funding, but also the cost of funding,89 inducing 
further negative effects including the inability of banks to fulfil their obligations,90 and 
reducing the funding benefits from implicit and explicit government guarantees.  
 
It may then be contended that financial institutions that hold substantial government debt 
securities are more vulnerable to failure during a sovereign debt crisis. This is because they 
are more likely to lose capital when the government defaults. Also, banks with too much debt 
are generally more vulnerable in an uncompetitive market with low economic growth, and 
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high labour costs and inflation. However, in systems where banks hold substantial 
government debt securities, the negative impact of a financial crisis that takes the form of a 
sovereign debt crisis is more severe on banks. In such systems, the banks that hold substantial 
government securities may be said to be less resilient to crises.  
 
Nonetheless, from the above, it may be contended that any financial crisis, whether it is a 
banking, currency, or sovereign crisis, has a direct negative impact on financial and economic 
levels of any State. Debts will mount, assets will be liquidated, the foreign currency exchange 
will become vulnerable, and inflation will dramatically increase along with low productivity 
and high unemployment levels. This phenomenon is what is referred to ‘financial crisis’ in 
this study. Since all financial institutions are not equally vulnerable to failure during these 
crises, it may be argued that some institutions are more resilient than others. As noted above, 
the institutions that are more vulnerable are those exposed to liquidity and credit risk, prone 
to excessive risk taking, over-reliant on external funding, and hold substantial government 
debt securities. However, it must be noted that the nature of the regulatory environment also 
determines the financial institution’s vulnerability to failure. This is because in a jurisdiction 
where institutions are allowed to sell their assets and return to target leverage, their 
vulnerability to crises is substantially reduced.91 Thus, in some regulatory environments, 
exposure to sovereign debt does not necessarily make the institution more vulnerable, 
whereas in other jurisdictions, reliance on external funding may actually make an institution 
more resilient. Thus, the question of resilience depends on the circumstances of each case. In 
the same vein, it will be shown that the legal or compliance risk is the most important risk in 
assessing the resilience of banks. As such, assessing the resilience of different banks requires 
comparing the way banks within the same regulatory environment manage risks (including 
legal or compliance risk).  In light of the above delineation of the term ‘financial crisis’, it is 
important to note that focus will generally be on the ‘global financial crisis’ that lasted from 
2007 to 2009. Hence, the resilience of Islamic and conventional banks will be determined in 
light of how they were affected by this financial crisis. The next section further delineates 
what is referred to as the 2007-09 global financial crisis in this study.92 
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2.2.4 The 2007-09 Global Financial Crisis 
 
During what has been described as the ‘worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of 
the early 1930s,’93 banks experienced major vulnerabilities in their funding models, in both 
funding costs and the funding market. This resulted mainly from mismatches between the 
liabilities and assets held by large internationally active banks, which subsequently rendered 
lenders unable to meet their financial obligations.94 Kalemli-Ozcan notes that investment-
oriented banks and other financial institutions were forced to leverage their funding structure 
through short-term wholesale funding via mechanisms such as the commercial paper and repo 
(repurchase agreement) markets.95 This unfavourable market situation stemmed from banks 
receiving less money than they would have received without the crisis. This resulted 
ultimately in an unfavourable funding market, with strong asset growth supported only by 
lower levels of equity/capital. In banking, capital is the source of funding and thus the driving 
force of their activities.96 Without capital, banks cannot sustain operations and must 
consequently leave the market. Banks will therefore do whatever is necessary to secure 
funding, and desperation may force them to sell their assets at a loss simply to gather enough 
funds to run the institution. If they lack foreign assets to sell, they must obtain external 
assistance at any cost, and external investors will seek high rewards for what they consider a 
risky venture.97 Bank funding aims to raise equity levels to gain more assets that eventually 
bring in profits, with the equity acting as a cushion to prevent the bank from incurring losses.  
Among the most important causes of the 2007–09 global financial crisis are excessive 
lending by banks over an extended period,98 securitisation problems, imprudent mortgage 
lending, market-to-market accounting, the housing bubble,99 rating agencies, a failure in risk 
management, excessive short-term incentives, a global financial imbalance, deregulatory 
legislation, off-balance sheet financing, human frailty, lack of transparency, complex 
financial instruments, financial innovation, and the government-mandated subprime 
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lending.100 The US housing boom had resulted in a high demand for the subprime mortgage 
market. Subprime borrowers (notably individuals without assets, income or employment) 
were offered mortgages by subprime lenders who believed there would be an influx of 
interest and thus profits. Of course, many subprime borrowers welcomed this move with open 
arms and rushed to apply for these mortgages.101 However, all too soon, market 
circumstances changed, predominantly owing to the Federal Reserve raising interest rates. 
The summer of 2007 witnessed notable tensions in the US subprime mortgage markets. Too 
many loans had been distributed to those unable to repay them, and lenders began defaulting 
on their payments. However, because these mortgages had undergone securitisation, legal 
claims over them lay not with the banks but with third parties. Securitisation is a financial 
innovation that allows banks to transform illiquid assets (such as mortgages) into securities 
products which can be sold to investors who receive an income stream from the long-term 
repayment of underlying loans. These securities were created not only with creditworthy 
mortgages but also sub-prime mortgages. Accordingly, when sub-prime borrowers started to 
default in the US from the beginning of 2007, this resulted in the collapse of the mortgage 
backed-securities market. Inter-bank lending then contracted to prevent further liabilities. 
Market uncertainty became rife, with many banks reluctant to risk further reduction in their 
capital reserves by providing loans to other banks, or loaning only at very high rates, 
producing a dramatic decline in interbank lending.102 With subprime borrowers unable to 
repay their loans, subprime lenders experienced massive losses, and from 2007 at least one 
subprime lender filed for bankruptcy each month.103  
With the onset of the collapse of the banking industry, it was clear that the market could not 
solve the subprime mortgage issue on its own, and the problem began to spread into the 
international scene.104 The British bank, Northern Rock, for example, was dependent on the 
interbank market; and as this experienced a decline, it sought funding assistance from the 
Bank of England due to the liquidity problems it was facing. By then, many central banks and 
States had begun crisis talks.105 These discussions between different States led to a 
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unanimous agreement to offer liquidity to troubled financial institutions to revive the 
interbank market.106 Thus, although US banks were affected through their short-term 
wholesale funding, as Adrian & Shin note,107 the problem spread to banks in the UK because 
they too depended on short-term wholesale funding.108 With rising solvency concerns, bank 
shares were falling worldwide, forcing international banks to seek local sources of financing 
in the countries where they operated.109 
As such, the financial institutions that were vulnerable to failure during the global financial 
crisis were those exposed to liquidity and credit risk due to over-reliance on short-term 
wholesale funding, viz., foreign deposits and foreign funds. Also vulnerable were financial 
institutions that were prone to excessive risk taking such as those that issued subprime loans 
with a much higher risk of default. These troubled institutions were then unable to sell their 
assets or obtain liquidity from local sources in order to return to target leverage. However, 
although financial institutions that were exposed to liquidity and credit risk or prone to 
excessive risk taking, over-reliant on external funding, and held substantial government debt 
securities were more vulnerable to failure during the financial crisis, it does not necessarily 
follow that the institutions that were less exposed to these risks were more resilient to the 
crisis. This is because in many jurisdictions, all banks were adversely affected by the crisis. 
As noted above, in some countries, market uncertainty became rife, with many banks 
reluctant to risk further reduction in their capital reserves by providing loans to other banks, 
or loaning only at very high rates, producing a dramatic decline in interbank lending. 
 
Nonetheless, this section has sought to delineate the terms of financial crisis and global 
financial crisis as used in this study. This sets the theoretical ground for determining whether 
the argument that Islamic banks are more resilient to financial crises is sufficiently justified in 
the existing literature. In the same vein, the next step is to determine what is meant by 
resilience in the argument. Thus, the next section seeks to delineate the concept of resilience. 
It attempts to determine what commentators generally refer to as resilient to financial crises, 
and why it is important to increase the resilience of financial system.  
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2.3 What Constitutes ‘Resilience to Financial Crises’? 
Commentators have always paid close attention to the relationship between bank risks and 
business model characteristics. Prior to the 2007–09 crisis, many studies focused on the 
relationship between bank risk and key factors such as capital,110 corporate governance,111 
financial markets,112 diversification113 and operating efficiency.114 However, many studies 
completed after the 2007–09 financial crisis have centred on understanding bank performance 
using stock market information. Peni and Vahamaa115 and Ellul and Yerramilli116 for example 
discuss internal risk control and the corporate governance of banks during the crisis. Beck et 
al117 and Beltratti and Stulz118 on their part analysed how banks with high Tier I capital (a 
core measure of overall financial strength from a regulator’s perspective, consisting primarily 
of disclosed reserves and common stock) and a greater loan-to-asset ratio survived the early 
stages of the crisis, and found that higher returns during the crisis were linked to more liquid 
assets and a larger deposit base. As will be shown below, there is much empirical evidence on 
how specific aspects of bank business models and risk management strategies influenced 
performance during the crisis. Thus, various business models and their association with bank 
risk make certain banks more resilient to financial crises. The 2007-09 financial crisis alerted 
regulators across the globe to the importance of enhancing the resilience of financial 
institutions within their respective jurisdictions in order to protect local depositors and 
preserve the soundness of the financial system.119 In this light, many studies have proposed 
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regulatory initiatives or standards that may improve existing regulatory approaches.120 The 
proposals are based on the proportions of the various types of asset that ought to be held by 
banks, the distribution of debt and equity that constitutes the banks’ finance, how transactions 
are financed, and the strategies used to generate income. This study captures the key findings 
of some major studies and attempts to map the profile of the financial institution that is 
resilient to financial crisis.  
2.3.1 The Profile of a Resilient Financial Institution 
2.3.1.1 Asset structure  
It has been shown that bigger banks have access to a greater quantity and range of resources 
they can use to generate greater investment returns compared to smaller banks.121 According 
to Tarashev et al.,122 Drehman and Tarashev,123 and Huang,124 the size of a bank can be a 
crucial determinant of its risk. In this regard, securitisation is very important because it helps 
banks offload loans from the asset side to finance their investments. Banks experienced rapid 
growth in off-balance sheet financing in the years preceding the crisis as a direct result of the 
massive expansion of the securitisation market. As Marques-Ibanez and Scheicher,125 and 
Shin126 explain, the rapid expansion of the securitisation market changed the business models 
of the banks, causing them to alter the incentives to hedge and take new risks. Securitisation 
may therefore turn liquid claims into marketable securities, allowing banks to offload their 
credit exposure, thereby lowering the regulatory pressure. Through securitisation, banks can 
diversify their credit risk both by sector and geographical region. Banks that were active in 
the securitisation market were found to have better capitalisation, higher profitability and 
lower insolvency risk.127 Furthermore, while securitisation can produce some static reduction 
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in risk, it may also lead to taking on new risk.128 For example, according to Nijskens and 
Wagner,129 Keys,130 and Mian & Sufi,131 securitisation often results in increased bank 
leverage and looser lending rates, which becomes systematically riskier. Nonetheless, a 
controlled amortised structure gives investors a more predictable repayment schedule.  
2.3.1.2 Capital structure 
Freixas and Rochet132 note that the literature shows contradictory effects of capital 
requirements on bank risk. If a bank has higher capital reserves, it has a stronger buffer to 
withstand losses. More capital means less leverage, which in turn reduces risk-shifting 
incentives towards excessively risky projects. Thus, banks with higher capital levels are 
incentivised to screen borrowers (by assessing their history to determine their repayment 
capability), mainly because a larger volume of lending increases overall risk. Such screening, 
however, offsets some of the risk resulting from the higher volume of lending.133 Because 
banks with high levels of capital are more likely to invest in riskier investments or in large 
numbers of different investments, thus increasing their chance of experiencing defaults and 
suffering losses. Hence, they direct additional effort into screening borrowers to prevent this 
from materialising. However, increasing leverage may reduce the likelihood of agency 
conflict, because, as Diamond and Rajan argue, debt holders want to become more efficient, 
and therefore intensify the pressure on their managers.134 According to Berger and Bouwman, 
the relationship between bank capital and risk can also be positive due to the regulators, 
because banks with more capital have a greater capacity to absorb risk.135 Nonetheless, 
generally speaking, the literature indicates a greater chance that a bank’s high-quality capital 
will increase during times of crisis, mainly owing to increased caution when making loans, 
such as by completing additional checks and risk assessments and utilising the many risk-
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related measures available, as seen during the debt crisis of 1982, which saw banks behave 
more cautiously in their lending activities.136   
2.3.1.3 Funding structure 
Since the development of financial innovations and the deregulation of the banking system, 
banks increasingly depend on the financial markets for their funding.137 They borrow 
intensively from wholesale markets through instruments such as commercial papers, 
repurchase agreements and mortgage bonds. As Shleifer and Vishny138 explain, retail 
deposits in banks are an alternative source of funding that have proved the most stable and 
efficient source during a financial crisis, as they are assured by the government and linked 
with the depositor’s liquidity needs, with predictable withdrawals at an aggregate level.139 
Importantly, retail depositors receive transaction services that are related to high switching 
costs as a result of the ‘stickiness’ of deposits.140 In this vein, flexibility for depositors 
wishing to adapt to the changes in market funding is greater in the wholesale market than in 
the retail market.  
The weight of evidence in the literature supports the benefit to banks of using market 
financing. For example, banks are able to raise large funds swiftly at a relatively low cost in 
the interbank market. Krishnan,141 Flanney and Sorescu,142 and Calomiris and Kahn143 also 
argue that financial market investors are more sophisticated than depositors, and that the 
financial markets therefore provide more market discipline. Nonetheless, wholesale funding 
has its drawbacks, as shown during the financial crisis, predominantly owing to cost-efficient 
monitoring that is not always thorough. This, in turn, gives the impression of a lack of 
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transparency and security, raising public concerns about losing their money, which can spark 
an unexpected rush of withdrawals, causing a critical liquidity risk.144  
2.3.1.4 Income structure 
Prior to the 2007–09 financial crisis, a rapid growth in credit occurred as a consequence of 
deregulation.145 This led to a high level of geographical expansion and a sharp increase in 
housing prices.146 The increase in turn caused a rise in collateral values fuelled by the strong 
credit growth.147 This explains why it has been observed that banking crises tend to be 
preceded by periods of excessive lending growth.148 The aggregate changes in lending can be 
affected by structural changes such as intense banking competition and changes in 
macroeconomic variables. As Ruckes,149 and Dell’Ariccia & Marquez150 note, banks can 
issue new lending opportunities by expanding their geographical market, loosening credit 
standards and gaining market shares. In the same vein, Keeton,151 Laeven and Majnoni152 and 
Foos et al.153 argue that microeconomic variables play a role in expanding banks’ lending 
opportunities where the loan growth of large international banks represents bank risk.  
Additional sources of revenue are available to banks as a result of the expansion of non-
interest income, such as commission, brokerage fees or trading investment banking. This 
results in a globally diversified income source for banks.154 Such diversified income sources 
help banks to create an overall stability in their general income.155 However, it is arguable 
whether heavy reliance on non-interest income reduces the overall risks faced by the banks. 
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Compared to interest income, non-interest income tends to be more volatile. In times of 
financial crises, traditional income and revenue sources can decline together with non-interest 
revenue sources. According to Altunb, non-interest income such as fees and brokerage 
charges can show a greater decline than traditional interest income.156 It can therefore be 
argued that a diversified portfolio is financially beneficial, although only for specific minor 
risks, not large systematic risk. Hence, DeYoung and Roland,157 note that the growing 
reliance on non-interest revenue sources has not reduced the volatility of bank earnings. 
However, De Jonghe argues that non-interest income is not linked to a decline in systematic 
risk for banks, based on stock market returns.158 
It is shown above that retail deposits in banks proved the most stable and efficient source of 
funding during the financial crisis because they are assured by the government and linked 
with the depositor’s liquidity needs, and with predictable withdrawals at an aggregate level. 
Also, banks that were more active in the securitisation market were found to have better 
capitalisation, higher profitability, and lower insolvency risk. Globally diversified income 
sources helped other banks to create an overall stability in their general income. In the same 
vein, banks with higher capital reserves had a stronger buffer to withstand losses, thereby 
demonstrating that more capital means less leverage, which in turn reduces risk-shifting 
incentives towards excessively risky projects. These are the characteristics of a resilient 
financial institution. 
 
Nonetheless, it remains difficult to map the accurate profile of the financial institution that 
was more resilient to the 2007-09 global financial crisis. This is because the above conclusion 
may be summarised as follows: banks with more capital have a greater capacity to absorb 
risk. However, as shown above, such banks were more likely to invest in riskier investments 
or in large numbers of different investments, which in certain cases significantly increased 
their chances of experiencing defaults and suffering losses. The banks were then compelled to 
direct additional effort into screening borrowers. Also, in times of a financial crisis, 
traditional income and revenue sources may decline together with non-interest revenue 
sources, implying that heavy reliance on non-interest income does not necessarily reduce the 
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overall risks faced by financial institutions. Thus, it is not simply a question of a bank having 
more capital to absorb risk but the bank being able to effectively manage risk. 
 
Notwithstanding, the analysis above crystallises why regulators and policymakers should 
place emphasis on risks concentrated in the most levered banks and the way they manage the 
risks. It also reveals important regulatory and supervisory challenges with regard to ensuring 
that financial institutions should not be overexposed to liquidity and credit risk, and over-
reliant on external funding. Given that Islamic financial institutions operate within the 
Shariah regulatory framework that requires the sharing of risk and essentially shuns toxic 
assets and derivatives, it is shown below that many commentators have argued that Islamic 
financial institutions are more resilient to financial crises than conventional or non-Islamic 
institutions. An attempt is made below to synthesise a wide range of studies that provide 
evidence that confirms or refutes this argument. However, it begins by determining what 
constitutes the term ‘Islamic banks’ in the contention that Islamic banks are more resilient to 
financial crises than conventional banks. Thus, it will also seek to critically assess the way in 
which Islamic banking is differentiated from conventional banking in the extant literature. 
 
2.4 What Constitutes ‘Islamic Banking’? 
It is generally uncertain why ‘Western banking’159 is often referred to as conventional 
banking. This is all the more confusing given that the concept of banking originated in the 
Middle East,160 which today is mostly Muslim. Notwithstanding, the term ‘conventional’ is 
often used to distinguish between the traditional banking system that involves deposits and 
interest-based loan services and Islamic banking that involves the provision of unusual or 
exotic products and services based on the principles of the Shariah.161 The basic concepts of 
Islamic banking therefore differ from those of conventional banking, which commentators 
such as Jobst and Sole,162 Sole,163 Qorchi,164 Siddiqi,165 and Hassan166 have striven to show in 
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their attempts to define Islamic banking. Hence, it is also referred to as Shariah-compliant 
banking, and is defined by Hassan as ‘the provision and use of financial services and products 
that conform to Islamic religion practices and law.’167 The General Secretariat of the 
Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) on its part defines the Islamic bank as ‘a financial 
institution whose status, rules and procedures expressly state its commitment to the principle 
of Islamic Shariah and to the banning of the receipt and payment of interest on any of its 
operations.’168 
Islamic banks are therefore unconventional because they are governed under Islamic law 
which is based on fairness, equity and justice in all banking transactions.169 It follows that 
many of the concepts of Islamic banks are very different from those of conventional banks. 
Under Islamic law, interest, referred to as riba, is prohibited and regarded as usury, which is 
not in accord with the Islamic concept of equity. Mehboob defines usury as ‘the obtaining of 
more money in return from the loan than the principal amount due.’170 The prohibition of riba 
may be the most significant difference between Islamic banks and conventional banks.171 
Zeineb and Mensi maintain that interest is the main cause of price increases and the creation 
of monopolies within society as it encourages the concentration of wealth while damaging 
social justice and equity.172 Instead, Islamic banks focus more on profit-loss sharing (PLS) 
arrangements. This is another significant difference between Islamic and conventional 
banking. The PLS concept is recognised as a way of sharing profits and insuring against 
loss.173 Such an arrangement means that the bank does not charge its clients interest; instead, 
it engages in asset transactions using the client’s capital, and then shares the profits with the 
client. This reflects the Islamic value of social justice and social equity. 
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As Iqbal and Mirakhor explain, the PLS agreement also reflects the Islamic values of 
cooperation, solidarity, fairness, justice and honesty.174 Therefore, while prohibiting interest-
based transactions it encourages business that generates legitimate and fair profits. As 
Khoutem and Nedra argue, PLS enables Islamic banks to provide better mobilisation of 
savings and savings rates, thus better mitigating risk through resolving information 
asymmetry.175  This encourages the integration of new projects where financial transactions 
underlie the activities of a productive economy. Iqbal and Chapra also argue that PLS ensures 
macroeconomic stability.176 Notably, non-profit-loss sharing agreements based on riba are 
subject to repetitive crises and losses, while Islamic banks can be considered ‘anti-crisis’ due 
to their profit-loss sharing agreements. Ali, Kia and Darrat confirm that PLS plays a crucial 
role in maintaining the net worth of banks under varying macroeconomic conditions and is 
pivotal in helping banks to avoid balance sheet deterioration, significantly enhancing their 
overall solidity.177 This is one of the main reasons why some commentators hold that Islamic 
banks were more resilient than conventional banks throughout the global financial crisis.178 
Nonetheless, where such a statement is made, it may be understood to imply that banking that 
is based on the principles of the Shariah is more resistant to shock than banking that involves 
deposits and interest-based loan services. The distinction between Islamic and conventional 
banking goes further than the nature of the deposits and services. The existing literature is 
rich in terms of distinguishing between both banking systems. An attempt is made in the next 
section to summarise the distinctions. 
2.4.1 The Differences between Islamic and Conventional Banking  
In addition to some of the differences discussed above, it is important note that unlike 
conventional banks, Islamic banks are more likely to be asset-based and more focused on risk 
sharing.179 Conventional banks are generally based on a high level of debt and allow the 
transfer of risk. Moreover, conventional banks collect a predetermined rate of return for their 
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investments; whereas Islamic banks normally share their profits and losses with their 
customers or investors, and do not have a guaranteed return on their investments.180 
Also, the Islamic banking sector prohibits gharar and maysir. Gait & Worthington describe 
gharar as ‘any contract for sale or purchase that includes uncertainty in genus, species, 
quantity of the object, price, time of payment in deferred sales, existence of object, and 
identity of object.’181 In the same vein, they define maysir as ‘the act of betting on the 
realisation of an event, based on subjective and future expectations, i.e. [a] high degree of 
asymmetric information.’182 As such, these are regarded as ‘gambling or games of chance.’183 
Ahmed notes that without gharar and maysir, Islamic banks have no opportunity for 
speculative behaviour, and this explains why Islamic banks were more stable than 
conventional banks during the global economic crisis.184 Table II below summarises the 
differences between Islamic and conventional banks captured in the literature. 
Table II: Overview of the differences between these two banking systems  
 
                    Conventional Banking 
 
Islamic Banking 
 
 
Ø  The notion of ‘time value of money’ 
and the associated risk determine 
how money is priced.185 
 
Ø Money is not priced because it is not 
considered to be a commodity, 
product or service. It also cannot be 
resorted to for price borrowing or 
financing (i.e. interest). 
 
 
Ø Financial assets are the main focus 
of transactions. 
 
Ø Real assets are the main focus of 
transactions. 
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Ø In the case of money loans, a fixed 
interest rate considered as the 
financial institution’s liability is 
offered to the party. 
 
Ø Enormous importance is attributed to 
the conditions of share of profits and 
losses among the financial institution 
and the holders of investment 
accounts, with investment accounts 
considered not as debt but as quasi 
equity.  
 
 
Ø Defaulting may attract extra costs, 
such as fines and compounded 
interest. 
 
Ø No extra costs can be imposed by 
Islamic Financial Institutions (IFIs). 
Fines are given to charity and 
occasionally reimbursement is 
provided if the accounts are settled 
early. 
 
 
Ø The financial institution adopts the 
role of creditor while the client is the 
debtor. 
 
Ø IFIs play the role of investor, 
partner, trader, buyer and seller, 
lessor and lessee in relation to their 
clients. 
 
 
Ø  Deposit guarantee is an obligation 
of standard banks. 
 
 
Ø  Deposits are guaranteed by IFIs 
solely for current accounts. 
 
Ø The financial institutions’ liquidity 
management and investment 
practices sometimes remain 
 
Ø IFIs ensure that their activities are 
transparent to investment account 
holders who also participate in 
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unknown to depositors, although 
Basel III addresses this issue as 
shown in Chapter 6. 
 
projects using their money. 
 
 
Ø Some level of risk is attached to 
most banking transactions. 
 
Ø Practices and transactions that are 
speculative regarding outcome 
and/or implementation or delivery 
timing are strictly prohibited. 
 
Ø The nature of clients’ business is not 
important, provided that it is not 
illegal. 
 
 
Ø IFIs do not undertake transactions 
with businesses contravening Islamic 
precepts (e.g. gambling, cigarette or 
alcoholic beverage production, etc.). 
 
 
Ø Standard financial institutions do not 
engage in Zakat.186  
 
Ø  Aside from undertaking Zakat 
payment, IFIs also serve as Zakat 
collection centres. 
 
 
Ø The priority is provision of loans and 
recovery with compounding interest. 
 
 
Ø The priority is participation in 
partnership organisations. 
 
 
In light of the above, it may be contended that there are clear differences between Islamic and 
conventional banking systems, and the argument that Islamic banks are more resilient to 
financial crises is based on the notion that the above features of Islamic banking increases the 
resilience of a bank. Thus, regulators and supervisors in jurisdictions that host only 
conventional banks may enhance the resilience of these banks by adopting and enforcing 
standards that are Shariah-compliant. Given the delineation of what constitutes a financial 
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crisis, the mapping of the features of the financial institution that is more resilient to financial 
crises, the next section critically examines studies that have concluded that Islamic banks are 
more resilient. It seeks to determine whether their conclusions are justified. The analysis 
considers the methodologies used in these studies, as well as the context in which Islamic and 
conventional banks were compared or contrasted. 
 
2.5 Are Islamic Banks More Resilient? 
The literature provides considerable empirical evidence regarding the resilience and stability 
of Islamic banking, as well as the factors that enhance the economic safety, stability and 
robustness of Islamic banks in comparison to conventional banks. Many studies hold that 
during the 2007-09 financial crisis specifically, Islamic banks proved to be more resistant 
than conventional banks as the former were able to achieve higher growth rates in loans and 
assets, and their equity vulnerability was fairly limited compared to that of conventional 
banks. One of the first studies to examine the solidity of Islamic versus conventional banks 
during the 2007-09 global financial crisis was conducted by Cihak and Hesse.187 They found 
that Islamic banks in eighteen countries generally demonstrated greater solidity than 
conventional banks. This finding closely reflected the results of the study conducted by that 
Hasan and Dridi which revealed that Islamic banks experienced higher growth in loans and 
assets than conventional banks during the financial crisis.188 They noted that Islamic banks 
had only limited exposure to the adverse impact of the financial crisis, although they became 
progressively weaker in 2009 than conventional banks.189  
 
From a broader perspective, Shafique, Faheem & Abdullah observed that most banks 
throughout the world were badly affected by the global financial crisis, including Islamic 
banks. However, ultimately, he concluded that Islamic banks performed better financially and 
faced lower risks due to their interest-free nature.190 Subsequently, Boumediene and Caby191 
also found that Islamic banks were more resilient during the 2007-09 financial crisis, 
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although they were not well protected from the negative impact of the crisis’ aftermath. 
Hence, like Hasan and Didri, they found that Islamic banks were more resistant to the initial 
financial shock. They examined the operations of Islamic and conventional banks in different 
Muslim countries including Turkey, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, 
Qatar, Kuwait, Jordan and Bahrain, and reported that Islamic banks were affected differently 
from conventional banks in 2008, showing stronger resilience during the crisis period from 
2007 to 2009 due to their lower leverage, higher solvency, smaller investment portfolios and 
particularly their adherence to Shariah principles.192 
 
Their performance progressively became worse than the performance of conventional banks 
as the crisis subsided. Thus, it may be contended that conventional banks perform better than 
Islamic banks during periods of economic growth. However, Islamic banks perform better 
than conventional banks during financial crises. Other important studies have sought to 
establish the link between Islamic banking and resilience to financial crises. Tabash and 
Dhankar193 investigated bank stability in the KSA between 2005 and 2010, and revealed that 
Islamic banks were less exposed to liquidity risk because they held more liquid assets than 
conventional banks. They concluded that the limited scope for investment among Islamic 
banks could explain their higher liquidity ratio, which showed no significant difference 
before, during or after the financial crisis. Islamic banks reliably held more short-term funds 
and high deposit percentages to meet sudden withdrawals. Islamic banks were also more 
equity financed and dependent on the PLS relationship, whereas conventional banks were 
highly dependent on a debt-credit relationship. There was also no significant difference in the 
capital adequacy of Islamic banks before, during or after the financial crisis, because of their 
asset-backed financing and distinctive Islamic principles.194 Aktas analysed bank stability in 
Turkey during the global economic crisis using a trend analysis on a yearly basis for the 
2006–2011 period, and noted that in terms of liquidity, capital adequacy and profitability, 
Islamic banks were more stable than conventional banks, even in 2008.195 
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Nonetheless, many studies have not adduced such clear-cut findings. The study conducted by 
Parashar and Venketesh196 for example had mixed results to the effect that during the crisis 
conventional banks suffered considerably more from poor liquidity and average returns on 
assets, whereas Islamic banks suffered more with poor average returns on equity, leverage 
and capital ratios. They segregated performance by isolated factors. However, when looking 
at the situation as a whole, they also concluded that the Islamic banks performed better 
overall between 2006 and 2009. In contrast, Imam and Kpodar197 observed that Islamic banks 
were neither better nor worse but rather complementary to conventional banks. They then 
argued that banks can remain stable during a financial crisis if their country has prudential 
regulations to ensure bank soundness during a period of financial uncertainty. Hence, the 
resilience of a bank depends more on the regulatory environment in which the bank is located 
than on the nature of the banking system adopted. Contrary to the above studies, Turk on his 
part found that Islamic banks are generally less stable and more vulnerable in uncertain 
financial situations because they are less competitive than conventional banks.198 He made an 
argument that was similar to that put forward by Imam and Kpodar that banks are in fact on a 
similar footing worldwide, and what is important is the regulatory environment. In the same 
vein, Kassim and Majid hold that both types of banks were equally vulnerable to the 2007-09 
financial crisis.199 Also, Smolo and Mirakhor concluded that both conventional and Islamic 
banks were vulnerable during the financial crisis, although the impact on Islamic banks was 
more limited.200 Hassan, Mohamed & Bader compared cost, revenue and profit efficiencies 
during the financial crisis and found no significant difference between Islamic and 
conventional banks using a sample of forty banks in eleven OIC countries.201  
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Despite the above, many commentators still hold that Islamic banks are more resilient 
because of their nature. Siraj and Pillai202 note that Islamic banks in the GCC region fared 
much better between 2005 and 2010 than conventional banks in the same region. They 
argued that the performance of the Islamic banks may be linked to the fact that they were 
more equity financed, and thus, their performance indicators, including capital adequacy, 
liquidity and profitability, were less affected by the global financial crisis from 2007. Abdulle 
and Kassim203 sought to determine how the global financial crisis affected Malaysian banks 
between 2006 and 2010. They assessed indicators such as credit risk, liquidity and 
profitability before, during and after the financial crisis, and found that Islamic banks had 
greater liquidity but less liquidity risk exposure than conventional banks during the crisis. 
Also, Rafiuddin and Alam examined banks in the UAE between 2005 and 2009 and observed 
that Islamic banks had lower risk and higher liquidity than conventional banks.204 However, 
unlike other studies, they found that the conventional banks were more profitable. They also 
noted a higher trend in registering Islamic than conventional banks after the 2008 meltdown. 
The findings of this study stand out because they show that conventional banks were more 
profitable before, during and after the crisis. Hence, although conventional banks were more 
adversely affected by the crisis, they maintained higher levels of profitability. This goes to 
show that there is not necessarily a causal link between performance during the crisis and 
resilience. Thus, the fact that a bank was not as adversely affected as other banks does not 
imply that the former is more resilient to financial crises. 
 
It must also be noted that some studies such as that conducted by Sehrish et al in Pakistan 
between 2007 and 2011 found that Islamic banks were less efficient in expense management 
as well as risk management in regard to loans compared to conventional banks.205 Also, 
Hidayat and Abdhullah analysed the impact of the economic crisis on the financial 
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performance of Islamic banks in Bahrain using a panel regression model, and noted no 
significant impact on these banks during the crisis period.206  
 
The majority of the studies cited above concluded that Islamic banks are more resilient to 
financial crisis than conventional banks. However, they submit diverse reasons why Islamic 
banks performed better during the 2007-09 global financial crisis. These include lower risk 
due to their interest-free nature, lower leverage, higher solvency, higher liquidity ratio due to 
smaller investment portfolios, less exposure to liquidity risk because they hold more liquid 
assets, more short-term funds and higher deposit percentages to meet sudden withdrawals, 
and their adherence to Shariah principles. However, it is difficult to determine what specific 
features of Islamic financial institutions may explain under all normal circumstances their 
resilience to financial crises compared to conventional institutions. In other words, it is 
difficult to generalise the findings of these studies given that they relate to the specific 
experiences of the Islamic and conventional banks examined. Hence, some of the studies 
found that Islamic banks had only limited exposure to the adverse impact of the financial 
crisis in 2008, and became progressively weaker than conventional banks in 2009, while 
other studies found that Islamic banks were neither better nor worse than conventional banks. 
Then one study concluded that Islamic banks are less efficient in expense management as 
well as risk management in regard to loans compared to conventional banks. 
 
The studies also employed different methodologies. Among the key studies, Cihak and Hesse 
used the Z-score (standard deviation from the mean determining the closeness to insolvency) 
as a primary dependent variable to measure individual bank risk and soundness; Boumediene 
and Caby also used the Z-score to measure the level of stability of 12 Islamic banks and 71 
conventional banks in Indonesia; Imam and Kpodar used econometric estimation techniques 
to model the way Islamic banking diffuses; Hassan, Mohamed and Bader used the Stochastic 
Frontier Approach to measure and compare the cost and profit efficiency of 37 conventional 
banks and 43 Islamic banks in OIC countries; and Abduh, Omar and Duasa used the 
cointegration test and vector error correction model to ascertain the relationship between 
macroeconomic variables and financial crises. It is frustrating that these studies generally 
failed to show the implications of the chosen methodologies, the variables involved, and how 
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the findings may be transferable to other contexts in order to justify the generalisable claim 
that Islamic banks are more resilient to financial crises.  
 
It is also difficult to generalise the findings of these studies because they reflect in different 
ways the effects of different rules and regulations in different regulatory environments. In the 
UAE for example, Islamic banks had lower risk and higher liquidity than conventional banks; 
in Pakistan, Islamic banks were less efficient in expense management but also less risky in 
managing loans; in Bahrain, there was no significant impact on Islamic banks; in Turkey, 
Islamic banks were more stable in terms of liquidity, capital adequacy, and profitability; and 
in the KSA, Islamic banks were less exposed to liquidity risk because they held more liquid 
assets than conventional banks. It is uncertain whether the use of the z-score indicator to 
measure the level of stability of Islamic banks in the UAE will yield the same results as the 
study conducted by Boumediene and Caby in Indonesia. 
 
As such, it may be contended that the various prudential regulations of these countries made a 
significant contribution to the findings of the diverse studies. These regulations determine 
how the financial institutions operate and manage risks, and therefore ensure their safety and 
soundness. However, although the abovementioned countries are largely Muslim countries, 
their regulations are not based on the principles of the Shariah or even variations of the 
principles. This is quite problematic owing to the fact that the reports discussing many of the 
studies concluded with a generalisable claim that Islamic banks are more resilient to financial 
crises. The studies largely focus on the performance of Islamic banks before, during and after 
the 2007-09 financial crisis and assumed that since Islamic banks generally performed better 
during the crisis, it may be concluded that they are more resilient. However, they did not 
show how the principles of the Shariah are causally linked to performance of financial 
institutions. Thus, it is not necessary to seek to determine which variation of the Shariah in 
any of the countries studied is the most effective in enhancing the resilience of banks. In the 
same vein, it is frustrating that these studies placed emphasis on the differences between 
Islamic and conventional banks, and yet failed to establish a theoretical link between 
principles of the Shariah and resilience to financial crises. It is shown above that banks with 
more retail deposits are resilient because these deposits constitute a stable and efficient 
source of funding during a financial crisis since they are assured by the government and 
linked with the depositor’s liquidity needs. Also, banks that are more active in the 
securitisation market are more resilient because of better capitalisation, higher profitability, 
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and lower insolvency risk. However, it is also shown that reliance on the government may be 
detrimental during a sovereign crisis and non-interest income may not necessarily reduce the 
risks faced by a bank if there is no good risk management strategy. It follows that the above 
studies ought to have shown that adherence to the principles of the Shariah ensures more 
retail deposits and securitisation and better risk management. In other words, the contention 
that Islamic banks are more resilient ought to be based on the demonstration of a cogent 
theoretical link between adherence to the principles of the Shariah and more capital and better 
risk management. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
This Chapter conducted a critical review of the existing literature in order to determine 
whether the generalizable claim that Islamic banks are more resilient to financial crises than 
conventional banks is justified. It began by seeking to determine the meanings given to the 
terms ‘financial crisis,’ ‘resilience’ and ‘Islamic banking’. It notes that the term financial 
crisis is broad and generic for it encompasses multidimensional situations in which financial 
assets lose a substantial part of their nominal value. Nonetheless, it is classified into two 
broad categories, namely crises that use quantitative definitions; and crises that depend on 
qualitative analyses. The first category of crises comprises currency and sudden stop (capital 
account or balance of payment) crises, while the second group includes debt and banking 
crisis. Also, other crises related to adverse debt dynamics such as sovereign crises may be 
classified in either category. Thus, it was noted that the term ‘financial crisis’ in this context 
refers to any category of crisis that has a direct negative impact on financial and economic 
levels of any State: debts mount, assets are liquidated, the foreign currency exchange 
becomes vulnerable, and inflation dramatically increases along with low productivity and 
high unemployment levels. The focus however was generally on the ‘global financial crisis’ 
that lasted from 2007 to 2009, and the resilience of Islamic and conventional banks was 
determined in light of how they were affected by this financial crisis. 
 
With regard to the question of resilience, it was shown that banks with more retail deposits 
had a more stable and efficient source of funding during the financial crisis because they are 
assured by the government and linked with the depositor’s liquidity needs, and with 
predictable withdrawals at an aggregate level. Also, banks that were more active in the 
securitisation market and banks that had a more diversified source of income were found to 
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have better capitalisation, higher profitability, and lower insolvency risk. Nonetheless, the 
most important element was the banks’ ability to manage risk. This crystallises why 
regulators and policymakers should place emphasis on risks concentrated in the most levered 
banks and the way they manage the risks. 
 
It was then shown that Islamic banking is generally held to involve the provision of exotic or 
unconventional products and services based on the principles of the Shariah. Although the 
principles are not standardized across Muslim countries in regard to what should constitute 
Shariah-compliant banking, there are general rules that apply in all Islamic jurisdictions such 
as the rules that prohibit riba (interest), gharar (speculation) and maysir (gambling) amongst 
others, and the rules that govern the use of PLS arrangements to provide better mobilisation 
of savings and savings rates and mitigate risk. 
 
It was then noted that all financial institutions, whether Islamic or conventional, are not 
equally vulnerable to failure during any of the categories of financial crises. Many studies 
demonstrated that the institutions that are more vulnerable are those exposed to liquidity and 
credit risk due to over-reliance on short-term wholesale funding, viz., foreign deposits and 
foreign funds. Other studies showed that also vulnerable are financial institutions that are 
prone to excessive risk taking, such as those that issued subprime loans with a much higher 
risk of default. These troubled institutions were then unable to sell their assets or obtain 
liquidity from local sources in order to return to target leverage. The different reasons for the 
vulnerability of certain institutions and the resilience of others imply that it is difficult to map 
the accurate profile of the Islamic financial institution that was more resilient to the global 
financial crisis in order to determine whether it matches the profile of institutions that are 
generally more resilient to financial crises. This is because different Islamic banks in different 
regulatory environments were affected in different ways. Thus, the commentators who 
concluded with the generalisable claim that Islamic banks are more resilient to financial 
crises did not establish a cogent theoretical link between adherence to the principles of the 
Shariah and resilience. Many showed that the principles of the Shariah limits exposure and 
may therefore ensure that the Islamic bank is not as adversely affected as conventional banks 
during financial crises. However, this thesis shows that there is no consistent application of 
such principles to limit exposure across Islamic jurisdictions. 
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It is noted above that regulators and policymakers should place emphasis on risks 
concentrated in the most levered banks, and the way they manage the risks. Given that 
Islamic financial institutions operate within the Shariah regulatory framework that requires 
the sharing of risk and essentially shuns toxic assets and derivatives, there are good reasons to 
assume that Islamic financial institutions ought to be more resilient to financial crises than 
conventional institutions. The findings of the majority of the studies cited above confirm this 
assumption. However, as noted above, they submit diverse reasons making it difficult to 
ascertain the specific features of Islamic financial institutions that explain their resilience to 
financial crises compared to conventional institutions. It remains that the vulnerability of the 
financial institution and system is a function of the risk management strategies adopted. Thus, 
the next Chapter analyses the risks involved in both conventional and Islamic banking and 
seeks to ascertain whether Islamic banks have more effective management strategies that 
enhances their resilience to financial crises. 
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Chapter 3 
 Assessing the Risk Management Strategies of Islamic Banks 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In Chapter 2, it was submitted that a bank’s resilience is a function of how it manages risk 
within its regulatory environment. The implication of this is that the argument that Islamic 
banks are more resilient to financial crises than conventional banks is premised on the 
contention that Islamic banks have more effective risk management strategies. This Chapter 
tests this argument. It begins by briefly explaining the concept of risk management. It then 
discusses different categories of financial and non-financial risk and ascertains their causal 
relationship with financial crises. Furthermore, it considers effective ways of managing risk 
and assessing the general strategies used by Islamic banks to manage risks. The objective is 
to determine whether the resilience of Islamic banks to financial crises may be attributed to 
their risk management strategies. 
3.2 The Concept of Risk Management 
 
Risk is a broad concept with no precise definition.207 However, it is often used to describe the 
probability of an unforeseen or unplanned event, leading to a negative outcome which has a 
detrimental effect on an investment or business.208 The negative outcome may include 
financial loss, damage to reputation or legal penalties.209 Risk management is therefore an 
important part of strategic management, because an organisation cannot define its objectives 
or develop an effective strategy without a mechanism for identifying and mitigating the 
relevant risks.210 Nonetheless, the history of the in-depth study of the concept is relatively 
recent.211 Crockford noted that no academic texts were produced on the topic of risk 
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management before 1955 and universities did not offer courses on the subject before this 
date.212 The first major works published on the topic were by Mehr and Hedges,213 and Heins 
and Williams.214 However, these authors explored pure risk management and market 
insurance,215 but excluded financial risk.216 However, financial risk management, as an 
overall concept, has since attracted significant attention and expanded as a result.217  
After the Second World War, many large-scale organisations with diversified portfolios 
began to consider protecting themselves against risk by utilising risk management strategies. 
Hence, risk management was deemed to be an effective alternative to market insurance.218 
Risk management was devised as a form of self-insurance and applied to reduce the potential 
losses resulting from risky business transactions. Banks therefore developed self-protective 
strategies, including the creation of liquid reserves to help them recover from accidents or 
unexpected market fluctuations.219 Attention was particularly directed towards certain key 
areas, including credit risk and market risk. The following decade witnessed high market 
volatility, which correspondingly motivated most large US investment banking entities to 
establish and assign a supervisory role to their risk management departments.220 Accordingly, 
whereas the pre-war era saw markets utilise various kinds of insurance to protect their 
financial systems against risk, post-war, the price of insurance coverage drastically increased, 
thereby motivating organisations to seek alternative financial risk management tools, such as 
derivatives.221 These are securities with prices that are derived from or dependent on 
underlying assets such as stocks, currencies, interest rates and bonds.222 The values of the 
derivatives are determined by fluctuations in the underlying assets. Derivatives were 
originally used to achieve balanced exchanged rates for commodities that were traded 
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internationally.223 Given that different currencies had different values, derivatives enabled 
them to account for the differences. However, they were increasingly used for a wide variety 
of transactions with different objectives. They were used to insure against risks on assets or 
for speculation in betting on the future prices of assets, or for hedging. As different forms of 
security, derivatives are associated with different types of risk, including underlying asset, 
expiration and counterparty. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, the use of derivatives to manage both insurable and non-insurable 
risks developed quickly, because they facilitated financial innovation and increased market 
resilience to crises.224  However, they posed remarkable challenges to policymakers and 
regulators, who were unable to determine whether derivative transactions were traded in a 
way that conformed to law and equity, and were supervised in such a way as to ensure that 
they did not expose traders to risk factors. The increased use of derivatives therefore required 
more sophisticated regulations, capable of curbing excessive risk-taking, but without 
dissuading financial innovation.  As such, given that some commentators have established a 
link between derivative transactions and the insolvencies or near collapse of Barings Bank, 
Lehman Brothers, Enron, and Long-term Capital Management,225 it may be argued that the 
necessary regulations were not in place, at least prior to the financial crisis of 2007-09. 
Enron, for example, mainly handled derivative contracts in over-the-counter markets or via 
dealer networks. However, its derivative transactions were largely unregulated.226 There was 
in fact very little information on the profitability of transactions, as there were no reporting 
requirements. Moreover, in 2008, the US government provided a financial package of $150 
billion to the American International Group, in order to prevent the company from filing for 
bankruptcy.227 The company was therefore exempted from posting collateral on most of its 
derivative transactions. These events naturally raised concerns about the regulation of trading 
derivatives.  
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In 2010, Andrew Sheng, Chairman of the Hong Kong Securities & Futures Commission, 
noted that the region’s financial regulatory structure was designed for normal events, based 
on the assumption that the Central Bank could effectively function as the lender of last 
resort.228 However, the Commission did not take into account spikes in interest rates during 
solvency or liquidity crises, where the Central Bank did not have sufficient liquidity to satisfy 
the demands of all the banks. This caused interest rates to rise even further in the 1980s, 
leading to market panic, when it was feared that the banking system - the depository of public 
savings - may be insolvent. Sheng thus concluded that during financial crises, it is difficult to 
distinguish between market and credit risk, given that the liquidity crisis transmits across the 
regional and international network to become a solvency crisis.229  
It must be noted that risk management is not synonymous with resilience. Risk management 
is discussed here as an important part of strategic management that can enable an 
organisation to strengthen its resilience. It is shown in Chapter 2 that resilience in this context 
means the ability of financial institutions to withstand shocks or significant stresses during 
financial crises. It is a concept that has emerged as a synthesis of ideas from different 
disciplinary traditions230 and evolved into policy and practice in the financial sector. Even 
within this sector, it is still a complex concept with several determinants that vary according 
to the context and interact with one another to weaken or strengthen an institution.231 In this 
thesis, it is viewed as an outcome. It exists on a continuum that may change over time as a 
function of the size of banks’ retail deposits or efficiency of the source of funding. It was also 
shown that during financial crises, some banks are more resilient because they are assured by 
the government and linked with the depositors’ liquidity needs and predictable withdrawals at 
an aggregate level. Other banks are more resilient because they are more active in the 
securitisation market and have a more diversified source of income with better capitalisation, 
higher profitability, and lower insolvency risk. However, it was submitted that the most 
important element is the banks’ ability to manage risk.  
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Thus, regulators and policymakers ought to place emphasis on risks concentrated in the most 
levered banks and the way the latter manage these risks. This means that the most important 
regulatory and supervisory challenges involve the formulation and implementation of 
effective strategies to ensure that financial institutions are not overexposed to liquidity and 
credit risk, and over-reliant on external funding. As such, although effective risk management 
is not tantamount to resiliency, it may guarantee such an outcome. The discussion of risk 
management in this section is therefore limited to ways in which the resilience of banks and 
the financial system may be strengthened using a mechanism for identifying and managing a 
banks’ exposure to financial risks.232 
 
3.2.1 The Internal Risk Management Models Used 
 
Regulatory and supervisory authorities must identify the potential sources of risk in the 
financial markets, how they are managed at banking level, and how they interact with 
external forces. An international architecture cannot manage the systemic risks 
accompanying the transactions of every financial institution and determine whether there 
have been substantial changes in credit volume and asset prices or severe disruptions in 
financial intermediation or the supply of financing at the level of each institution. Given that 
the latter has first-hand knowledge of the scale of its balance sheet problems and its leverage 
ratio, it is foremost tasked with adopting an effective risk management strategy to reduce its 
vulnerability to financial crises. It therefore follows that a link may be established between 
resilience to financial crises and risk management. Nonetheless, risk management is also a 
very broad concept that describes a process of identifying, assessing and mitigating or 
eliminating exposure to loss. Each institution has a risk management model based on how its 
managers foresee risks, assess impact and define suitable responses. Thus, some institutions 
have better risk management models than others.233 Brown et al show that the development of 
an effective model is a complex and error-prone process, and banks must ensure that sound 
                                                
232 Regarding the contention that strengthening the resilience of the banking system requires an improvement of 
risk management, see BCBS, Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking Sector (BIS 2009) 1. This explains 
why Pillar 2 of the Basel II Accord provides a framework for dealing with residual risk or risk that remains after 
the risk controls have mitigated or eliminated the inherent risks. See also, G Voinea and SG Anton, ‘Lessons 
from the Current Financial Crisis: A Risk Management Approach’ (2009) 1(3) Review of Economic and 
Business Studies 139, 143-146. 
 
233 For the history of the use of risk management models, see J Phillipe, ‘Risk Management Lessons from Long-
Term Capital Management’ (2000) 6 European Financial Management 277, 277-300. 
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modelling includes comprehensive procedures for model validation, which takes into account 
the risk inherent in the model adopted.234 Thus, banks that manage risks better are those that 
have a model risk management framework that is similar to the frameworks that they use to 
manage other risks to which they are exposed.235 
 
Two of the most widely used models include RiskMetrics and CreditMetrics, which focus on 
market risk and credit risk, respectively.236 The RiskMetrics variance model was first 
introduced by JP Morgan in 1992 as its internal risk management methodology.237 There was 
little standardisation in the market at the time and this model became the benchmark for 
measuring financial risk.238 It is based on two assumptions: first, the returns on risk factors 
are normally distributed; and secondly, the volatilities of risk factors are best measured using 
the moving average of past returns that is exponentially weighted. It comprises three 
approaches for modelling financial risk factors,239 namely the covariance approach, the 
historical simulation, and the Monte Carlo simulation.240 However, Steen et al used daily data 
for more than 20 years and backtested this model for 19 different commodities and one major 
commodity index and found that it does not capture the true empirical return distribution that 
depends on the changing volatility.241 Also, it does not take into account time-varying 
volatility. Thus, they concluded that it is problematic for low and very high quantiles and less 
appropriate than the quantile regression (QR) model that involves estimating a liner QR using 
volatility as an input.242 
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The CreditMetrics model was also introduced by JP Morgan in 1997, and in a period of two 
years, it was used by most major banks as part of their credit risk management.243 It involves 
analysing and managing credit risk of investment instruments portfolio. It therefore analyses 
the entire portfolio on the basis of the assessment of the credit risk of individual instruments, 
taking into account the cross-correlation of bonds.244 However, this model is based on 
external ratings, and rating agents have maintained that external ratings are not accurate 
measures of default, but rather a tentative ranking of one entity to another, which does not 
vary with changing economic conditions.245 Also, the ratings are used by banks under the 
Basel approach for allocating capital since the Basel Accord Amendment on market risk.246 
Thus, given that the ratings do not change with fluctuating market conditions, the capital 
allocated does not.247 
 
Their application is centred on measuring portfolio risks by directing attention towards 
discrepancies and utilising ‘value at risk’ (VaR) as a means of quantifying aggregate portfolio 
risk.248 RiskMetrics was developed for use in the private sector; interlinking improvements in 
financial techniques and advancements in technology. The above model has assisted firms in 
assessing VaR, which measures any expected loss and retrospectively allocates existing 
capital across a business.249 Conversely, Credit Metrics is a model that allows businesses to 
measure current risk and forecast any future risk.  
 
Current and future risks are each measured in a specific way. For instance, future risk is 
evaluated through the statistical analysis of current or potential risk exposure. However, 
current risk can be measured using either transaction or portfolio methods. The transaction 
method calculates the potential exposure of each of the organisation’s transactions, multiplied 
by the maturity or level of potential exposure to risk, all in relation to the market risk. 
Conversely, the portfolio method involves calculating the potential risk exposure of a firm’s 
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transactions in a group, which is similar to computing VaR as a means of measuring market 
risk.250 
In light of the disparity between the various applications of risk management models, as well 
as in the results obtained, the main challenge for policymakers is to create uniform standards 
of risk management, which may then be enforced by regulators. Several attempts have been 
made in different jurisdictions and some of the standards enforced in many Islamic countries 
are assessed below. However, policymakers must take into account the various types of risk 
emerging from financial markets. Equally, the regulator should ensure that the enforcement 
of uniform standards prevents risks from accumulating and escalating to national and global 
level. However, this may only be possible if policymakers and regulators can identify the 
different categories of risk arising and are aware that these can destabilise the corresponding 
financial system. It follows that in order to support the idea of Islamic financial institutions 
having better risk management models, it must be established that Islamic regulators (internal 
and external) can identify the various categories of risk emerging from the Islamic financial 
markets and subsequently compel Islamic banks to mitigate or eliminate them. The next 
section briefly discusses different categories of financial and non-financial risks and seeks to 
determine the causal relationship between these and financial crises, as well as effective ways 
of managing such risks. It then examines how Islamic banks manage these risks and 
determines whether their resilience to financial crises may be attributed to their risk 
management strategies. 
 
3.3 The Management of Financial Risks 
3.3.1 Credit Risk 
 
Credit risk is a pervasive risk that arises when a bank borrower, counterparty or obligor fails 
to meet its obligations under the agreed terms.251 It is therefore associated with lending 
activities, wherein loans remain partially or completely unpaid. Credit risk arises from a 
decline in the credit standing of the counterparty.252 Thus, borrower risk may be treated as a 
form of credit risk. Borrower risk can be described as the potential failure of a bank 
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counterparty or lender to fulfil obligations and responsibilities that directly relate to the 
agreed stipulations.253 Credit risk management is concerned with ensuring that risk-adjusted 
return rates, as highlighted by the bank, are maximised by ensuring that exposure to credit 
risk is maintained within and across acceptable parameters.254 As such, it is essential for 
credit risk, as well as any risks recognised as part of credit transactions, to be managed by the 
bank and across its entire portfolio.255 Furthermore, it is important for banks to direct further 
attention towards the links between credit risk and other types of risk. In this regard, credit 
risk management is noted as a critical aspect of any comprehensive risk management system 
and is therefore imperative for the long-term success of any banking business.256  
Banks generally manage credit risk by establishing and maintaining credit exposure through 
the use of a risk-adjusted rate of return, in line with acceptable parameters.257 This means that 
banks implement stringent measures prior to issuing loans, such as assessing an individual’s 
credit risk, as a means of identifying their own exposure to the risk of default, by evaluating a 
number of relevant factors. They will also set repayment requirements to ensure that the loan 
is repaid as quickly as possible, but within limits. This means that monthly repayments will 
be fixed high enough to repay the loan as quickly as possible, but not so high as to deter the 
borrower’s progress.258  
The core strategy adopted by banks to manage credit risk, as established in Basel I and 
subsequently in Pillar 1 of Basel II,259 is to ensure that the bank has adequate levels of capital. 
This is established by adhering to capital adequacy requirements.260 These control measures 
ensure that the bank has the money to support its operations. In practice, it is not common for 
banks to dispense all their money as loans. They often dispense only a predetermined 
percentage. This will be subject to change, depending on the bank’s capital figures. Capital 
adequacy regulation enhances the safety of the banking sector by giving banks the incentive 
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to engage in active risk management.261 They may for example hedge their exposure to risk, 
if it is acceptable under the local laws, in order to mitigate downside risks.262 Thus, although 
capital adequacy does not necessarily have a significant impact on the bank’s profitability,263 
it establishes a floor on bank risk. The requirements provide a cushion that enables banks to 
absorb loss given that they prescribe that bank lending may only be supported by adequate 
levels of capital. Thus, capital adequacy requirements provide a form of assurance to 
regulators that banks with adequate levels of capital are able to withstand loss caused by 
defaulting borrowers. The requirements therefore alter the bank’s credit standards, as well as 
counterparty credit risk. To manage credit risk, banks must operate a sound gearing process; 
establish the credit-risk environment; maintain, measure and monitor appropriate credit 
administration, and ensure adequate credit risk control.264  
 
Default or unsuccessful performance causes risk of loss, otherwise known as default risk,265 
which is also a form of credit risk. In the past, the emphasis on this type of risk could be 
explained as loans constituting a major source of profit and therefore, implicitly, a major 
source of loss for financial institutions. It also follows that banks that fail to maintain, 
measure or monitor appropriate credit administration and ensure adequate credit risk control, 
are likely to suffer serious losses. Moreover, where the banking system cannot absorb the 
credit losses that accumulate, its weaknesses are transmitted to the entire financial system and 
real economy.266 However, this is only possible where systemic risk regulators fail to adapt to 
evolution in the financial system or to supervise the system adequately. Interestingly, prior to 
the financial crisis of 2007-09, the efforts of most banks in Europe and the US were geared 
towards compliance with the requirements of Basel I and II. In order to optimise risk 
management processes, they needed to ensure that capital allocation would be more risk-
sensitive and that it would quantify credit, market and operational risk with data and formal 
techniques; improve disclosure requirements to enable participants in the market to assess the 
                                                
261 T Pausch and P Welze, ‘Credit Risk and the Role of Capital Adequacy Regulation’ (2002) University of 
Augsburg. Available at: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/bd70/779ae79687453d4d665d16ff1da2c3d7b298.pdf  
[19 March 2018] 14. 
262 WA Kaal and DA Oesterle, ‘Hedge Fund Regulation’ in K Baker and G Filbeck (eds), Hedge Funds: 
Structure, Strategies and Performance (Oxford University Press 2017) 373. 
263 WA Kaal and DA Oesterle, ‘Hedge Fund Regulation’ in K Baker and G Filbeck (eds), Hedge Funds: 
Structure, Strategies and Performance (Oxford University Press 2017) 373. 
264 H Mehran and AV Thakor, note 252 above. 
265 European Islamic Investment Bank (2010a), Product Programme: DualCurrency Murabaha, February 2010. 
266 I Macerinskiene, L Ivaskeviciute and G Railien, note 23 above, 7. 
 
 
73 
adequacy of the banks, and align regulatory and economic capital more closely, so as to 
narrow the scope for regulatory arbitrage.267  
 
Basel II prescribes two approaches for measuring credit risk: the Standardised Approach 
(STD) and the Internal Ratings-Based Approach (IRB). The STD requires measuring risk in a 
standardised manner. It includes two approaches, namely linking the bank’s risk weight to the 
sovereign rating of the country in which the bank is incorporated and ensuring that the risk 
weight corresponds to the bank’s credit rating.268 The Basel framework initially prescribed 
the use of external ratings to determine the risk weights of the bank’s exposures.269 In light of 
the fact that external ratings are problematic as shown above, the Basel Committee 
recommends removing the references to external credit ratings and sovereign of 
incorporation.270 Hence, the STD will require the exposures of banks to be risk-weighted by 
reference to a look-up table that outlines a range of risk weights. The Committee believes that 
this revised approach is suitably reflects the extent of the riskiness of exposures.271 
 
With regard to IRB, given its reliance on internal risk assessment, it can only be used with the 
approval of the regulator.272 This approval is based on whether a bank’s risk-rating system 
meets the minimum criteria established; indicating that even the sophisticated credit risk 
management systems, which existed prior to the financial crisis of 2007-09, could not prevent 
losses or the transmission of weaknesses to the entire financial system. However, these risk 
management systems were subsequently overhauled with improved regulations following the 
crisis. Moreover, a new international regulatory framework was proposed in the Basel III 
Accord.273 These regulations were largely based on the requirement for more capital, higher 
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quality capital, and more balanced liquidity.274 Nonetheless, it remains uncertain whether 
these reforms have effectively improved the resilience of the participating financial 
institutions.275 
Among the tactics increasingly adopted by financial institutions to keep track of credit risk 
and attempt to alleviate it are restrictions on countries; counterparties and excessive exposure; 
diversification; covenants; delegations; extrinsic and intrinsic ratings, and watch lists or 
undertakings requiring close surveillance. Nevertheless, the probability of default is shrouded 
in uncertainty, making it difficult to anticipate. This means that precise measurements of 
credit risk cannot be calculated in advance. The qualitative and quantitative risk features 
presented by customers, such as operating experience; management prowess; quality of 
assets; ratios of leverage and liquidity; earnings, and debt service, are integrated on the basis 
of credit applications known as credit-scoring models.276 Nonetheless, there may be some 
uncertainty concerning whether regulators have the requisite sophistication to ensure that 
financial institutions use the above tactics to identify and mitigate credit risks. 
Given that Islamic financial institutions are concerned with investments and partnerships, 
rather than lending,277 it may be argued that they are not confronted with the same risks as 
conventional banks. Thus. Islamic regulators are less likely to overlook the accumulation of 
credit risk in the system. However, Islamic banks face special credit risks, including 
Mudaraba investments and Murabaha transactions,278 with Islamic banks allocating more 
financing and loans, thus increasing their exposure to such risk.279 Banks generally face credit 
risk in their relationship with debtors. As noted above, the risk is related to the ability of the 
debtor to repay at the agreed time for repayment and in accordance with the conditions 
specified in the agreement. The risk of default is inherent in almost all operations of 
conventional banks given that their relationship with all individuals or businesses they 
transact with is that of debtor and creditor. Islamic banks on the other hand invest in common 
projects with customers rather than issue direct loans. However, these modes of financing 
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also carry credit risk.280 The Murabaha and Istisna for example may be considered sales with 
delayed payment that may generate debts in the banks’ accounts. Also, the commodity debt 
from Salam involves credit risk. This is because it is a contract in which the bank makes 
payment in advance for the goods to be delivered at a future date. The customer is not 
expected to give anything in the nature of money in exchange for the advance payment. Thus, 
the payment is a form of debt security that is linked with the price of the specified 
commodity. However, the bank does not necessarily deal with the producers of the 
commodities and does not charge interest. Thus, the default risk is much higher than in 
commodity-backed bonds that conventional banks obtain from producers. Then the funds 
given by banks through the Murabaha and Musharaka carry credit risk given that the 
entrepreneur must guarantee the capital, which translates into a debt liability. Where the 
capital is used in a deferred sale, the bank that provides the capital faces an indirect credit risk 
that pertains to the likelihood of the counterparties defaulting. As a result, Islamic banks 
should have relevant credit-scoring models and unique methods of measuring credit risks, 
which may be assessed by Islamic regulators. Building on the characteristics of credit risk 
encountered by Islamic financial institutions, the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) has 
proposed a set of guidelines, which are shown in Box 3.1, below. 
 
Box III.1: Principles of Credit Risk  
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In light of Principle 2.3, illustrated above, the exposure to credit risk will depend on the 
Islamic financing structure adopted by the bank. Nonetheless, it must be noted that various 
financing structures carry relatively low credit risk, because the assets of Islamic banks are 
generally of a debt nature, following sale-based financing; while deposits are on a profit and 
loss-sharing basis. This means that Islamic banks may simply shift the risk of debt default to 
investment depositors. Moreover, the profit and loss-sharing agreement provides a buffer 
against systemic failure281 and it is easier for supervisory authorities to assess whether 
Islamic banks are viable and can fulfil their financial commitments to creditors. In the same 
vein, it is easier to determine whether an Islamic bank’s operations are likely to trigger 
instability in, or even the collapse of, the entire banking system. The credit risk posed by 
Islamic banks is assessed according to their participation in the credit-line operation of a 
foreign agency, including a lending agency; the establishment of correspondent banking 
relationships in international markets; equity investment by a foreign lending agency or 
investor, and participation in a bank rehabilitation programme. 
As such, apart from the fact that Islamic regulators do not prescribe how Islamic business 
should be conducted, there is very little difference in approach compared to non-Islamic 
regulators; just like conventional regulators, Islamic regulators maintain prudent oversight 
and assess the risk composition of financial institutions’ assets, taking into account minimum 
capital requirements.282 Thus, Islamic banks are less likely to trigger instability through the 
accumulation of credit risk, because the various financing structures that they use carry lower 
credit risk, rather than because they use better credit risk management techniques. This 
explains why they are likely to pose systemic credit risks through their participation in the 
credit-line operation of a foreign lending or other type of foreign agency; the establishment of 
correspondent banking relationships in international markets, or equity investment by a 
foreign lending agency or investor. The regulator’s task is consequently easier, since it is 
limited to assessing the risks emerging from these transactions. However, it is uncertain 
whether the same may be said of other financial risks.  
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3.3.1 Portfolio Risk 
 
Every financial instrument represents an element of a bank’s overall portfolio. It is important 
to analyse and ascertain the degree of risk of each portfolio, because it is risky for a bank to 
invest all of its capital by lending to everyday customers.283 The day-to-day customers are 
represented as the regular, frequent customers visiting a bank.284 However, there is a need for 
banks to ensure that their portfolios and the risk associated with them are diversified, so as to 
minimise any losses arising from an adverse event. It is crucial to safeguard the bank, its 
activities and its customers, with priority being given to the minimisation of risk.285 Portfolio 
risk may either be a market or idiosyncratic risk.286 The following section focuses on the 
management of market risk by Islamic banks. 
3.3.1.1. Market Risk 
 
Market risk, also known as undiversifiable risk, is related to price, equity or interest rate 
fluctuations in the general market, while idiosyncratic risk, also known as diversifiable risk, 
is a company-specific risk.287 Examples of the latter include a sudden poor earnings forecast 
or report, strikes, and a drop in sales. Systematic market risk arises from changes in the prices 
of all instruments, because of movements in macroeconomic variables. To calculate market 
risks and make better lending decisions, banks normally use risk-adjusted return on capital 
(RAROC); a technique that factors risk into the evaluation and calculation of financial 
return.288 This tool is widely applicable, from individual loans to trading positions and even 
entire lines of ventures.  
The basic concept of RAROC is that higher risk in an investment means a higher chance of 
incurring loss, thus negatively affecting a form by reducing the available equity or capital. 
Hence, adjustments must be made to ensure that high-risk ventures generate sufficient profit 
to achieve an appropriate risk-profit balance. RAROC makes this adjustment by ensuring that 
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high-risk projects receive a higher capital return.289 Accordingly, a riskier venture needs to be 
able to generate an almost guaranteed profit; achieving a similar rate of return on equity to 
that of a less risky venture. In implementing RAROC, the capital figure received by a product 
is manipulated to equal the biggest loss likely to be incurred by the product over a certain 
period. In cases involving individual instruments, the capital figure is estimated by 
establishing the expected change in market value based on market factors, such as 
fluctuations in currency and interest rates. Such changes are derived from historical data and 
anticipated through sound judgment and experience.  
As risk calculations consider asset price volatility,290 banks use VaR to manage market risk 
by estimating potential loss incurred by adverse movement in the market.291 VaR in this 
context is derived from the Basel Committee’s 1996 Market Risk Amendment and is 
calculated to determine the amount of capital that a bank should hold, in order to safeguard 
itself against exposure to market risk.292 VaR is a financial technique that enables banks to 
measure their risk of future loss under stable market conditions and over a specified period.293 
There are many methods used to measure VaR, including the Variance-Covariance method 
and the Monte Carlo method.294 The Variance-Covariance technique is the safest and 
quickest to implement, relying on different assumptions according to market data. However, 
it is risky, since the measurement relies on a linear approximation of the portfolio. In contrast, 
the Monte-Carlo technique is time-consuming, but more reliable, since it allows flexibility in 
integrating private and market information.  
Referring to its characteristics, market risk must be managed and examined on an ongoing 
basis.295 Financial institutions may adopt different approaches to market risk management 
and measurement, but the majority impose restrictions and establish triggers for portfolios, 
separate transactions, departments and traders.296 Additionally, for the routine regulation of 
risks associated with banking and trading books, financial institutions rely on a number of 
tools, such as mark-to-market, stop-loss provisions, gap analysis, back-testing, and stress-
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testing. Stress-testing, in particular, has been used with increasing frequency to anticipate 
expected losses.297 Meanwhile, mark-to-market trading is underpinned by factor sensitivities 
and VaR.298 The latter is an especially popular approach to methodical measurement and the 
assessment of market risk.299 A relatively new instrument of risk management, VaR provides 
an estimate for a specific time interval regarding a company’s potential losses or gains.300 
Furthermore, it reduces the financial risk linked with portfolios to a numerical estimate, 
namely, the value of any losses that might occur in a series of potential events and within a 
defined time period.301 
Market risk can be managed more effectively, if VaR is applied in conjunction with other 
instruments, like Expected Shortfall (ES), which is a universal instrument that enjoys a global 
unique evaluation of portfolio risks.302 Hence, a model should only be implemented after a 
thorough evaluation of data input. Furthermore, market risk management benefits from 
countless derivative products of considerable complexity, which are available on the standard 
market and can be used to hedge positions.  
The identification and mitigation of market risk is very important, because a change in the 
market risk of one sector may be triggered by a change in another, thus affecting the 
composition of the market. Zalewska examined the market risk of the banking, utilities and 
industrial sectors both before and after the global financial crisis of 2007-09 and found a 
positive relationship between increased market risk in the industrial sector during the crisis 
and the market risk of the banking sector before it.303 In six of the most developed countries 
that experienced a banking crisis due to systemic risks,304 there was a sharp increase in the 
industrial sector’s market risk. Zalewska also noted that the Central Banks of these countries 
cooperated to regulate international finance, while the prices or returns of several companies 
within these markets were regulated. Grout and Zalewska had previously established a 
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similar composition effect with regard to the dotcom bubble,305 also finding that changes in 
regulation affected internationally diversified portfolios. As such, despite the fact that 
supervisory authorities cooperate to regulate companies’ prices and returns, systemic risks 
may still emerge, insofar as changes in one sector will affect the composition of the market. 
With regard to Islamic banking, fluctuations in the values of marketable or leasable assets, 
such as the Sukuk, may create market risk. Additionally, the volatility of the market value of 
assets, such as Salam or Murabaha assets, which are purchased to be delivered after a given 
period, may generate serious and systemic market and agency risks.306 Given that Islamic 
banks are compelled to comply with Shariah principles, they are forbidden from using risk 
management tools, such as hedging and credit derivatives. Additionally, the fact that Islamic 
regulations are not standardised increases uncertainty, and this may actually increase the level 
of market risk confronted by Islamic banks. Nonetheless, Chakroun, Sebai and Gallali 
analysed the effect of market risks on the stability of both the Islamic and conventional 
banking industries and found that although the financing structures of conventional banks 
create more systemic risks, the dynamic conditional beta of both systems307 follows the same 
trend.308 Hence, both Islamic and conventional banks react in the same way to the market and 
are both sensitive to market risk. 
As such, although Islamic banks face the same market risk as conventional banks, they are 
restricted by Shariah rules with regard to the risk management tools that they may employ.309 
This undermines the contention that Islamic banks are more resilient to financial crises, 
because of the way in which they manage risk in their respective regulatory contexts. 
Moreover, the fact that Islamic regulations are not standardised implies that Islamic 
regulators rely on specific interpretations of Shariah principles. This is discussed further in 
Chapter 4 and in itself increases the level of risk. With regard to managing market risk, IFSB 
Principle 4.1 provides a specific approach, depicted in Box 3.2 below. 
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Box III.2: Market Risk Management Principle Provided by the IFSB 
 
As noted above, the financing structures used by Islamic banks, as well as fluctuations in the 
values of marketable or leasable assets, create market risk that banks need to identify and 
mitigate. However, due to restrictions on the instruments that they can deploy to manage risk, 
Islamic banks are confronted with greater challenges in terms of market risk management. 
Nonetheless, such restrictions are eased by the fact that the Gharar interdiction circumscribes 
the extent to which Islamic banks can trade, thus reducing the scale of the risks that they face. 
Furthermore, the approach prescribed by IFSB Principle 4.1 is generic and does not address 
the unique difficulties faced by Islamic banks, which arise from the restrictions imposed by 
Shariah. Given that there is a causal link between systemic market risk and financial crises, it 
is difficult, in light of the above analysis, to contend that Islamic banks are less likely to be 
adversely affected by financial crises, based on them having an appropriate market risk 
management framework. In the same vein, it is difficult to argue that Islamic banks are more 
resilient to crises, due to them having adequate supervision and regulation. This is because 
they lack risk management strategies that are tailored towards Islamic banking, to the extent 
that it may be submitted that Islamic banks have unique strategies for mitigating risks more 
effectively. They appear to rely on the same strategies as conventional banks, insofar as the 
strategies are Shariah-compliant. 
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3.3.2 Interest Rate Risk (IRR) 
 
The evaluation of interest rate risk (IRR) is a significant consideration for banks, as well as 
for regulators.310 It is faced by all banks but increased sharply during the financial crisis of 
2007-09.311 IRR may generally be considered as potential changes to interest rates, which can 
in turn reduce bank’ earnings and thus decrease their overall net worth. This is why IRR is 
positively correlated with bank risk.312  
IRR manifests itself in a number of different ways; the most common of these is revealed 
when reviewing the bank’s assets, such as loans, which may mature at a different rate from 
the bank’s liabilities.313 IRR is known to have significant potential to negatively impact 
earnings and net worth. Therefore there is the belief that a bank can optimally eliminate its 
risk by ensuring that all of its liabilities and assets mature at the same time.314 However, such 
an approach would mean that banking institutions earn less profit without the presence of 
such risks.315 Banks can earn profit by shouldering IRR, while satisfying customers’ demands 
for loans and deposits.316 The challenges in this regard are centred on measuring IRR and 
managing such risk, so that the compensation received is appropriate to the risks incurred.317 
IRR may arise when the value of an investment changes as a result of a shift in the absolute 
interest rate spread between two rates. This is caused by a mismatch in the maturities of the 
liabilities and assets, which banks can manage by capturing the risk and repricing 
mismatches. According to Ruckes, this can be measured either from the perspective of 
earnings, or in terms of economic value.318  
                                                
310 L Angbazo, ‘Commercial Bank Net Interest Margins, Default Risk, Interest-rate Risk, and Off-balance Sheet 
Banking’ (1997) Journal of Banking & Finance 55-87. 
311 J Begenau, M Piazzesi and M Schneider, ‘Banks’ Risk Exposures’ (2015) Stanford University. Available at: 
https://web.stanford.edu/~piazzesi/banks.pdf  [18 November 2017] 3. 
312 G Dell’Ariccia, L Laeven and R Marquez, ‘Real Interest Rates, Leverage, and Bank Risk-taking’ (2014) 149 
Journal of Economic Theory 65, 66. 
313 F Song and AV Thakor, ‘Relationship Banking, Fragility, and the Asset-liability Matching Problem’ (2007) 
20 Review of Financial Studies 2129, 2129–2177. 
314 A Christie, ‘The Stochastic Behavior of Common Stock Variances: Value, Leverage and Interest Rate 
Effects’ (1982) Journal of financial Economics 407, 407-432. 
315 J Fields and E Venezian, ‘Interest Rates and Profit Cycles: A Disaggregated Approach’ (1989) Journal of 
Risk and Insurance 312, 312-319. 
316 Kalok Chan, et al, ‘An Empirical Comparison of Alternative Models of the Short- term Interest Rate’ (1992) 
The Journal of Finance, 1209, 1209-1227. 
317 A Christie, note 308 above. 
318 ME Ruckes, ‘Bank Competition and Credit Standards’ (2004) 17 Review of Financial Studies 1073-1102. 
 
 
83 
Although it has been established that monetary policy is related to financial stability,319 
there is limited empirical support for the contention that low interest rates constitute a 
root cause of financial crisis.320 Nonetheless, IRR may contribute to the build-up of a 
financial crisis, because reduced interest rates enhance asset and collateral values and 
impact on the probability of default estimated by banks.321 This then motivates risk-
taking. Low interest rates also motivate banks to invest in high-margin and high-risk 
areas, possibly leading to a low proportion of safe assets in banks’ asset portfolios. This 
explains why, shortly before the financial crisis of 2007-09, lower interest rates and 
lower bank lending standards were noted, with an emphasis on borrowers with lower 
credit quality.322 Nonetheless, the problem seems to be the banks’ reaction to low interest 
rates, rather than how the latter affect other market forces, without any input from banks. 
In other words, if banks avoid engaging in excessive risk-taking, due to low interest 
rates, there will be no causal link between the latter and a financial crisis. This is why 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has proposed principles to guide 
banks’ IRR management, with banks being obligated to ensure senior management 
oversight of IRR exposure.323 
Despite the fact that low interest rates do not play a directly significant role in financial 
crises, as shown above, it may be argued that, theoretically, it is unlikely for a crisis 
related to IRR to be triggered by Islamic financial institutions. This is because Shariah 
prohibits Riba, or the charging of interest, while debt is only permitted when it relates to 
real transactions and is not used for speculative purposes. Moreover, the relationship 
between the bank (lender) and the customer (borrower or investor) is seen as a 
partnership, where the former has a continued stake, or where both parties have mutual 
interests in the transaction. This implies that risk-shifting is considered as gambling. 
Hence, default risk may not be shifted. It is also difficult for regulators to deduce that 
banks are motivated to engage in excessive risk-taking, due to low interest rates. Islamic 
regulators are consequently in a much better position, since risk is communicated to all 
stakeholders in transactions undertaken by Islamic banks. 
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Notwithstanding the above, given that low interest rates do not play a significant direct 
role in financial crises, it may be difficult to support the argument that the very low or 
non-existent IRR in Islamic transactions demonstrates that Islamic banks have better risk 
management tools. IRR is not included in the Islamic risk management framework or the 
frameworks created by Islamic regulators to monitor and protect the interests of 
investors. 
 
3.3.3. Liquidity Risk 
 
Liquidity risk is the risk of an investment lacking marketability, so that it cannot be sold or 
bought quickly enough to minimise loss.324 The main causes of liquidity risk are an 
unexpected need for capital and a lack of confidence. For example, if customers withdraw 
higher amounts of cash than normal, a bank may face liquidity issues in meeting its 
obligations. Therefore, the main aim of a liquidity risk management strategy is to avoid 
negative net liquid assets, where asset and liability management (ALM) forms a key part of 
liquidity risk management in banking.325 The BCBS introduced a new liquidity standard 
protocol in 2010, devising the Basel III Liquidity Coverage Ratio and the Net Stable Funding 
Ratio, implemented as a framework to ensure funding liquidity. Another technique applied by 
banks is to prevent liquidity problems by holding liquid assets, such as cash.326 This is 
possible when the bank offers a specific firm a long-term loan, with the firm also being 
obliged to pay a security deposit in advance.327 Such a technique is efficient for preventing 
liquidity risks. However, it allows depositors to take charge of the bank, as they are entitled 
to withdraw their cash at any time.328 
When a financial institution cannot harmonise the maturity of assets and liabilities, or more 
specifically, when it cannot satisfy its liabilities, due to insufficient liquidity for regular 
operations, a liquidity risk emerges. This type of risk is the outcome of funding or asset 
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liquidity risks associated with an inability to secure cash at an acceptable cost from loans or 
asset sales, respectively. However, adequately organised cash-flow requirements and the 
securing of new sources of funding in the event of cash deficiency can help contain the 
funding risk; whereas diversifying assets and imposing restrictions on specific illiquid 
products can alleviate asset liquidity risk.329  
Liquidity risk is therefore an outcome of the disparity between the two sides of the balance 
sheet, which either results in excess liquidity or a deficiency in cash.330 During the financial 
crisis of 2007-09, concerns about this outcome became prominent. This is because the 
primary source of stress for banks’ funding conditions was the market’s illiquidity for 
wholesale funding,331 whereby banks were unable to raise liquid asset buffers to 
overcome low market liquidity. Thus, banks that are exposed to liquidity risk are likely 
to sharply contract their supply of credit during a financial crisis.332 The liquidity 
pressure is then transferred to other banks’ balance sheets through drawdowns and 
displaced new lending. A good example is the British bank, Northern Rock. During the 
early 2000s, in order to fund mortgages and other long-term commitments, it relied unduly on 
short-term funding from the interbank lending market.333 With the onset of the global 
financial crisis towards the end of the decade, the bank was unable to generate income from 
its loans and also obtain financing. The bank eventually failed due to a bank run caused by 
news that it was seeking help from the government.334  
 
What is surprising is that prior to the 2007-09 financial crisis, banks and supervisory 
authorities alike failed to anticipate the shocks to liquidity. Given that these shocks were 
incurred by actions that were external to the banks implies that both the banks and 
supervisory authorities used incorrect variables to capture exposure to liquidity risk.335 
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Hence, some banks issued loans from money market funds, rather than from deposits, 
and when the money market funding dried up, they were unable to match their assets and 
liabilities. This explains why the Basel III Accord requires banks to observe both the 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio and the Net Stable Funding Ratio, so that they maintain high-
quality liquid assets to sufficiently cover their total net cash outflow over a period of 30 
days, while the available amount of stable funding exceeds the required amount of stable 
funding over a period of 12 months of extended stress.336 
It is interesting that liquidity risk factors are the same for both conventional and Islamic 
banks. This is because they both operate by obtaining funding from short-term deposits to 
finance long-term loans, meaning that they must adopt liquidity risk management strategies 
to ensure that they meet expected and unexpected cash needs at reasonable cost. Unlike IRR, 
which Islamic banks seldom encounter due to the prohibition of interest, liquidity risk is a 
more serious issue for Islamic banks than for conventional banks. This is because Islamic 
banks cannot use interest-based financial instruments that are designed for liquidity risk 
management including discount windows from the Central Bank, lender of last resort 
facilities, the secondary market for debt instruments, or the intra-bank market. Islamic banks 
are consequently unable to raise funds quickly from the market when required. This is 
exacerbated by the fact that they face additional liquidity risks from certain Islamic 
instruments, such as Mudarabaha or Bay’ al Salam, which may only be traded at par value, 
in order to avoid opening the doors of interest. Accordingly, given the restrictions imposed by 
Shariah, Islamic banks need to be innovative and ingenious in developing Shariah-compliant 
liquidity risk management strategies. 
Such strategies may, for example, take into account the fact that Return on Equity (ROE) in 
Islamic banking is correlated with Return on Assets (ROA), whereas in conventional banking 
these are independent of each other.337 By definition, ROE is the percentage of profitability 
that an organisation generates in relation to the money invested by investors, whereas ROA 
refers to the profitability of a specific organisation in reference to its total assets, efficiently 
allocated by the management.338 As such, liquidity stress in Islamic financial institutions 
must be managed on a trust basis between the institutions’ management, partners, 
members and stakeholders. It must also be managed externally through the regulator, 
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whereby the responsibility for liquidity risk management must be assumed by the bank 
and all its stakeholders.339  
Principles 5.1 and 5.2 of the IFSB guide to Islamic financial institutions are illustrated in 
Box III.3, below. 
Box III.3: Liquidity Risk Management Principles Provided by the IFSB 
 
The IFSB places an emphasis on compliance with Shariah. As shown above, this in turn 
imposes serious limitations on Islamic banks. Moreover, it creates additional liquidity risks, 
given that certain Islamic instruments, such as Mudaraba or Bay’ al Salam, may only be 
traded at par value. As such, Islamic banks are simply required to retain an adequate amount 
of liquidity to guard against insolvency. The IFSB has for example addressed the structure 
and contents of products and services offered by Islamic banks and issued capital adequacy 
standards including a detailed guidance for these institutions.340 It recommends the total 
eligible capital for Islamic banks to the sum of the Core Capital (common equity, retained 
earnings and reserves) and Additional Capital (Shariah-compliant instruments and 
reserves).341 The Core Capital is similar to the Tier 1 Capital under the Basel Accord, while 
the Additional Capital is similar to Tier 2 Capital. The IFSB states that the sum of the Core 
Capital and Additional Capital shall not be less than 8% of the total risk-weighted assets at all 
times. This is the same capital adequacy measure recommended by the Basel II Accord.342 
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The publication of the IFSB standards has been supplemented by several publications related 
to the calculation of capital adequacy.343 However, they are largely based on Pillar 1 of Basel 
II with some modifications to cater for the specificities of Islamic finance. For example, the 
IFSB’s standards on disclosure to promote transparency and discipline in the market are 
stricter. 
 
Islamic banks may also purchase instruments from the Central Bank or government,344 
provided that the instruments are not interest-based. Thus, the IFSB requires Islamic 
regulators to periodically monitor Islamic banks, in order to ensure that they maintain the 
necessary levels of liquidity.345 It thus follows that the argument in support of Islamic banks 
being more resilient than conventional banks to financial crises is difficult to justify on the 
basis of Islamic banks applying better liquidity risk management strategies. The restrictions 
imposed by Shariah actually make it more difficult for Islamic banks to manage their 
liquidity risks. This is because the avenues available to Islamic banks for maintaining 
adequate liquidity to preserve their insolvency are limited. Meanwhile, establishing a 
relationship of trust between their management, partners, members and stakeholders will 
not help Islamic banks retain high-quality liquid assets to sufficiently cover their total 
net cash outflow, or to ensure that the available amount of stable funding exceeds the 
required amount of stable funding over a given period of extended stress. 
It is important to note that the causal link between risk management and financial crises is not 
limited to financial risk or the categories discussed above. Exposure to non-financial risk may 
equally trigger a financial crisis.346 Hence, the effective management of non-financial risk can 
render a financial institution resilient to financial crises. The next section emphasises a key 
non-financial risk, namely operational risk, and examines the relationship between this, the 
risks discussed above, and financial crises. It then attempts to determine whether Islamic 
banks have more effective strategies for managing non-financial risk. 
 
                                                
343 See IFSB, note 334 above, 1-2. 
344 Ibid, 63. 
345 IFSB, Guiding Principles of Risk Management for Institutions (Other than Insurance Institutions) Offering 
Only Islamic Financial Services (IFSB 2005) 20. 
346 LB Andersen, D Hager, S Maberg, MB Naess and M Tungland, ‘The Financial Crisis in an Operational Risk 
Management Context – A Review of Causes and Influencing Factors’ (2012) 105 Reliability Engineering & 
System Safety 3, 3. 
 
 
89 
3.4 The Management of Non-Financial Risk 
 
The main non-financial risks encountered by Islamic banks are operational risks. These arise 
due to inadequate internal processes, strategies and systems, which cause internal system 
failure. A breakdown in corporate governance and internal controls, resulting in performance 
failure, fraud and mistakes, is considered as an operational risk caused by human error.  
Given that it emerges from failed internal processes, it includes various factors, such as staff-
related risks and risks pertaining to legal, political, IT and regulatory domains, as well as 
human error. Meanwhile, transactional processes involve error- or fraud-related risks, with 
financial, image or operational damages also potentially induced as a result of support 
activities, such as human resource management and IT. Accordingly, internal control 
procedures need to be implemented across transactional and support activities. Operational 
risk may also be witnessed in relation to management activities, including project 
management and decision-making. However, management activities are far more difficult 
and sometimes awkward to handle in the context of an operational risk framework, when it is 
considered that making decisions under conditions of uncertainty, without comprehensive 
information, is a management concern. Nonetheless, risks may be mitigated through the 
adoption of decision-making and robust project management processes. 
Although it may be argued that reputational risk is sufficiently important to merit attention in 
its own right, it remains a form of operational risk.347 Thus, where a bank loses the public’s 
trust, it can have an impact on other banks, especially in the case of a relatively recent 
industry, like Islamic finance.348 One striking example of this was the negative publicity 
generated by the collapse of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) in 1991 
and the Al-Baraka Bank’s withdrawal from the UK market in 1993.349 This seriously affected 
customers’ trust in Islamic financial institutions, and the Islamic Bank of Britain (IBB) has 
since struggled to repair the damage to the reputation of Islamic banking in general.350  
However, banks may alleviate reputational risk by cooperating with other financial 
institutions, standardising contracts and procedures, conducting self-assessment, promoting 
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client awareness, and initiating industry affiliations.351 It therefore follows that although 
reputational risk is an important topic in itself, it may be causally linked to financial crises as 
an operational risk, since it relates to performance failure, fraud and errors. 
 
3.4.1 Legal, Compliance and Operational Risk 
 
Legal and compliance risk may be said to constitute a form of operational risk.352 These risks 
arise from the law governing the jurisdiction in which the bank operates. For example, since 
Islamic banks are associated with Shariah law, legal risk is incurred by the fact that this law 
is more prone to change and has high volatility, due to different interpretations of the Quran 
and Sunnah by the relevant religious leaders.353 Moreover, Islamic financial institutions are 
generally obliged to rely on interpretations of Shariah by local religious leaders; members of 
their Shariah boards; local regulations, and their requirements when preparing 
documentation, due to the absence of standardised contract formats for various financial 
tools. In the same vein, legal risk emerges from Islamic contracts, given the lack of litigation 
mechanisms for dealing with issues related to contract enforcement by the counterparty.354 
Thus, contracts must be formulated in such a way that potential disagreements are minimised, 
with the applicable law being clearly specified, so as to alleviate legal risk. However, Chapter 
6 illustrates how in KSA, the financial and non-financial risks discussed above, including 
operational risk, are all forms of legal or compliance risk. This is because the regulators have 
imposed specific obligations to manage these risks and the failure to do so may result in 
sanctions.  
From a general perspective, it may nevertheless be argued that all risks, apart from market, 
credit and liquidity risks, fall into the category of operational risk, since these are essentially 
types of governance risk. From an international perspective for example, operational risk has 
been defined by the BCBS, as the risk of loss arising from external circumstances, or when 
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internal operations, people or systems are managed ineffectively.355 It includes fiduciary risk 
and transparency risk, which require elaborate practices and systems of risk management to 
alleviate them. Nonetheless, operational risk generally becomes more pronounced as 
operational activities expand in scope and size.356 That said, it is demonstrated in Chapter 6 
that where the law imposes an obligation to manage a certain type of risk, the latter becomes 
a legal or compliance risk. This is because the failure to fulfil the obligation attracts legal 
sanctions. 
Due to the fact that it only becomes obvious upon occurrence of a critical situation, such as a 
financial crisis, operational risk presents significant measurement and management 
challenges.357 Notwithstanding this, a consensus is yet to be reached regarding a standard 
framework of operational risk, which is compatible with all organisations, due to the variety 
of practices that this type of risk entails. Internal audit ratings, quality self-evaluation, 
operational risk indicators or Key Risk Indicators (KRIs) (for example, volume, turnover, or 
error rate), and fluctuations in income and losses are just some of the data analysed by 
financial institutions. As such, Islamic banks equally face operational risk, given that their 
employees or managers sometimes fail to conduct business or fulfil contractual obligations in 
accordance with Shariah principles.358 A fiduciary risk also emerges in instances where the 
Islamic bank is unlikely to be fully compliant with a contract’s Shariah obligations. Here, the 
absence of standardised reporting and accounting in Islamic financial institutions leads to 
transparency risk.359 The question that follows is whether Islamic banks have better 
operational risk management systems, which render them more resilient than conventional 
banks to financial crises. 
According to a study by Shafique et al., there is no difference in operational risk features 
between Islamic and conventional banks, as they are all prone to the same kinds of risk.360 
However, Shafique et al. emphasise that operational risk occurs more frequently in Islamic 
banking, due to a number of reasons, such as the cancellation of Mudarabah and Istisna’ 
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contracts, problems arising internally in the control system, breakdowns in back office 
operations, technology risks, and risk in the Islamic legal environment as a whole, which 
comprises Shariah law.361 Abdullah, Shahimi and Ismail evaluated the key issues in the 
management of operational risk in a sample of Malaysian Islamic banks and found that 
although it is significant, due to unique contractual features relating to Shariah, the core 
principles of Basel II may be applied to these institutions.362 Thus, it is also important to 
establish stricter eligibility criteria for capital in Islamic banks. However, the above 
authors note that it is important for the unique characteristics of Islamic banks be taken into 
account, when implementing the core principles of Basel II.363 
Izhar examined exposure to operational risk in Islamic banks in general and found that 
due to their relatively small size, the sophisticated methods of measuring operational 
risk-based capital, which are found in the Basel II framework, are not adapted to Shariah 
principles.364 Moreover, he advises that it is important to collect a significant amount of 
loss data. The Basel II framework outlines many approaches but provides that the Basic 
Indicator Approach is the standard approach under which banks should be required to hold 
capital equal to a fixed percentage of 15% of the average annual gross income.365 Banks 
using the approach must hold capital for operational risk equal to the average over the 
previous three years of a fixed percentage of positive annual gross income. When calculating 
the average, the figures for any year in which the annual gross income is negative or zero are 
excluded from both the denominator and numerator.366 However, in December 2017, the 
BCBS published a new standard approach for measuring minimum operational risk capital 
requirements to replace the existing approaches in the Basel II framework.367 The new 
standard approach is based on the Business Indicator, Business Indicator Component, and the 
Internal Loss Multiplier. The operational risk capital requirement is the product of the 
Business Indicator Component and the Internal Loss Multiplier. Where the bank’s Business 
Indicator is less than 1 billion euros, the capital calculation is not affected by the internal loss 
data, and the operational risk capital is equal to the Business Indicator Component. 
                                                
361 V Greuning, and Z Iqbal, Risk Analysis for Islamic Banks (World Bank Publications 2008) 192. 
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Lastly, Wahyudi et al.368 examined the definition and scope of operational risk in Islamic 
banks but failed to identify a unique risk management strategy aligned with Islamic 
banking. 
The IFSB has outlined principles to guide Islamic financial institutions in designing 
appropriate management strategies. These are presented in Box 3.4, below. 
Box III.4: Operational Risk Management Principles Provided by the IFSB 
 
As noted above, operational risk is particularly prominent in Islamic financial institutions. 
Indeed, Islamic managers have been reported as attributing the highest importance to 
operational risk, after mark-up risk.369 Moreover, greater significance is accorded to 
operational risk in deferred sales contracts, such as Salam and Istisna and even with regard to 
Shariah compliance in contracts, for example, Murabaha and Ijarah. IFSB Principles 7.1 and 
7.2 require systems and controls to be established, including Shariah boards or advisors to 
ensure Shariah compliance. However, they do not propose mechanisms for applying 
regulated pressure, associated with capital buffers that will positively affect the way in 
which Islamic banks adjust their levels of capital and operational risk. It may therefore 
be important to develop a regulatory framework that will reflect the core principles of 
Basel II and Basel III. A resilient bank should have similar standards taking into account 
the complexity and implementation challenges posed by Shariah rules. As such, although 
there is a causal link between operational risk and financial crises, Islamic banks are not 
                                                
368 I Wahyudi et al, ‘Operational Risk in Islamic Banking’ in Risk Management for Islamic Banks: Recent 
Developments from Asia and the Middle East (John Wiley & Sons 2015) Chapter 7.  
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found to have superior operational risk management systems that render them more resilient 
than conventional banks to financial crises. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
A causal link between financial crises and risk management is illustrated above. However, 
risk management is also a very broad concept, which describes a process of identifying, 
assessing and mitigating or eliminating exposure to loss. Thus, each organisation has a risk 
management model that is based on how the managers of that organisation identify risks, 
assess impact and define suitable responses. It implies that some organisations manage risks 
better than others. With regard to policymakers, the main challenge is to create uniform 
standards of risk management, which may then be enforced by the regulators. This may only 
be possible, however, if the various categories of risk emerging from the financial market can 
be identified. As such, the argument that Islamic financial institutions have better risk 
management models must be premised on the evidence of Islamic regulators (both internal 
and external) being capable of identifying the different categories of risk emerging from the 
Islamic financial markets, and their willingness to compel Islamic banks to mitigate or 
eliminate them. 
Islamic banks are faced with special credit risk, including Mudarabah investments and 
Murabaha transactions. They also allocate higher financing and loans, thus increasing their 
exposure to this risk. Moreover, they face bigger challenges in relation to market risk 
management, given that they are required to comply with Shariah principles. Furthermore, 
they are unable to use risk management tools, such as hedging and credit derivatives. Aside 
from this, liquidity risk is more serious for Islamic banks than for conventional banks, due to 
the prohibition of interest. Hence, Islamic banks cannot use interest-based financial 
instruments that are designed for liquidity risk management. Besides, they are unable to raise 
funds quickly from the market when necessary, or to address additional liquidity risks from 
Islamic instruments, such as Mudaraba or Bay’ al Salam, which may only be traded at par 
value. They are equally faced with operational risk, since their employees or managers 
sometimes fail to conduct business or fulfil contractual obligations in accordance with 
Shariah principles. A fiduciary risk then emerges in instances where Islamic banks are 
unlikely to comply in full, with a contract’s Shariah obligations, while the absence of 
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standardised reporting and accounting in Islamic financial institutions leads to transparency 
risk. 
Despite the above risks, Islamic banks do not operate a sounder gearing process, establish a 
better credit-risk environment, maintain, measure and monitor appropriate credit 
administration, or ensure better risk control than their conventional counterparts. Neither is 
there any evidence that Islamic regulators have established stricter eligibility criteria for 
capital in Islamic banks. Moreover, there are no custom-made credit-scoring models or 
unique methods of measuring credit risks, which may be assessed by Islamic regulators. For 
routine risk regulation associated with Islamic banking and trading books, Islamic regulators 
therefore rely on tools such as mark-to-market, stop-loss provisions, gap analysis, back-
testing, and stress-testing, which resemble those used to monitor and assess conventional 
banks. As such, apart from the fact that the Islamic regulator does not prescribe how Islamic 
business should be conducted, there is barely any difference in approach from that of non-
Islamic regulators.  
It may consequently be submitted that Islamic banks are less likely to trigger instability 
through the accumulation of risk, because the financing structures that they use carry lower 
risks, rather than because they implement better risk management techniques. Likewise, their 
financing structures carry relatively low credit risk, because the assets of Islamic banks are 
generally of a debt nature, following sale-based financing, while deposits are on a profit and 
loss-sharing basis. This means that Islamic banks may simply shift the risk of debt default to 
investment depositors. Equally, restrictions are eased by the fact that the Gharar interdiction 
circumscribes the extent and amount of trading by Islamic banks, thus reducing the level of 
risk that they encounter. Further to the above, Islamic banks deal in investments and 
partnerships, rather than lending, making it is easier for supervisory authorities to assess 
whether Islamic banks are viable and can fulfil their financial commitments to creditors. 
Lastly, it was noted in this chapter that in theory, it is unlikely for a crisis related to IRR to 
be triggered by Islamic financial institutions. This is because Shariah prohibits Riba (the 
charging of interest) and debt is only permitted when it relates to actual transactions and 
is not used for speculative purposes. 
It may therefore be contended that Islamic banks are resilient to financial crises, but not as a 
result of their risk management strategies. They are able to withstand shocks or significant 
stresses during financial crises because they are less prone to withdrawals during panics and 
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their lending decisions are not sensitive to deposits. Also, intermediation is asset-based rather 
than debt-based. Theoretically, this should allow for risk sharing rather than the transfer of 
risk, thereby limiting the importance of risk management. It may then be argued that the 
resilience is rather due to Islamic banking being essentially based on profit and loss-sharing 
partnerships, which reduce the overall risk faced by such financial institutions. Also, the fact 
that Islamic banks do not finance instruments such as derivatives that have significant 
inherent risks reduces the overall risk faced by these banks. Nonetheless, this does not imply 
that Islamic banks are necessarily more resilient to financial shocks and stresses than 
conventional banks. This is what this thesis seeks to ascertain. Thus far, although it has been 
established that Islamic banks are resilient, it has not been shown that they are generally more 
resilient than conventional banks. In this light, the next Chapter critically examines the profit 
and loss sharing partnership and seeks to determine how it enhances the resilience of Islamic 
banks, and whether it enables these banks to show stronger resilience than conventional 
banks during financial crises. 
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Chapter 4: 
Financing on a Profit and Loss-Sharing (PLS) Basis 
4.1 Introduction 
 
It is noted in Chapter 3 that there is no evidence that Islamic banks operate a sounder gearing 
process, maintain, measure and monitor appropriate credit administration, and ensure better 
risk control than conventional banking?. However, it was submitted that Islamic banks are 
less likely to trigger instability through the accumulation of risks because the financing 
structures they use carry lower risks. It was then suggested that the financing structures are 
those set up within the Shariah-compliant profit and loss sharing (PLS) or profit sharing 
agreements. This Chapter explores this theory. The investigation is based on the contention 
that equity-based contracts, namely the Mudarabah and Musharakah, are the primary modes 
of financing on the PLS basis,370 supplemented by fixed-return sales-based and assets-based 
modes. The latter may be used to manage the risks that emerge from the former. This Chapter 
begins with a brief analysis of the equity-based primary modes of financing and discusses 
how the mix of risks that emerge from the modes are managed using sales-based and assets-
based instruments. Emphasis is placed on the Murabaha and Ijara. It is then argued that the 
use of the equity-based instruments makes Islamic banks more resilient to financial crises. 
However, serious regulatory challenges posed by the instruments are outlined. Thus, in 
conclusion, it is submitted that banking that is essentially based on equity-based PLS schemes 
as delineated here reduces the overall risk confronted by financial institutions. 
4.2 Equity-Based Modes 
4.2.1 The Mudarabah 
Ibn Rushd of the Maliki School described the Mudarabah as follows: 
the giving of wealth by one person to another so that he may trade with it (in return) for a 
defined ratio of the profit that the worker (amil) earns, that is, a part that is agreed upon 
by both as a third, fourth, or half.371 
                                                
370 NM Sapuana, ‘An Evolution of Mudarabah Contract: A Viewpoint from Classical and Contemporary Islamic 
Scholars’ (2016) 35 Procedia Economics and Finance 349, 350; U Chapra, The Future of Economics: An 
Islamic Perspective (The Islamic Foundation 2000) 274. 
371 Ibid. See also, NM Sapuana, ‘An Evolution of Mudarabah Contract: A Viewpoint from Classical and 
Contemporary Islamic Scholars’ (2016) 35 Procedia Economics and Finance 349, 351. 
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In the same vein, Al-Sarakhsi, a Hanafi scholar of the 11th century, stated that people have a 
need for Mudarabah contracts for the following reasons: 
for the owner of the capital may not find his way to profitable trading activity and the 
person who may find his way to such an activity may not have the capital. And profit 
cannot be attained except by means of both of these, that is, capital and trading activity. 
By permitting this contract, the goal of both is attained.372  
The Mudarabah is a risk-sharing venture, whereby one party, known as the Rabbul-Maal, 
provides capital to the counterparty, the Mudarib, for the purpose of investing in a 
commercial enterprise.373  This mode is also sometimes referred to as the Qirad, Muqaradah 
or Muamalah,374 with the Mudarib being akin to a general or working partner, while the 
Rabbul-Maal is comparable to a sleeping or silent partner. The consideration furnished by the 
Mudarib is a share of the profits generated by the enterprise, according to a predetermined 
ratio. The Mudarabah may also be based on the Sukuk or Islamic bonds, whereby the 
Rabbul-Maal and Mudarib have undivided shares in the ownership of assets related to a 
special investment activity or specific project. The Rabbul-Maal provides the initial 
investment, while the Sukuk holders also provide financing. The project is managed by the 
Mudarib, usually through a Special Purpose Vehicle. This is a limited company that is 
created for a specific purpose such as the issuance of a particular security and isolates the 
owners or financial group from financial risk.375 Hence, the Special Purpose Vehicle isolates 
the Rabbul-Maal and Mudarib from financial risk. Profit is paid to the Sukuk holders and 
Rabbul-Maal, not interest. There is no guarantee that the initial investment will be repaid. 
 
The assumption of risk by the Rabbul-Maal justifies the reward. It also explains why the 
Mudarabah is deemed to resolve conflicts of interest and to curb excessive risk-taking.376  
The managers are required to act in accordance with the terms of the partnership agreement 
and also promote the partnership’s success. This prevents managers from taking on risky 
projects with money provided by the bank’s shareholders. It also prevents managers from 
                                                
372 See T Spoors, Islamic Finance (Lulu 2014) 108. 
373 Azmi Omar, Muhamad Abdu and Raditya Sukmana, Fundamentals of Islamic Money and Capital Markets 
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University of Portsmouth 2017) 87-89. 
374 NMN Zain et al, ‘Gold Investment Application through Mudarabah Instruments in Malaysia: Analysis of 
Gold Dinar as Capital’ (2014) 10 Asian Social Science 173, 174. 
375 D Murphy, Understanding Risk: The Theory and Practice of Financial Risk Management (CRC Press 2008) 
76; T Sainati et al, ‘Special Purpose Entities in Megaprojects: Empty Boxes or Real Companies? Literature 
Review’ (2016) 48 Project Management Journal 55, 56. 
376 See Z Iqbal and M Lewis, An Islamic Perspective on Governance (Edward Elgar 2009) 239. 
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distorting information in order to optimise bonuses or stock-price-related options. This is 
because the Mudarib as a general partner, must be provided with access to all information, 
and makes the important decisions since the Rabbul-Maal (the bank) is a sleeping partner. 
This is essentially a relationship between capital and work.377 Hence, there are instances 
where the bank is the Mudarib while the customer is the Rabbul-Maal. A good example is the 
Mudarabah General Investment Account offered by the Bank Negara of Malaysia.378 The 
customer or depositor seeking an investment opportunity is the Rabbul-Maal. He invests 
through the bank (the Mudarib), which manages the funds. Both parties share in the profit 
according to a pre-agreed ratio. The fund is invested in any Shariah-compliant activity chosen 
by the bank. This implies that the relationship may become very complex, whereby the bank 
uses the money as the Rabbul-Maal in another Mudarabah venture. The money will therefore 
constitute the capital of another venture with a customer (the Mudarib) who provides 
labour.379 The losses are borne by the Rabbul-Maal, which implies that the depositor faces the 
credit risk in the second Mudarabah venture, of which he knows nothing. Nonetheless, some 
Islamic banks also offer the Mudarabah Specific Investment Account, which restricts the 
funds to specific projects approved by the Rabbul-Maal.380 Other Islamic banks compensate 
the depositor for the loss suffered in the business venture with funds from a reserve account. 
The depositor bears all the loss only where there are no funds available in the reserve account 
or the loss was due to the bank’s negligence.381 However, the form of the Mudarabah is 
uncertain from a legal perspective, although it may be compared to a limited investment 
partnership, established as a collective investment scheme or venture capital fund.  
 
As noted above, Mudarabah agreements can be very complex with the use of two-tier 
models, where two contracts exist within the same scheme.382 The first of these contracts is 
concluded between the depositors or financiers and the bank (acting as an intermediary), 
while the second is between the bank (acting as the financier) and the borrower (Mudarib). 
                                                
377 S Archer and RAA Karim, ‘Profit-Sharing Investment Account in Islamic Bank: Regulatory Problems and 
Possible Solutions’ (2009) Journal of Banking Regulations 300, 300-309. 
378 See Bank Negara Malaysia, ‘Investment Account’ (2014). Available at: 
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and 7.1. 
379 See also, AA Hamzah et al, ‘Islamic Investment Deposit Account through Mudarabah and Commodity 
Murabah Contract: An Overview’ (2014) 9 Prosiding Perkem 28, 29-30. 
380 Ibid. 
381 See for example, Nib International Bank, ‘Mudarabah Investment Saving Account’ (2018). Available at: 
http://www.nibbanksc.com/mudharabah-investment-saving-account/  [29 January 2018]. 
382 See AM Vernados, Islamic Banking and Finance in South East Asia: Its Development and Future (2nd edn, 
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The parties of the first contract share the bank’s profits, while the parties of the second share 
the profits gained by the Mudarib. The profits may be generated from approved assets bought 
and sold with money provided by the bank or rent that the latter charges as co-owner of 
property bought with its money. Theoretically, such PLS operations should mitigate liquidity 
risk, since they appear on both sides of the balance sheet: withdrawals of deposits, and loans 
drawn down by borrowing clients. The depositors share the risk with the bank on the liability 
side and absorb any shock on the asset side.383 Thus, the bank may sell the asset bought by 
the Mudarib if it is unable to meet its obligations in terms of funds demanded by clients. 
Nonetheless, in practice, the unpredictable conduct of the borrower poses a moral hazard, 
thereby deterring many Islamic banks from using this mode of financing.384  
 
The moral hazard in this context relates to the situation where one party is responsible for 
furthering the interests of another but decides to put their own interests first.385 As defined by 
Dowd, ‘a moral hazard is where one party is responsible for the interests of another, but has 
an incentive to put their own interests first.’386 With regard to Islamic banks, Rahman noted 
that moral hazard problems could be ex ante and ex post.387 They are ex ante where the bank 
is unable to effectively monitor the borrower or the Mudarib and therefore cannot develop a 
credible project that ensures prudent behaviour. They are ex post where the bank is unable to 
observe returns, and some dishonest borrowers can then pretend that their returns are low. 
Such a Mudarib may therefore extract value out of the project, even if it leads the bank’s 
insolvency.388 
 
Thus, the Mudarib might take excessive risks that the bank would then have to bear or spend 
the bank’s assets on non-value added perks. However, this is a risk confronted by all 
Mudarabah transactions, given that financiers are always obliged to rely on the Mudarib’s 
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expertise and good faith. The Mudarib is responsible for the management or operation of the 
venture capital fund, while the Rabbul-Maal simply contributes money to the fund. If a 
scheme fails, despite the Rabbul-Maal not being liable for any debts or obligations of the 
fund (beyond the amount contributed),389 it will suffer a loss of capital, while the Mudarib 
will only suffer the loss of its services. The Mudarib is only required to repay the principal of 
the loan issued by the bank. However, where the money is provided as capital for a specific 
project, the Mudarib is under no obligation to repay the capital. That is why it is noted above 
that some banks such as Nib International Bank have reserve accounts from which they can 
repay the Rabbul-Maal. Nonetheless, where the reserve accounts do not have sufficient 
funds, the bank is not liable to repay the Rabbul-Maal unless the scheme failed due to the 
bank’s negligence or fault. 
 
Despite the uncertainty over the legal form of the Mudarabah, as well as the moral hazard in 
the investment, parties in the Bailiwick of Jersey may establish simultaneous limited 
partnerships with the Mudarabah, insofar as the latter fulfils the requirements of Shariah 
Standard No.13 of the Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial 
Institutions (AAOIFI).390 This demonstrates the closeness between a Mudarabah and a 
limited partnership. In fact, the origins of the European partnership or commenda may be 
traced back to the Mudarabah, which was adopted by Italian merchants to finance their 
trips.391 Interestingly, this was precisely the early purpose of Mudarabah agreements, which 
explains the origins of the term in ‘Darabah fil ard’, referring to travel for the purpose of 
trade - although this expression is used in the Quran, not the Mudarabah. It demonstrates that 
the Mudarabah itself forms part of a practice that developed through the expansion of trade 
across the Middle East to Central Europe, rather than constituting a specific prescription of 
the Quran. It even predates the dawn of Islam.  
Banaji intimates that the Mudarabah developed when trade with the Ottoman Empire and 
Muslim Near East was flourishing and trading companies, bills of exchange and contracts 
were established.392 It was so effective that it united merchants and prevented the ritual 
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suicides of many bankrupts.393 Notwithstanding this, it may be difficult to argue that 
financing projects through an ancient form of limited partnership/collective investment 
scheme can curb excessive risk-taking and enhance the resilience of banks in the face of 
financial crises. The Mudarabah is among the oldest contracts in Islamic history.394 It has 
been noted that the Holy Prophet was a Mudarib for his future wife, Khadija, who was the 
Rabbul-Maal.395 It is ideally established in an interest-free economic system where traders 
are honest and have no incentive to prioritise their selfish interests.396 However, it is uncertain 
whether such a system exists in the contemporary society. 
Bacha observed that although Islamic banking became very dominant in Malaysia, fewer 
banks used Mudarabah financing, compared to short-term trade financing.397 This was ironic 
given that Mudarabah is based on profit and loss sharing which is deemed to be at the core of 
Islamic finance. He attributed the Mudarabah’s lack of popularity to the serious agency 
problems embedded in the scheme, as well as the lack of the bonding effect of debt financing 
that can create perverse incentives. He noted further that when a financier was faced with 
conventional debt, equity financing, and the Mudarabah, the latter was the worst option in a 
risk-return framework because the expected returns were low, and the risk was high; the 
financier shares the profit with the manager cum borrower, while the financier bears all the 
loss. As such, the Mudarabah is structured in accordance with a strict interpretation of the 
Shariah, which may not be suitable for contemporary business society. He proposed ways of 
addressing the inequality in the distribution of risk and returns, viz., using the principles of 
mezzanine and vertical-strip financing,398 although he did not show how these solutions 
would comply with the Shariah, which is the main purpose of Islamic finance. 
 
In his dissertation on the application of the Mudarabah in Malaysian Islamic banks, 
Shaharuddin noted that the rapid growth Islamic finance was driven by the use of Ijarah and 
Murabaha debt-like contracts rather than the Mudarabah and Musharakah which are based 
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on profit and loss sharing.399 He argued that this is because it is easier to adapt the Ijarah and 
Murabaha to contemporary banking practices, although that entails in some instances 
circumventing established principles of the Shariah. Also, even when banks used the 
Mudarabah financing scheme, they focused on risk-free instruments rather than interest-free 
instruments. Thus, they financed the purchase of houses, cars and letters of credit and 
invested in the inter-bank money market. They also used the Profit Equalisation Reserve, 
which is a specific amount of money that is appropriated by the bank out of the Mudarabah 
fund before allocating the Mudarib share in order to raise the owners’ equity and maintain a 
certain level of return on investment for the account holders.400 This enables the bank to 
continue to pay competitive returns, even when the investment portfolio has 
underperformed.401 He argued this market driven approach emphasised the bankers’ needs 
which is inconsistent with the spirit of the profit and loss sharing scheme prescribed by the 
Shariah.  
 
What is important about the Mudarabah is that it operates on the basis of mutual trust and 
good faith, in order to minimise moral hazards.402 Mutual trust is sustained by the belief that 
the Mudarabah is a trade instrument endorsed by the Holy Scriptures. Early Islamic jurists, 
who were venerated, such as Imam Malik and Imam Shafi, described family members and 
close friends of the Holy Prophet investing in the wealth of orphans under Mudarabah 
agreements.403 Suhaib also cites the Holy Prophet’s statement that “There are three things 
which are blessed, selling with a postponed credit, Muqaradah and mixing wheat and barley 
for one’s household and not for sale.”404 Moreover, the second to the tenth hadith explain 
various aspects of the Mudarabah and highlight accepted practices.405 As such, the 
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Mudarabah is essentially an Ubberimae Fidei (utmost good faith) contract, with the parties 
being compelled by their belief in Islam to act honestly.   
Given that the Rabbul-Maal agrees to share the risk of loss with the Mudarib, it is imperative 
that the latter acts in good faith. This explains why the Shariah principles governing 
Mudarabah transactions include fair dealing and the certainty of the contract. Excessive risk-
taking and fraud, which are among the causes of financial crises (see Chapter 2), are reduced 
to a minimum by the requirement of good faith. This is why there is a movement to recognise 
good faith as a general contractual duty in English law.406 In fact, English scholars who reject 
the idea of a duty of good faith propound an ontological view that is diametrically opposed to 
what is endorsed by Islamic scholars. Sir Roy Goode, for example, argues that the general 
duty of good faith should be rejected, because “the predictability of the legal outcome of a 
case is more important than absolute justice”.407 He then maintains that the “last thing 
[English courts] want to do is to drive business away by vague concepts of fairness which 
make judicial decisions unpredictable”.408 Nonetheless, Islamic scholars prioritise fairness, 
honesty and the promotion of general welfare.409   
Good faith is a contractual principle in many non-Islamic countries, such as the US410 and 
Germany.411 In the US, section 1-304 of the Uniform Commercial Code of 1952 states that 
“Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its 
performance and its enforcement”. Thus, through the duty of good faith, the Mudarabah 
provides an avenue for obtaining the economic benefits of limited partnerships and 
corporations, while avoiding the inherent risks of these commercial enterprises.  
With regard to corporations, the separation of powers between the Mudarib and the Rabbul-
Maal is akin to the separation of shareholder ownership from directors’ control. The 
corporation operates with resources provided by the shareholder, which are placed under the 
management of directors. These directors then offer the required skills and expertise. 
However, the Mudarabah does not provide any right of oversight or governance to the 
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Rabbul-Maal in exchange for his or her funds, while the Rabbul-Maal does not have a board 
of directors to monitor the Mudarib. Equally, there is no provision of Shariah law that 
resembles section 172 of the UK Companies Act, 2006 (CA, 2006), which states that ‘A 
director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to 
promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole.’ Moreover, 
unlike the shareholders, the Rabbul-Maal cannot remove the Mudarib, if dissatisfied with the 
performance of the latter. Meanwhile, the Mudarib does not have a duty to issue annual 
reports and the Rabbul-Maal does not have the right to appoint external auditors.412 This 
implies that the Mudarabah does not address the agency risk emerging from the threat of 
fund managers acting in their own interests, as opposed to the interests of the fund or the fund 
provider.  
Regardless of the above, section 172, CA 2006 does not fully resolve the agency problem, 
given that a similar problem exists between the board and the management.413 In addition, it 
is uncertain whether the management are required to continue promoting the success of the 
company for the benefit of shareholders, when the company becomes insolvent.414 Logically, 
the interests of creditors should become the primary interest, in the case of insolvency. 
Nonetheless, this shows that the best way to resolve the agency problem is to consistently 
align the interests of the managers and owners,415 which is the main objective of the 
Mudarabah. 
Notwithstanding the above, it must be noted that the objective of the fund provider or 
investor cannot be limited to finding a person with sufficient skill or expertise to manage the 
funds; while the objective of the fund manager cannot be limited to finding an investor. 
Hence, there are other risks that Mudarabah transactions confront, apart from agency 
problems and moral hazards. These include credit risk, operational risks and a certain level of 
liquidity risk. Islamic banks often use other instruments to mitigate these, as explained below. 
In that case, the objective is to demonstrate that the effective use of PLS equity-based 
contracts, as well as of the instruments presented below, is to mitigate the embedded risks 
and thus enhance the resilience of financial institutions in the face of financial crises. 
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4.2.2 The Musharakah 
 
Also known as Shirka, the Musharakah represents a joint venture, used by merchants across 
the ancient Middle East to conduct sizeable trading operations abroad.416 However, unlike the 
Mudarabah, each party contributes to an agreed percentage of the capital, labour and 
entrepreneurship.417 This implies that there is no silent or sleeping partner. Although it is 
comparable to a joint venture in the UK,418 the Musharakah is characterised by shared returns 
and risks, and shared governance and ownership. Thus, the partners pursue this venture to 
gain scale efficiencies by pooling their resources and sharing risk in major investments. 
Equally, as with joint ventures in the UK and US, it is uncertain whether the Musharakah is a 
legal relationship sui generis; it is generally treated as an equity-based partnership and there 
is no attempt in the literature to distinguish it from a legal partnership (Shirka). In fact, what 
distinguishes the Musharakah from the Mudarabah are the terms of the agreement. With 
regard to the former, all partners are working partners and contribute to the fund, while in the 
latter, only the sleeping partner provides the capital. It may therefore be stated that there is no 
logical basis for distinguishing between the Musharakah and a partnership and the same legal 
principles should be applied to both.419 This is because the Musharakah has not developed to 
a point, where it may no longer be recognised as a partnership. Hence, since partnerships may 
be contractual (Shirka al uqud) or non-contractual (Shirka al milk), the Musharakah may also 
be based on a contract or joint ownership, without a formal partnership agreement.420 
Nevertheless, the Musharakah is closer to the form of a legal partnership (Shirka) than to the 
Mudarabah. This is because a key characteristic of the Shirka is the mixing of capital shares 
to make individual shares indistinguishable. This is known as Ikhtilat.421 Under the 
Mudarabah, only the silent party provides the capital meaning there is no mixing of capital 
shares or mingling of wealth. It thus follows that unless provided to the contrary, the liability 
of the partners in a Musharakah agreement is unlimited, given that their liability for the debts 
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of a Shirka is unlimited. Nonetheless, where the laws of the jurisdiction provide for limited 
partnerships, the Musharakah may be set up as a limited partnership, or as a diminishing or 
digressive scheme, whereby one partner’s equity in the asset progressively diminishes until 
the asset is fully owned by the other partner:422 the one partner is simply bought out of the 
partnership after receiving payments over and above its share of the profits.423  
The various products that a bank may purchase under Mudarabah and Musharakah 
agreements carry different types of risk. These are largely related to the conduct of the 
counterparties and the limitations on banks as financiers to monitor and control these 
counterparties. However, emphasis is placed on good faith and fairness, in order to mitigate 
such risks, while banks equally use sales-based and lease asset-based contracts for this 
purpose. The next section explores the combination of risks embedded in the above PLS 
equity-based contracts and shows how sales-based and lease asset-based contracts are used 
for the mitigation of risk. 
 
4.3 Managing the Mix of Risks in Equity-Based Modes 
 
There are generally two types of Mudarabah agreement: the restricted Mudarabah and the 
unrestricted Mudarabah.424 Under the restricted Mudarabah, the fund provider specifies the 
terms and conditions that will bind the fund manager. This means, for example, that the fund 
manager may be limited to using the funds in a specific location or for specific purposes. 
Where the fund manager violates the terms, he or she may be liable for any loss. On the other 
hand, no limitations are placed on the manager of an unrestricted Mudarabah.  
Theoretically, restricted partnerships pose a very low level of risk to the participating banks, 
given that the risks emerging from them relate to the specific assets or project to which a fund 
is linked.425 In contrast, the unrestricted partnership is exposed to higher financial risk, since 
the bank, as the fund provider, gives the Mudarib the permission to funnel the money into 
any type of project that will further the interests of both parties. The restricted partnership is 
akin to the Mudarabah Specific Investment Account offered by the Bank Negara of Malaysia, 
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while the unrestricted partnership is akin to the Mudarabah General Investment Account 
offered by the Bank Negara of Malaysia discussed above. As such, Rabbul-Maal may decide 
to trust the bank and allow it to invest the deposit in any project that it deemed profitable, or 
the Rabbul-Maal may make the deposit for the investment in a designated project only. 
However, both forms of undertaking are exposed to fiduciary risks, including the risk of 
misconduct, negligence, poor internal control and poor governance. As noted above, this is 
exacerbated by the fact that the fund provider has no right of intervention or oversight. With 
regard to the Musharakah, these risks are lower, since both parties contribute to the capital 
and management. The reserve accounts used by Nib International Bank as well as the Profit 
Equalisation Reserve discussed above may mitigate these risks, although the risks cannot be 
eliminated given that only part of the Mudarabah fund is appropriated by the bank for these 
reserves. A higher level of financial disclosure and transparency is therefore required for 
Mudarabah agreements. Nonetheless, in both the Mudarabah and Musharakah, the parties 
must have thorough knowledge of the capital, so that all possibility of ambiguity or 
uncertainty is eliminated. Moreover, given the duty of utmost good faith under Shariah, the 
Mudarib or fund manager will be held liable, if he does not fully disclose financial 
information to the Rabbul-Maal on request. As a result, the latter should have ready access to 
audited reports and information concerning market depth and price levels.426 
It is well-established that Shariah law offers many guidelines on the application of the 
principle of good faith, in light of the ethical behaviour required of Muslim traders.427 This 
explains why there is a sanction against inserting terms that could be considered unfair into 
an agreement.428 Moreover, the divinely-sanctioned doctrine of Hisbah or accountability 
imposes a duty on the ruler or government to intervene in the market, enjoining the right and 
just and forbidding the wrong and unjust.429 Caliph Ali is known to have written to the 
Governor of the Rashidun empire, El-Ashter El-Nakee, instructing him to deal with traders, 
whose behaviour was having a detrimental effect on good faith transactions.430 Hence, there 
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is some consensus on the requirement of good faith in contractual performance at the 
conclusion of a contract.431 
It follows from the above that the mutual trust and good faith of the Mudarib and Rabbul-
Maal will reduce moral hazards and agency problems. They will also minimise the risk of 
information failure. Where the Rabbul-Maal does not have access to information about the 
management and performance of a project, the risk of information failure or asymmetry is 
very high, since the Mudarib will possess greater material knowledge.432 This will 
consequently lead to an imbalance of power and unreasonably increase the project’s exposure 
to risks. However, these risks may be mitigated by full disclosure and transparency on the 
part of the Mudarib, owing to his duty to behave with the utmost good faith.  Nonetheless, as 
noted above, there are other risks involved in these transactions, although only a small 
proportion of the assets of most Islamic banks constitute equity. Given this fact, the main risk 
inherent in Mudarabah and Musharakah agreements is credit risk. The Islamic Financial 
Services Board (IFSB) has noted that although Sukuk instruments are actively rated by major 
international rating agencies, such as Fitch and Moody or Standard & Poor, the Mudarabah 
accounts for only 4.8% of the new global Sukuk issuances, while the Musharakah accounts 
for just 5.6%.433 Similarly, the Mudarabah accounts for only 2.4% of the global Sukuk 
outstanding, while the Musharakah accounts for 16.9%.434  
Credit risk in this context is the probability of loss as a result of the Mudarib’s default or 
inability to repay a debt in time. Thus, it is essentially of risk to the borrower, as there is the 
possibility that the Mudarib, like any other lender, may fail to fulfil obligations and 
responsibilities pertaining to the agreed stipulations. However, the credit risk is only 
enhanced, if the bank as the Rabbul-Maal fails to conduct a suitable risk analysis, prior to 
entering into the agreement, and fails to monitor the Mudarib, who has a duty to act in good 
faith. Regarding Musharakah transactions, the bank or financier participates in the 
management of the project, which makes it easier to assess and manage credit risk. 
However, banks using Mudarabah agreements also face operational risks, due to a lack of 
oversight. These risks may emanate from the failure of internal control systems, difficulties in 
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monitoring the general implementation of the contract, and problems with managing 
commodity inventories in illiquid markets. As noted above, however, the enforcement of the 
duty of utmost good faith mitigates these risks, although they will be lower in the case where 
the bank is the Mudarib, given that it will have skill, expertise and experience in managing 
similar projects within the specific legal environment. Nevertheless, it follows that where the 
bank is the Rabbul-Maal, the operational risk will be high, due to the fund manager’s 
possible incompetence or dishonesty. Nonetheless, this is a risk that all investors are exposed 
to. The advantage of an Islamic bank is that the fund manager has a duty of utmost good 
faith. Despite this, however, what renders the Mudarabah and Musharakah problematic is 
that they are not secured by a collateral asset, whereby the bank or financier can recoup the 
investment by liquidating the assets tied to the funds in the event of default. As already 
explained earlier, this risk is lower in Musharakah agreements, since there is no silent or 
sleeping partner, but where the project becomes insolvent, the entire capital sum invested 
under both schemes is lost, given that it will rank lower than the debt instruments.435  
Further to the above, since the Rabbul-Maal may withdraw its money from the fund at any 
time, the Mudarib may be confronted with enhanced liquidity risk. Both partners of the 
Musharakah will face the same risk, given that they will be obliged to rely on the 
counterparty’s capacity to provide the funds committed and to pay the expenses of the 
partnership. The risk is further enhanced by the fact that Islamic banks cannot use interest-
based financial instruments, which are designed for liquidity risk management, such as 
discount windows from the central bank, a secondary market for debt instruments, and an 
intra-bank market. In addition, instruments like Bay’ al Salam may only be traded at par 
value, so as to avoid opening the door to interest. Hence, it is uncertain how the regulator will 
be able to ensure that Islamic banks secure funding liquidity, if they are not compelled to use 
liquidity standard protocols - such as those introduced by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) - or required to implement quantitative liquidity standards, like the 
Basel III Liquidity Coverage Ratio.436 The IFSB notes that in the near future, Islamic banks 
are likely to face a shortage of high-quality collateral to meet the heightened regulatory 
requirements of Basel III.437  
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Banks that implement equity-based contracts also confront serious portfolio risks and as 
stated in Chapter 2, these include market or undiversifiable risk and idiosyncratic risk. The 
former relates to price, equity, and exchange or interest rate fluctuations in the general 
market, while the latter is a company-specific risk. There is also an important benchmark rate 
risk embedded in almost all products of these banks, given that they do not deal with interest-
based assets. Moreover, although Islamic banks are not confronted by interest rate return risk 
(IRR), the value of their investments may nevertheless change, due to shifts in the return rate 
spread between two rates. Aside from the above, Islamic banks do not charge fixed returns on 
finances provided via equity-based contracts. Hence, there is a risk that returns may deviate 
from what is expected by depositors or investment account holders, with an asset-liability 
mismatch requiring the bank to reprice the mismatch. An empirical study conducted by 
Ariffin et al found that this was one of the three most important risks posed by the equity-
based contracts used in Islamic banks.438 
The Rabbul-Maal or rational financier requires an effective tool to manage its risk position 
through a bank. However, such a bank would be exclusively permitted to use Islamic 
instruments. Despite this serious restriction, however, some Islamic instruments may be used 
to effectively mitigate the risks embedded in PLS equity-based contracts. The discussion in 
the following section is centred on two of the most widely used instruments of this nature. 
 
 
4.3.1 The Use of Sale-based and Lease Asset-based Contracts 
4.3.1.1 The Murabahah 
 
The Murabahah is a financing structure in the form of a sales contract, whereby one party 
purchases an asset and leases the asset to the other party, who subsequently makes periodic 
payments until the loan is repaid in full.439 Ownership is thus transferred to the second party. 
The underlying contract for deferred payment is called the Bai-muajjal.440 The parties must 
agree on the mark-up or cost-plus price for the asset. Hence, the contract is used to finance 
the purchase of assets, without involving interest payments.441 The financier discloses the 
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cost incurred in acquiring the asset and then adds a profit in the form of a percentage or lump 
sum thereon. This is quite similar to charging interest. However, as observed by Saeed, 
Islamic banks interpret Riba as occurring mainly in financial transactions whereby the 
borrower is obliged to pay for the use of money lent. Since, neither the Quran nor the Sunna 
states that any increase given to pay a debt (as in this case) is Riba, Islamic banks are 
theoretically allowed to charge a mark-up in Murabaha contracts. Neinhaus therefore noted 
as follows: 
For the Islamic banks, especially their advisers in Islamic law, the prohibition of interest is 
not mainly an economic problem, as it is for Muslim economists who claim the allocative and 
distributive superiority of an interest-free system, but it is first and foremost a legal 
prescription. Prohibited is any predetermined positive return to the provider of capital in a 
purely financial transaction, that is where an entrepreneur receives from a bank liquidity or 
money for utilisation at his own discretion. Murabaha, mark-up or Ijara, leasing, are not such 
purely financial transactions, because the entrepreneur does not receive liquidity or money but 
real assets, i.e. merchandise or machinery.442 
It has however been argued by some Islamic scholars that the mark-up in price is the same as 
financing on the basis of simple interest because they both require a fixed pre-determined 
return on capital.443 However, regardless of how the prohibition of Riba is construed, and 
whether the mark-up should be used only for trade-specific practices rather than financing 
schemes,444 the allocative and distributive superiority of the Islamic system is not based on 
the prohibition of interest but rather on the financier’s obligation to disclose the cost incurred 
in acquiring the asset. This promotes fair trade and prevents the buyer from making an 
unreasonably high profit, or profit that exceeds the normal opportunity for profit derived from 
capital and labour costs. It then follows that the financier may only impose a penalty for late 
payment, if it undertakes to ‘purify’ the amount received as a penalty by donating it to 
charity.445  
The fact that the financier is allowed to charge a penalty to deter late payment partially 
mitigates the credit risk emerging from the counterparty’s delayed or deferred payments. 
Where the financier has already delivered the asset, it is also exposed to credit risk, if the 
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counterparty fails to make payment in time. However, this risk is not specific to Murabahah 
agreements or Islamic banks. Most banking transactions that involve the issuing of a loan or 
the financing of a purchase of an asset are exposed to this risk. Where the purchased asset is 
tied to the debt, the debt may be satisfied out of the asset’s value in the event of default by the 
client. Thus, the asset - or any other asset of value - may be placed as collateral for the debt, 
in accordance with Shariah Standard Number 39 of the AAOIFI. The bank simply needs to 
include procedures in the contract for the physical repossession of the asset. The Sukuk and 
shares of Islamic financial institutions may also be used as collateral. Notwithstanding this, 
however, a bank’s recourse will be limited to the asset being financed and no further mark-up 
or penalty may be applied. Given the unfairness of this restriction, some Shariah Boards 
allow banks to recover additional amounts to off-set any damage or loss caused by the 
client’s default.446 Nevertheless, it should be added here that there is no consensus on the 
legitimacy of compensation for loss caused by default. 
Further to the above, the financier must also confront operational risks, although these are 
less significant than in the equity-based transactions discussed above. This is because the 
financier does not rely on the client’s internal control systems to identify and manage 
problems with operational processes. Nonetheless, due to the asset-based nature of the mode 
of financing, the drafting and execution of the underlying contracts may give rise to 
operational risks. However, once again, these risks are not specific to Murabahah agreements 
or Islamic banks. 
As noted above, there is an important benchmark rate risk embedded in almost all of the 
products offered by Islamic banks, because they do not deal with interest-based assets. There 
is consequently a high probability that an investment will not meet the benchmark or 
minimum rate of return, where other financial institutions are trading interest-based assets on 
the same market. Islamic banks rely on returns receivable based on the nature of the mark-up 
on Murabahah assets (fixed in advance), or on returns on investments corresponding to 
market expectations.447 This is an expensive option for the bank, since it must forgo all or 
part of its share of the profits, in order to pay the investment account holder a rate of return 
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that is similar to the benchmark rate. This attempt to absorb the market risk therefore results 
in a displaced commercial risk.448  
Additionally, for the mark-up rate, it is uncertain whether Murabahah agreements can use an 
external interest rate as a benchmark, such as the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR).449 
This is the average interest rate charged to leading banks in London, when they borrow from 
other banks. As a result, LIBOR is based on interest or Riba, which is prohibited under 
Shariah law. It then becomes difficult to distinguish between interest and the guaranteed 
profit collected by the financier from Murabahah transactions. This is why it has been 
described as a trick designed to defeat the underlying intent of Shariah.450 Moreover, Siddiqi 
emphasises that the Murabahah ensures the passing of any risk to which the transaction is 
exposed, on to the client, just as conventional banks insure risks.451 
Notwithstanding the above, Islamic banks may use the Murabahah to purchase and sell 
commodities, as a means of managing illiquidity or mitigating the liquidity risk that emerges 
from Mudarabah and Musharakah transactions. Shariah principles require the underlying 
asset to be non-perishable, uniquely identifiable and freely available. Hence, many Islamic 
banks use metals traded on the London Stock Exchange,452 while others use crude palm oil.453 
The Mudarabah is therefore implemented in a way that resembles the interbank deposit 
transactions of conventional banks. The investing bank buys the asset from a broker at cost 
and sells it to a client bank at cost-plus, based on deferred payment. The broker then sells the 
asset to another broker at cost, while the transaction may be reversed, if the investing bank 
faces liquidity issues.454 Some central banks, such as Bank Negara Malaysia conduct these 
transactions with local banks, as well as with foreign Islamic banks.455 It should however be 
noted that the investee bank neither possesses nor owns the underlying asset, when selling to 
another broker at cost. Hence, this raises issues about the legitimacy of this transaction, since 
it is Gharar for a seller to offer a product that it does not own. Furthermore, although it 
resolves any short-term liquidity problems created by Mudarabah and Musharakah 
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transactions, it creates long-term illiquidity problems, due to low returns and an absence of 
interest.  
Lastly, the instrument is of little value in an illiquid secondary market. This is an especially 
serious problem in Islamic finance domiciles with limited capital market activities, unless 
they host conventional capital and stock markets - as in the case of Pakistan’s thriving 
Karachi Stock Exchange. This is because the secondary market would be highly likely to face 
illiquidity problems, where banks remained the primary or only source of funding. 
4.3.1.2 The Ijara 
 
The Ijara is also an asset-based mode of financing, which enables Islamic financial 
institutions to manage any risks emerging from Mudarabah and Musharakah transactions, or 
to securitise the debts arising from them. Using the Ijara, a bank may earn profit without 
charging interest, in accordance with Shariah principles,456 similar to a lease agreement in the 
UK. The term ‘Ijara’ is derived from the term Al-ajr, which may be translated as 
‘compensation’, ‘reward’ or ‘counter value’.457 It relates to the Quranic term, ujar, which 
signifies something given in exchange for usufruct or the right to enjoy the use of another’s 
property and its profits.458 The two main requirements of an Ijara contract consist of the 
parties agreeing to the terms of the contract, with the subject of the contract being usufruct or 
an agreed rental. However, the subject of the contract must actually exist and have a valuable 
use. Thus, assets with no usufruct cannot be leased under an Ijara contract and these include 
things that cannot be used unless they are consumed, such as oil, money or food.459 
Moreover, only the usufruct is transferred to the lessee, implying that the corpus of the asset 
remains under the lessor’s ownership. Likewise, the rental and period of the lease must be 
clearly defined.460 
As a result, the Ijara contract generally carries lower risk and provides better prospects of 
generating profit for Islamic financial institutions, which implies that it may also be used to 
manage illiquidity. It is often used with forward sales modes of financing, such as Isistna to 
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finance the construction of project assets.461 Upon completion of the project, the title of the 
building is transferred to the bank, which then enters into a parallel Ijara or Isistna at a mark-
up with a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) for lease or purchase of the asset. The Isistna 
ensures that the bank retains ownership of the underlying asset, in order to sell or lease it to 
the SPV once construction is complete.  
Meanwhile, where the subject of the contract is a fungible good and the bank is required to 
pay the purchase price in full at the time of entering into the agreement, the forward purchase 
agreement is the Salam.462 The risk embedded in Salam agreements is higher, because the 
bank may purchase an asset that it is eventually unable to sell. Nonetheless, it follows that the 
bank may enter into a Mudarabah or Musharakah agreement, if the subject is a house or 
other tangible asset. After paying for the construction of the house, it may then enter into a 
parallel Ijara contract at a mark-up with an SPV for the lease of the house. The Ijara contract 
consequently absorbs any shocks from the Mudarabah or Musharakah agreement. 
The Sukuk or Shariah-compliant bond also offers strong potential for the securitisation of a 
secondary market for Ijara assets. Standard 17 of the AAOIFI describes the Sukuk as 
“securities of equal denomination representing individual ownership interests in a portfolio of 
eligible existing or future assets”. Although the structure of the Sukuk may be based on both 
equity-based and asset-based contracts, the Ijara Sukuk is the most widely used, as indicated 
above.463 The Sukuk involves investment in tangible assets and pays profit rather than 
interest.464 Where the Sukuk securities have joint ownership of an asset purchased by an 
investment company or special purpose vehicle, the Sukuk holders will be entitled to collect 
rent on the asset as profit. However, the Sukuk holders will not be the owners of the asset, 
since only the usufruct is transferred to them. Given that the Sukuk is asset-backed, however, 
the probability of default is low and in theory, the credit and operational risk will also be low.  
The Ijara Sukuk is often used by Islamic financial institutions in their liquidity management. 
Where the government as the originator sells an asset to an SPV, which is acting for an 
investment company, the SPV securitises the asset and sells Sukuk certificates to investors. 
The SPV will then be able to pay for the asset with the proceeds from the sale of the Sukuk 
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463 See also, I Sobol, note 378 above, 572. 
464 A Mirakhor and I Zaidi, ‘Profit-and-Loss Sharing Contracts in Islamic Finance’ in MK Hassan and M Lewis 
(eds), Handbook of Islamic Banking (Edward Elgar 2007) 53. 
 
 
117 
certificates. In turn, the asset is leased back to the government, which makes rental payments. 
These are then passed to the certificate holders as profit. Islamic banks may therefore manage 
liquidity by purchasing Ijara Sukuk as a means of rental income. When they face liquidity 
problems, they may sell the certificate on the secondary market to obtain liquidity, but where 
the secondary market is illiquid, they may sell the certificate to the central bank.465  
Notwithstanding the above, the legitimacy of this risk management scheme is questionable, 
since in many cases, the underlying assets are not readily available; implying that the Sukuk is 
actually asset-based, rather than asset-backed. Sukuk holders are only granted beneficial 
ownership, which is in fact an unsecured debt claim against the originator. However, Shariah 
requires a true sale transaction, where full ownership is transferred to the buyer. Moreover, 
Warde raised an important concern relating to what would happen to Sukuk in the event of 
failure and whether certificate holders will be treated as creditors or owners of the underlying 
asset.466 Nevertheless, it is unlikely that they will be treated as owners in relation to 
transactions based on the Ijara Sukuk, given that it is essentially a lease agreement. 
Moreover, they will be unsecured creditors. 
 
4.4 PLS Equity-Based Modes and the Resilience of Islamic Banks 
 
Chapter 2 clarified that not all financial institutions are equally vulnerable to failure during 
financial crises and that the most vulnerable institutions are those exposed to liquidity and 
credit risk; prone to excessive risk-taking, and unable to sell their assets or obtain liquidity 
from local sources as a means of returning to target leverage. Although Chapter 3 then 
revealed that Islamic financial institutions do not possess better risk management models and 
Islamic regulators cannot readily identify the different categories of risk emerging from the 
Islamic financial market, Islamic banks are able to provide capital and generate profits using 
PLS equity-based schemes with a low total risk load. This is especially the case where the 
banks use sales-based and lease asset-based contracts to mitigate the liquidity, market and 
credit risk arising from equity-based schemes.  
Additionally, the exposure brought about by the above-mentioned schemes is limited. The 
special credit risk embedded in Mudarabah investments and Musharakah transactions is 
                                                
465 See M Ayub, Understanding Islamic Finance (John Wiley & Sons 2010) 374-375. 
466 I Warde,  note 132 above, 152. 
 
 
118 
mitigated by the counterparty’s duty of utmost good faith and mutual trust, which are 
sustained by the belief that contracts are trade instruments endorsed by the Holy Scriptures. 
Thus, since Mudarabah and Musharakah contracts are essentially Ubberimae Fidei or good 
faith contracts, they are based on full disclosure and transparency on the part of the Mudarib 
and the alignment of the parties’ interests. It follows that the risk of moral hazards and of 
agency and information failure or asymmetry are mitigated. Equally, credit risk will only be 
enhanced, if the bank fails to conduct a suitable risk analysis prior to entering into an 
agreement, or of it fails to monitor the Mudarib. This risk will be even lower in Musharakah 
transactions, where the bank participates in the actual project management; making it easier 
to assess and manage credit risk. The most serious risks facing banks that use these PLS 
equity-based schemes comprise liquidity risk, market risk and rate of return risk. 
However, banks may use a sales-based instrument, such as the Murabahah to manage 
illiquidity. This takes place in a way that is similar to the interbank deposit transactions of 
conventional banks. For instance, the bank buys the asset from a broker at cost and sells it to 
a client bank at cost-plus, based on deferred payment. The latter then sells the asset on to 
another broker at cost and the transaction may subsequently be reversed, if the investing bank 
faces liquidity issues. The bank may also use a lease asset-based instrument, such as the 
Ijara. It will consequently enter into an equity-based agreement, with a tangible asset as its 
subject; paying for the asset and entering into a parallel Ijara contract at a mark-up with an 
SPV for the lease of the asset. This will ensure that the Ijara contract absorbs any shocks 
from the equity-based agreement. 
Irrespective of the above, a very important risk confronted by Islamic banks and one that is 
not mitigated by the above-mentioned instruments is rate of return risk, relating to the 
benchmark rate risk. This is because these instruments do not allow banks to reprice asset-
liability mismatches. The risk of returns deviating from what depositors or investment 
account holders expect is heightened by the fact that the latter often expect returns that are 
similar to benchmark rates. However, the use of the Murabahah to mitigate this risk is rather 
expensive, as demonstrated above, since the bank must forgo all or part of its share of the 
profits, in order to pay the depositor a rate of return on a par with the benchmark rate. 
Islamic banks are in a particularly difficult position, because they can only use an Islamic tool 
to hedge benchmark rate risk. The hedging tools available to them are limited to the liquidity 
mismatch between short-term funding, and long-term financing and investing, implying that 
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there are few liquid hedging tools available to them. Moreover, as noted in Chapter 3, 
although there are countless derivative products on the standard market, which could be used 
for hedging, Islamic banks cannot use derivatives, because they are not Shariah-compliant. 
Islamic banks therefore often use Murabahah contracts to manage liquidity risks. Thus, an 
appropriate tool could be the profit rate swap to the bank from fluctuations in borrowing 
rates. This would involve exchanging profit rates between a floating rate party and a fixed 
rate party, through the execution of an underlying contract.467 The Waad contract provided by 
each counterparty would then ensure that the swap reaches maturity.468 This is because the 
counterparty undertakes to enter into the relevant commodity trade. Moreover, Islamic banks 
may issue Sukuk certificates to ensure securitisation. 
Overall risk may also be reduced or eliminated by profit equalisation reserves or investment 
risk reserves. These reserves offer returns that are based on the market rates of return on 
specific benchmarks, such as conventional deposits.469 They may also be used to redistribute 
the income accrued to investment funds. 
 
4.5 Regulatory Challenges Posed by PLS Modes 
 
Despite the fact that the use of PLS equity-based instruments, supplemented by sales-based 
and assets-based contracts (as shown above) mitigates the embedded risks and renders 
Islamic banks more resilient to financial crises, equity-based instruments pose remarkable 
challenges to regulators. This is one of the main points against the widespread acceptance of 
these Islamic modes of financing. Financial service regulators are unable to identify the 
sources of risk emerging from equity-based contracts, how these are managed at banking 
level, or how they interact with external forces. 
The first challenge posed is the lack of a well-defined legal framework, as there are no 
commercial laws tailored towards the implementation of PLS contracts. This explains the 
uncertainty surrounding the legal forms of the Mudarabah and Musharakah. As discussed 
above, the Musharakah is closer to a legal partnership (Shirka), because a key characteristic 
of the Shirka is the mixing of capital shares, but under the Mudarabah, there is no such 
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mixing, with only the silent party providing the capital. Nonetheless, there is some 
uncertainty as to whether the Musharakah has developed to a point where it may no longer be 
recognised as a partnership. Although Jersey accounts for 8% of publicly accounted Islamic 
funds,470 parties may only establish the Mudarabah in tandem with limited partnerships. 
Thus, the Mudarabah is not treated as a limited partnership stricto sensu.   
Nevertheless, it is important that these equity-based instruments should take a specific legal 
form, in order to define the relationship between the parties and determine their rights and 
liabilities in a consistent manner. It has been pointed out that an important distinction 
between business forms involves the issue of whether or not the business has a legal 
existence.471 This will determine whether the business is a legal entity and whether the 
liability of its members is limited or unlimited. It is also held that a proper basic liability rule 
is the most important contract law issue.472 Thus, the allure of the Mudarabah and 
Musharakah must lie in their unique ability to bring together certain key features. Such 
clarity may facilitate the parcelling out of liability by the regulator, in the event of relevant 
laws being violated, while the lack of clarity may be explained by the absence of uniform 
standards, which can be enforced by the regulator. The supervisory and regulatory authorities 
should in fact be able to ensure the enforcement of uniform standards to prevent the 
accumulation of risks, which then become systemic risks. 
Ironically, an important associated risk inherent within all instruments used by Islamic banks 
is the Shariah risk. This pertains to the interpretation of Shariah principles by the bank’s 
Shariah Board, which may vary from one jurisdiction to another.473 For example, where the 
Musharakah is treated as an unlimited partnership, the partners’ liability should be unlimited. 
Moreover, diverse interpretations result in the use of different financial reporting, auditing 
and accounting standards and the Shariah Board of one financial institution may adopt non-
standard practices or measures, which would simply be considered non-compliant with 
Shariah by other Shariah Boards. This is why it is indicated above that the legitimacy of 
instruments such as the Ijara Sukuk is contentious in some quarters.  
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In some jurisdictions, there are established standards to be complied with by Islamic banks.474 
In Indonesia for example, the National Shariah Board issues fatwas or authoritative legal 
opinions on Islamic banking products and the latter are bound by these opinions.475 There are 
fatwas on Mudarabah, as well as on Musharakah, Ijara, Istisna, and Salam. In Bahrain, the 
Central Bank requires all Islamic banks to set up an independent Shariah Supervision 
Committee, in accordance with the standards published by the AAOIFI,476 to which Bahraini 
banks must comply. However, the Central Bank does not act as the regulatory and 
supervisory authority; each bank’s board will ensure that their products comply with AAOIFI 
standards, as well as with other Shariah rules. In Pakistan, the Banking Companies Ordinance 
of 1962 required banks to offer products that comply with the Islamic modes established by 
the State Bank of Pakistan’s Shariah Board of Each bank is required to appoint a Shariah 
Advisor, who is tasked with approving products and issuing opinions. The role of the Shariah 
Board of the State Bank is therefore largely advisory, although its opinion prevails over that 
of the Shariah Advisor. Meanwhile, in Nigeria, the Central Bank requires all Islamic banks to 
appoint a Shariah Advisory Committee to advise the senior management and board of 
directors on compliance with Shariah principles.477 Where the members of the Advisory 
Committee have conflicting opinions, the matter may be referred to the Shariah Council of 
the Central Bank. 
It follows from the above that there is no common regulatory approach; standards and 
practices are fragmented, reflecting specific cultural, political and legal environments. They 
are consequently based on the opinions of the Shariah Board of each bank and to a lesser 
extent, on the National Shariah Board of the Central Bank. It is therefore difficult to evaluate 
the strength and effectiveness of the regulation of Islamic banks in general, even within a 
single jurisdiction. It is also difficult for the prudential authority to determine whether 
individual banks have adopted appropriate risk management strategies and reporting 
processes, with regard to the risk characteristics of the above-mentioned equity investments. 
At present, parties to Mudarabah and Musharakah agreements are simply required to agree 
on appropriate valuation methodologies. However, such agreement does not mitigate any 
risk, where one party lacks sufficient knowledge or skill in assessing valuation 
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methodologies. This leads to information asymmetry, as mentioned earlier. Where the party 
with the requisite knowledge or skill is the bank, the risk will be even higher, since the only 
regulatory body able to intervene will be the bank’s own Shariah Board. 
The difficulty of developing tangible regulatory measurements based on diverse 
interpretations of Shariah principles delineates the legal risks confronted by Islamic banks. 
These risks are nonetheless mitigated in jurisdictions where there are standard guidelines 
geared towards helping supervisors and regulators develop appropriate measurements. 
Attempts have been made to establish international standards, which address the specific 
risks to which Islamic banks are exposed and the requisite infrastructure for effective 
regulation. Some of these standards are critically analysed in Chapter 5, in order to determine 
whether they enhance regulatory clarity and improve supervisory instruments. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
Under equity-based PLS modes, clients deposit money with a bank and receive no interest 
but are entitled to a predetermined share of the bank’s profits. This implies that the bank can 
either be the Mudarib or Rabbul-Maal, depending on whether it is investing money deposited 
by a client, or investing in a general partner’s enterprise. What is important is that both 
parties agree on how the risk is shared. This is why it is noted above that equity-based modes 
are based on an alignment of the parties’ interests. Risk-sharing establishes a moral difference 
between financing on a PLS basis and loans issued by conventional banks.478 It must be 
clarified here, however, that usury was once also banned in many European countries and 
interest was only tolerated as an exception, where the debtor had inflicted damage through 
default. This exception subsequently became generalised, when a theory of interest was 
developed to justify interest at the creation of the loan, rather than at the end.479 Hence, 
interest-free financing on a PLS basis has a strong moral foundation. Theoretically, PLS 
operations should mitigate liquidity risk, since they appear on both sides of the balance sheet; 
the fact of depositors sharing risk with the bank on the liability side absorbs any shocks on 
the asset side. PLS operations are also based on mutual trust and good faith, which mitigate 
the moral hazards, agency risks and information asymmetry risks. In addition, where the bank 
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is the Mudarib, the operational risk is lower, given that the bank will have skill, expertise and 
experience in managing similar projects within the specific legal environment. 
Other risks embedded in equity-based transactions may be mitigated by the use of sales-based 
instruments, such as the Murabahah, and assets-based instruments, such as the Ijara. This is 
how Islamic banks can provide capital and generate profits using PLS equity-based schemes 
with a low total risk load. Islamic banks using these schemes match the profile of institutions 
that are generally more resilient to financial crises, as described in Chapter 2. They are less 
exposed to liquidity and credit risk, averse to excessive risk-taking, and can sell their assets 
(such as Sukuk) and obtain liquidity from local sources, so as to return to target leverage. 
However, it has been noted that since the investee bank neither possesses nor owns the 
underlying asset of the Murabahah, when selling to another broker at cost, it raises issues 
over the legitimacy of this transaction. It represents Gharar for a seller to offer a product it 
does not own. Additionally, it is difficult to distinguish between interest and the guaranteed 
profit collected by the financier from Murabahah transactions. The legitimacy of the Ijara 
Sukuk may subsequently be questioned, given that in many cases, the underlying assets are 
not readily available, which in turn implies that there is no real sale transaction and a Sukuk 
holder will only have an unsecured debt claim against the originator. 
Nonetheless, the most important flaw in PLS equity-based schemes is the lack of tangible 
regulatory measurement based on common interpretations of Shariah principles. The 
uncertainty surrounding regulatory standards thus renders it difficult to transpose these 
schemes to other, especially non-Islamic, jurisdictions. Moreover, the absence of clear 
regulatory standards makes it difficult for regulatory and supervisory authorities to compel all 
Islamic banks within their jurisdiction to conduct robust stress tests to identify and mitigate 
risks. Irrespective of this, the use of equity-based schemes only resolves short-term liquidity 
problems, but creates long-term illiquidity problems, due to low returns and an absence of 
interest, as illustrated earlier. This may explain why only a small proportion of the assets of 
most Islamic banks constitute equity. It may then be argued that many Islamic banks were 
unaffected by the financial crisis of 2007-09, due to limited exposure, especially to foreign 
counterparties in PLS equity-based agreements. In this light, the next Chapter critically 
examines and compares the management of risk by banks in KSA, as well as the regulation of 
these institutions. It seeks to determine whether the financial crisis of 2007-09 could have 
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been triggered by interest-free Islamic banks using PLS equity-based instruments to provide 
clients with capital. 
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Chapter 5 
Ascertaining the Resilience of Islamic and Conventional Banks in the 
Regulatory Environment of Saudi Arabia 
5.1 Introduction 
 
It was noted in Chapter 4 that Islamic banks are generally more resilient to financial crises 
than conventional banks. However, this is only in instances where Islamic banks provide 
capital and generate profits using profit-and-loss sharing (PLS) equity-based schemes, with a 
low total risk load. It was also noted that the most serious flaw of PLS equity-based schemes 
is the lack of tangible regulatory measurements based on common interpretations of Shariah 
principles. This Chapter verifies the observation that Islamic banks using PLS modes are 
more resilient to financial crises. The focus is on assessing the regulatory framework that 
governs the PLS schemes. The performance of Islamic banks using these schemes is 
evaluated in comparison to conventional banks within the regulatory environment of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). In this regulatory environment, Islamic and conventional 
banks are required to comply with the same laws and regulations.  
This Chapter begins with an analysis of the legal and regulatory framework that 
accommodates Islamic and conventional banks. It then assesses the measures taken by 
policy-makers and regulators in the KSA to ensure that the regulations account for the 
specific risks emanating from all Shariah-compliant products and services. This is especially 
important in the KSA, where regulators have adopted Basel Standards and approaches, 
although the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has failed to consider the 
specific risks embedded in Islamic products.  
The performances of Islamic banks and conventional banks in the KSA during the financial 
crises of 2007-09 and 2014 are compared. The objective is to determine whether interest-free 
Islamic banks using PLS modes of financing were more resilient to these crises. Lastly, this 
Chapter seeks to determine whether the use of these modes of financing in the US could have 
prevented the crisis and if so, how Islamic banks could be accommodated within the US 
regulatory framework. 
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5.2 The Legal and Regulatory Framework 
 
KSA is a monarchy with no written constitution. Nonetheless, the Basic Law of Governance, 
promulgated by Royal Decree No. A/90 of March 1, 1992, outlines the responsibilities of the 
Kingdom’s governing institutions. It also affirms in Article 1 that the fundamental law is 
Shariah, derived from the Quran and Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad. Shariah therefore 
prescribes and regulates the implementation of all laws in KSA. Section 44 of the Saudi Basic 
Law provides that legislative, executive and judicial authorities are empowered to enact, 
enforce and interpret Shariah. Meanwhile, Article 51 describes the judicial authorities as 
comprising the Shariah court system, Board of Grievances, and quasi-judicial committees. 
Examples of such committees include the Capital Market Authority (CMA), which supervises 
the offer of securities regulations;480 the Banking Disputes Settlement Committee of the 
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), and the Commercial Papers Committee and Anti-
Commercial Fraud Committee481 of the Ministry of Commerce and Investment.482 SAMA 
regulates and supervises the insurance industry in accordance with the Cooperative Insurance 
Companies Control Law promulgated by Royal Decree No. M/32 on 8 January, 2003.  
In addition to the above, SAMA regulates and supervises banks under Banking Control Law 
(BCL) promulgated by Royal Decree No. M/5 and dated 11 June, 1966.483 This law remains 
in force, since it has neither been repealed, nor substantially amended.484 The BCL is the 
main statute governing the regulation and supervision of 13 nationally licensed commercial 
banks, as well as 14 foreign-licensed commercial banks in KSA.485 However, only four of 
these banks are Islamic or fully Shariah-compliant,486 while the others provide a mix of 
conventional and Shariah-compliant products and services. The fact that only four out of the 
27 banks operating in KSA are fully Shariah-compliant may explain why the BCL does not 
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provide a specific legal framework for Islamic banks.  Unlike so many other Islamic states, 
such as Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Indonesia and Sudan, there is no national Shariah board in 
KSA. Neither is there a Shariah Supervisory or Advisory Board comprising jurists 
specialised in Islamic commercial jurisprudence, who can certify Islamic financial products 
nationwide and issue a fatwa or legal opinion.487 Article 1 of the 1957 SAMA Charter 
provides that the agency regulates commercial banks and exchange dealers, but makes no 
mention of Islamic commercial banks or even Islamic products. This may be due to the fact 
that the Islamic financial industry was only revived as recently as 1963,488 six years after the 
enactment of the SAMA Charter. Nonetheless, the Charter could be modified to take into 
account the unique nature of Islamic finance. 
The KSA financial market is regulated by Capital Market Law (CML) promulgated by Royal 
Decree No. M/30 of 31 July, 2003. The CML requires the development of procedures geared 
towards reducing the level of risk related to securities transactions.489 It broadly empowers 
the CMA to regulate the issuance of securities and monitor any dealings in them. 
Nonetheless, just like BCL and the SAMA Charter, the CML does not offer clear guidelines 
to traders in Islamic instruments, such as Sukuk or shares in Islamic banks. It therefore 
follows that the law in KSA does not distinguish between Islamic instruments and 
conventional debt instruments, based on the nature of the financial institution from which 
they originate, with the CMA regulating the issuance of all these instruments using the same 
rules and regulations. These include the CMA Listing Rules and the CMA Offer of Securities 
Regulations.490 Although these Rules and Regulations were issued in 2004, they make no 
mention of Shariah or even Sukuk. Moreover, the CMA Committee for the Resolution of 
Securities Disputes entertains disputes within the framework of the Resolution of Securities 
Disputes Regulation. This was established by the CMA Board in 2011 and amended in 2016. 
However, the Regulation makes no mention of any disputes relating to the issuance of 
Islamic bonds. 
Hence, the CMA issues the requisite rules and regulations for creating an environment that is 
conducive to growth and enforces the transparency and disclosure standards of listed 
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companies,491 without regard to whether or not a financial institution is Shariah-compliant. 
Islamic banks have Shariah Supervisory Boards, which determine whether they are Shariah-
compliant, although if they are not, it does not invalidate the process or product. This is 
somewhat confusing, given that the legal system in KSA is based on Shariah. Surely, if an 
institution or person acts in a way that contravenes Shariah rules, such conduct should be 
illegal. Nonetheless, given the absence of standardised regulations, it is sometimes difficult to 
determine whether certain conduct or a product is Shariah-compliant - reliance on banks’ 
Shariah Supervisory Boards can be problematic, as shown in Chapter 4, given that the legal 
opinions of different Boards may conflict with each other. A good example of this is a debate 
that followed an interest-based loan taken out by the Yanbu National Petrochemical 
Company (YANSAB), where the CMA subsequently approved YANSAB’s initial public 
offering of 35% of its shares on the KSA market. It was argued in some quarters that CMA’s 
approval of the offering was justified by the fact that YANSAB’s main activities were 
Shariah-compliant.492 However, other observers contended that the CMA should have 
rejected the offering, because YANSAB had failed to meet the requisite standard, due to its 
involvement in activity that was not Shariah-compliant.493 Moreover, it is uncertain whether 
the same argument would arise, where a financial institution’s activities were only indirectly 
related to instruments that were not Shariah-compliant. This would in fact be a very difficult 
standard to uphold, given that the Saudi riyal is committed to a long-standing exchange rate 
peg to the US dollar.494 The consequence is that SAMA’s key policy rate is linked to interest 
rates in the US, which is quite beneficial to SAMA, since it enables it to anchor monetary 
policy at the short end, while liquidity conditions in the country stabilise long-term rates.495 
Nevertheless, fluctuating interest rates in the US have a significant impact on SAMA, despite 
interest being outlawed in KSA. 
Notwithstanding the above, KSA has a distinct regulatory framework, whereby transparency 
and disclosure standards are enforced without regard to whether or not the financial 
institution is Shariah-compliant. The same rules apply to both conventional and Islamic 
banks. Given that the BCBS seeks to promote convergence toward common standards and 
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approaches, SAMA has logically adopted the Committee’s supervisory standards and 
guidelines. This has no doubt facilitated the process of regulating each type of bank with the 
same approach. The following subsection shows how this has been achieved.  
 
5.2.1 The Implementation of Basel Standards 
 
Given KSA’s unique regulatory environment, where Islamic and conventional banks are 
required to comply with the same laws and regulations, SAMA has consistently exercised its 
powers under the BCL and SAMA Charter to implement Basel requirements, with a few 
exceptions, such as the definition of high quality liquid assets or securities.496 In some 
instances, SAMA has also imposed stricter requirements than those recommended by the 
BCBS. It is argued here that this ensures that the unique risks embedded in some Islamic 
products are covered. 
SAMA has issued regulations based on Basel II (as amended) and Basel III, with no 
challenge to the validity of the regulations in any court of law.497 Thus, Islamic banks in 
KSA, including Al Rahji Bank, the largest Islamic bank in the world,498 have avoided raising 
the issue with SAMA of these standards not being tailored towards Islamic finance. This is 
regardless of the fact that it should have happened, if these banks had felt compelled to apply 
standards that did not comply with Shariah,  because neither the Charter nor the BCL grants 
legal protection to SAMA in either its regulatory or supervisory capacity. SAMA requires the 
Basel framework to be applied to every tier within each banking group, including foreign 
banks that are active on a fully consolidated basis.499 The objective here is to capture risk in a 
holistic way and to ensure that banks’ risk exposure is backed by high quality capital. This 
amounts to an attempt to ensure that each bank maintains a level of capital that is 
commensurate with its risk profile. In July 2009, SAMA issued Circular No. BCS 769, which 
specifically required banks in KSA to devise policies and set up systems and processes that 
are compliant with Basel II Standards. It also included guidelines in this regard. In December 
                                                
496 BCBS, Regulatory Consistency Assessment Programme (RCAP): Assessment of Basel III Liquidity Coverage 
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2012, SAMA issued its Final Guidance on the implementation of capital reforms under the 
Basel III framework and in July 2014, it issued its Final Guidance on the implementation of 
the Basel III internal ratings-based approach to credit risk.500 
In short, SAMA has generally reproduced Basel III requirements to enhance the management 
of credit risk, market risk, operational risk and liquidity risk by banks in KSA. For example, 
Circular No BCS 5611 requires KSA banks to comply with Basel III’s rules on the point of 
non-viability. Hence, any bank seeking to issue an additional Tier 1 or Tier 2 capital 
instrument must adopt a contractual loss absorption mechanism, which can be activated by 
the bank’s non-viability or a trigger event. However, it is important to note here that Basel 
III’s requirements regarding non-viability do not apply, where local laws require Tier 1 and 
Tier 2 instruments to be written off on the point of non-viability. Thus, rather than enact 
regulations to such effect, which would ensure that the instruments fully absorb any losses 
before they become systemic, SAMA has opted to reproduce the Basel requirements. SAMA 
has likewise reproduced Basel III requirements on capital conservation and countercyclical 
buffers.501 
The Basel Liquidity Coverage Ratio therefore applies to all 13 nationally licensed banks in 
KSA, whether Islamic or conventional. The first liquidity coverage ratio standard was 
introduced by SAMA through Circular No. BCS 7390 of 8 February, 2012. Three major 
revisions were issued over three subsequent years. The effect of the Circular and regulations 
was that all commercial banks in KSA are subject to Basel III liquidity coverage ratio 
standards, with SAMA being able to impose corrective measures or fines in the event of 
breach. It may also take supervisory action to ensure compliance with its regulations. 
Interestingly, the way in which SAMA regulates both Islamic and conventional banks using 
the same instruments has not resulted in any deviation from the Basel Standards.502 For 
example, SAMA has issued a Circular to banks stipulating the implementation of Basel 
principles for sound liquidity risk management (Sound Principles) and application of liquidity 
monitoring tools. The Sound Principles were introduced through Circular No. 771 of 
December 2008, requiring all commercial banks to assess their level of compliance with these 
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Principles.503 Nonetheless, although Basel II (para. 651) encourages banks to comply with 
these Principles using the basic indicator approach, SAMA imposes compliance on banks in 
KSA. The basic indicator approach is a risk measurement technique that is suitable for banks 
with non-significant international operations; banks are required to hold capital for 
operational risk that is equal to the average over the past three years of a fixed percentage of 
positive gross income for each year.504 It must however be noted that the BCBS published a 
revised standardised approach for operational risk in December 2017. This replaces the 
approach in the Basel II framework. It is based on the Bank Indicator or a measure of the 
bank’s income, and the Internal Loss Multiplier or a measure of the bank’s historical 
losses.505 Nonetheless, SAMA’s guidelines complement the approaches in the Basel II and 
Basel III frameworks. Given that Islamic banks in KSA do not have significant international 
operations beyond the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) countries, 
the imposition of the basic indicator approach on all banks is of benefit to the Islamic banks. 
What emerges over the course of this clarification is the requirement for KSA banks to set up 
processes for the active management of liquidity risk. In this regard, SAMA has issued 
guidelines that complement Basel II’s Pillar II stress test.506 The objective of this is to ensure 
that each bank operates at a level of risk that is commensurate with its liquidity profile. The 
bank must also maintain an adequate level of liquid assets, clearly determining its liquidity 
risk tolerance and devising an appropriate strategy to maintain its stability. Equally, SAMA 
requires the involvement of senior management to define, approve and monitor the above 
processes, similar to the recommendations of the BCBS.507  
Out of all the Sound Principles, one of the most important is Principle 13, which requires 
banks in KSA to disclose liquidity-related information to the public on a regular basis. This is 
intended to enable market participants to assess the soundness of each bank’s risk 
management strategy and liquidity position.508 This disclosure is beneficial to Islamic banks, 
because (as noted in Chapter 4), certain important Islamic modes, such as the Mudarabah and 
Musharakah require a high level of financial disclosure and transparency, in that the parties 
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need to be thoroughly informed about the capital and in a manner that minimises or 
eliminates any possibility of ambiguity or uncertainty. 
Liquidity monitoring tools were introduced in KSA through Circular No. 351000147086, 
issued in September 2014. This Circular proposed a specific risk management strategy for 
adoption by banks. For example, banks are required to define their monitoring tools as part of 
the risk management process and submit monthly returns. These tools capture specific data 
on certain market indicators, as well as on cash flow, the quality of any available 
unencumbered assets, and the balance sheet structure of each bank. These data help 
supervisors assess the liquidity risk of each bank. Thus, the tools monitoring contractual 
maturity mismatch profiles identify any gaps indicating the amount of liquidity each bank 
must raise in each specific time band. Banks must also identify any sources of wholesale 
funding that are of such importance that withdrawal of the funding could cause serious 
liquidity problems. This is very important for Islamic banks, given that in PLS equity-based 
agreements, the Rabbul-Maal may withdraw their money from the fund at any time. 
SAMA is empowered by the BCL to conduct regular on-site inspections. Banks are 
consequently required to provide information on their risk management processes, while 
SAMA may thereby evaluate their operations and systems of internal control and 
management. SAMA therefore regularly assesses all commercial banks in KSA to identify 
any risks that they might be exposed to, while at the same time ensuring that they maintain 
adequate liquid assets and operate at a level of risk that is commensurate with their liquidity 
profile. It follows that SAMA is justified in implementing the same regulations with regard to 
both Islamic and conventional banks, since any bank that does not maintain an adequate level 
of liquid assets is likely to confront problems of illiquidity, irrespective of whether or not its 
processes are Shariah-compliant.  
Notwithstanding the above, the uniqueness of Islamic finance cannot be overlooked. It was 
demonstrated in Chapters 3 and 4 that Islamic banks confront special risks embedded in PLS 
agreements, which require relevant credit-scoring models and unique methods of measuring 
any risks that may be duly assessed by regulators. The problem posed by standardised 
approaches, such as Basel II and Basel III, as well as the IFSB Principles discussed in 
Chapter 3, is that they are generic and do not address the unique difficulties faced by Islamic 
banks as a result of restrictions imposed by Shariah. In light of SAMA’s implementation of 
the Basel Standards described above, the following subsection looks at how the risk profile of 
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Islamic products and services may be assessed, taking into account the peculiar nature of 
Islamic finance. 
 
5.2.2 Assessing the Risk Profile of Islamic Products and Services 
 
It is unfortunate that despite issuing more than 1500 Circulars,509 SAMA has yet to provide 
any clear guidance on how banks in KSA should determine the risk profile of Islamic 
products and activities. This explains why there are no specific rules governing the prudential 
reporting of Islamic products. Moreover, it is uncertain how the specific risks embedded in 
these products should be integrated into supervisory processes. For instance, the transposition 
of Basel requirements may not always be effective in KSA, since the BCBS has not taken 
into account the specific risks emanating from the range of Shariah-compliant activities. The 
BCBS contends that there might not be any observable consequence in KSA, because 
Shariah-compliant activities are not prevalent.510 As a result, only a relatively small 
percentage of banking activities are required to be Shariah-compliant, since Islamic banks 
constitute a minority in the banking industry and the regulators’ interpretation of Shariah 
rules are sometimes flexible. A good example is the CMA’s approval of YANSAB’s initial 
public offering, although the latter had previously obtained an interest-based loan from a 
conventional bank. Moreover, none of the 13 local banks in KSA may be considered 
important in global terms, while only three of the 14 branches of foreign banks are of 
importance in the global system.511 Besides this, SAMA has identified just six local banks of 
importance in the domestic system,512 with Al Rajhi Bank being the only one that is fully 
Shariah-compliant. 
Notwithstanding the above, it may be submitted that SAMA is aware that Basel requirements 
fail to take into account the specific risks emanating from Shariah-compliant activities. 
Hence, in several instances, SAMA has adopted an approach that is stricter than the Basel 
Standards. Abdullah et al. are cited in Chapter 3 as recommending this approach to mitigating 
the unique risks embedded in Shariah-compliant products and services. Two examples are 
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discussed above, namely SAMA’s imposition of the basic indicator approach and 
requirement for liquidity-related information to be disclosed to the public on a regular basis. 
Another example is that SAMA does not allow banks to include Level 2B assets in their 
liquidity coverage ratio. Level 2 assets are those with a value that can be determined through 
a quote on an inactive market.513  Good examples of Level 2B assets that are often traded 
include corporate debt securities and residential mortgage-backed securities, which are not 
issued by a bank.514 These will attract a haircut ranging from 25% to 50%, indicating a huge 
difference between the market value of residential property used as collateral and the amount 
of the loan. Thus, Level 2B assets are interest-based and this can result in unfair profit 
exploitation,515 implying that they are not Shariah-compliant.  
Aside from the above, the GCC Member States, which are all Islamic,516 have agreed to grant 
a concession for banks exposed to any GCC sovereign funds, whereby they can apply a 0% 
risk weight for such exposure when calculating the credit risk capital charge.517 They may 
however assign risk weights ranging from 0-150% to claims on non-GCC sovereign funds. 
This preferential treatment enables GCC sovereign funds to scale up their investments in 
Islamic finance and ensure long-term funding for Islamic banks. For example, the Kuwait 
Investment Authority and Dubai Financial Group have since increased their exposure to 
Islamic products by taking stakes in Islamic banks.518 However, this is an easy decision for 
banks in KSA, because all GCC countries have a rating of AA- and above, except for Oman 
and Bahrain- with KSA’s banks having only minimal exposure to either of these two 
countries.519  
Additionally, GCC Member States, such as Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE, require their 
domestic public-sector entities to be risk-weighted as sovereign wealth funds. Their banks 
may apply the same criteria to the public-sector entities of other GCC Member States, whose 
supervisors reciprocate, insofar as the exposure is funded in the local currency. However, 
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SAMA requires claims on public-sector entities to be risk-weighted on the basis of their 
credit assessment.520 This demonstrates that SAMA’s commitment to deviate from the Basel 
Standards in the promotion of Islamic finance is questionable. It may subsequently be argued 
that SAMA’s changes to the Basel Standards are motivated by the need to ensure that banks 
in KSA effectively monitor and control risk, rather than complying with Shariah. However, it 
is shown above that SAMA has modified Basel Standards in a way that clearly enhances risk 
management in Islamic banking. Another example in this regard is that unlike the 15% 
materiality level of the bank’s capital for significant investment in business entities, as 
recommended by Basel II, SAMA requires a materiality level of 10%, which is much 
stricter.521 Moreover, unlike Basel II (para. 56), SAMA considers international organisations, 
such as the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), European Central Bank (ECB) and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) as sovereign funds and does not necessarily risk-weight 
them at 0%. In fact, only the GCC sovereign wealth funds are risk-weighted at this level. 
SAMA then applies a 100% risk weight on claims that are collateralised by residential 
mortgages, which is much stricter than the 35% recommended by Basel II (para. 72). It 
relates to the aforementioned fact that SAMA does not allow banks to use Level 2B assets for 
their liquidity coverage ratio, since most of these frequently traded Level 2B assets include 
residential mortgage-backed securities, which have not been issued by a bank. SAMA equally 
forbids the recognition of equities and mutual funds for credit-risk mitigation under the 
standardised approach, although this is permitted by Basel II (para. 145). Furthermore, 
SAMA has imposed a run-off rate of 10% on all overseas subsidiaries or branches of KSA 
banks, regardless of whether their host countries have insurance schemes or require a lower 
run-off rate. 
It may therefore be argued that the application of Basel Standards and the imposition of 
stricter measures enables SAMA to fully capture the large number of risks that are imbedded 
in the broad range of Shariah-compliant products and transactions. Without a regulatory 
framework tailored towards Shariah-compliant banking, it is difficult to imagine an 
approach, which could more effectively ensure that Islamic banks maintain a sufficient level 
of capital for their risk profiles. This also explains why SAMA uses an interventionist 
approach; applying the supervisory review process to each bank, in order to ascertain its 
capital adequacy and determine whether it should hold additional capital to cover risks that 
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are not sufficiently covered. Thus, it does not simply capture risk holistically, but also 
ensures that the risk exposure of each bank is backed by high quality capital. In this way, it 
conducts a detailed and in-depth risk assessment of each bank and sets the minimum or target 
capital adequacy ratio for it. Moreover, it generally expects banks to operate above this target 
and may compel them to do so.522 Hence, KSA’s banks require a formal internal process, 
used to determine their overall capital adequacy, with SAMA discussing the internal capital 
adequacy process (ICAAP) of each bank in annual meetings. During these meetings, SAMA 
assesses the bank’s methodology with regard to risk identification, measurement and 
aggregation, which enables it to intervene at a very early stage and prevent a bank’s capital 
from falling below the target. For this reason, a bank may be required to increase its capital, 
limit dividend payments and risk-weighted assets, or consider mergers. 
It must nonetheless be noted that the legal basis for SAMA’s monthly meetings and 
evaluations is problematic. Although Article 3(d) of the SAMA Charter empowers it to 
demand monthly statements from banks, it also specifies that banks should avoid disclosing 
details of their customers’ private accounts. However, SAMA understandably often relies on 
Article 17 of the BCL, which states that it may compel banks to provide any information that 
it deems important. The fact that SAMA prioritises Article 17 of the BCL, rather than Article 
3(d) of its Charter, shows that it considers disclosure to be an essential regulatory 
requirement. As noted above, this may be attributed to the fact that equity-based PLS 
agreements are ubberimae fidei contracts based on full disclosure. SAMA therefore enables 
Islamic banks in KSA to apply Basel Standards along the same lines as conventional banks, 
and also gives them the opportunity to monitor and mitigate unique risks in their products and 
services. 
It follows that KSA provides a unique forum for comparing the risk management strategies of 
both Islamic and conventional banks, as well as their resilience to financial crises. Such a 
comparison may therefore help to ascertain whether the kind of financial crisis experienced in 
2007 can equally be triggered by interest-free Islamic banks using PLS modes of financing.  
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5.3 The Resilience of Saudi Banks to Financial Crises 
 
As indicated above, both Islamic and conventional banks operate in KSA within the same 
legal and regulatory framework. However, Islamic banking is solely delineated by Shariah 
rules, specifically the rules prohibiting interest and promoting the sharing of profit and loss 
(PLS). In addition, Islamic banks are prohibited from investing in haram products or 
activities, such as gambling, prostitution, alcohol and drugs. They are also prohibited from 
investing in speculative instruments, such as those that do not derive their value from 
underlying assets. All transactions must involve direct participation in asset performance and 
banks must invest in real or tangible products. Although these restrictions drastically reduce 
the number of products and services that Islamic banks can buy and sell, Chapter 4 clarified 
that they can provide capital and generate profits using PLS equity-based schemes, with a 
low total risk load. They also use sales-based and lease asset-based contracts to mitigate the 
liquidity risk, market risk and credit risk emerging from these equity-based schemes. 
Nonetheless, it was equally noted that the special risks embedded in PLS schemes are largely 
mitigated by the counterparty’s duty of utmost good faith and the mutual trust sustained by 
the belief that contracts are trade instruments, which are endorsed by holy scripture. 
Notwithstanding this, since the same rules apply to both conventional and Islamic banks in 
KSA, and because SAMA has reproduced the Basel Standards - modifying them to include 
much stricter requirements, so that any risks relating specifically to Islamic products are 
covered - the question that follows is whether Islamic banks in KSA are more resilient than 
conventional banks to crises occurring in the same country. It is difficult to provide a 
straightforward answer to this question, because although only four of the 13 licensed local 
banks in KSA are Islamic banks, most of the commercial banks offer a mix of Islamic and 
conventional products. Thus, around half of the assets on the KSA market are Islamic 
products.523 This means that the resilience of Islamic banks may only be determined by how 
they perform during financial crises, rather than how they perform in relation to conventional 
banks. The discussion below focuses on the performance assessment of KSA banks during 
the 2014 crisis, which had a greater adverse effect on GCC countries than it did on other 
regions. Also examined will be the global crisis of 2007-09.  
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5.3.1 The Crisis of 2014 
 
Oil prices plummeted towards the end of 2014, causing a swing in KSA’s current account 
from a surplus of approximately 10% of its GDP to a deficit of around 8% by the end of 
2015.524 The government’s oil revenue was almost halved, meaning that the fiscal deficit rose 
from around 3.4% of the GDP in 2014 to approximately 16% in 2015, and payment to 
suppliers was generally delayed.525 The government responded with its Vision 2030 plan and 
the National Transformation Programme. This began with spending cuts and the issuing of 
USD 17.5 billion in international bonds, and USD 9 billion of the Sukuk.526 Customers, 
individuals and enterprises began withdrawing their deposits by the end of 2014 to meet cash 
flow needs and to purchase government bonds that were issued to finance the fiscal deficit. 
Thus, by the middle of 2016, deposits had fallen sharply, to the extent that withdrawals of 
liquidity from the market by SAMA exceeded cashflows into the Saudi banking system.527 
There was also a sharp rise in interbank interest rates amongst conventional banks. The 
interbank market is not well-developed in KSA, because Islamic banks do not award or 
receive interest-based loans. Thus, as noted in Chapter 4, due to the limited number of 
funding sources, Islamic banks are compelled to rely on the Central Bank in times of crises. 
They use the Murabahah in a way that is similar to the interbank deposit transactions of 
conventional banks; whereby the commercial bank, acting as the investing bank, buys the 
asset from a broker at cost and sells it to the client’s Central Bank at cost-plus, based on 
deferred payment. The latter then sells the asset on to another broker at cost. The transaction 
may subsequently be reversed to help the investing bank manage liquidity. However, despite 
the legitimacy of the transaction under Shariah, it has not been successful in easing the 
liquidity conditions of certain Islamic banks.528 
Regardless of the above, the IMF noted that the number of non-performing loans increased 
by only 0.3% between 2014 and 2016.529 Despite the fact that there is no detailed information 
about restructured and rescheduled loans, this demonstrates that most banks in KSA have a 
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high-quality loan portfolio. Moreover, despite the fall in banks’ net income, they remained 
profitable, with a stable fee income and high net interest margins.530 In fact, these margins 
remained high, due to a large proportion of the deposits and loans being Shariah-compliant 
and therefore, interest-free. The loan-to-deposit ratio531 continued to rise during the crisis, 
while the liquid assets to short-term liabilities ratio532 dropped in 2014, but began rising again 
in 2015.533 Hence, many banks did not have sufficient liquidity to cover unexpected funding 
requirements. They were therefore required by SAMA to increase their capital buffers as well 
as provision coverage of non-performing loans. Also, SAMA relaxed the limits on banks’ 
loan-to-deposit ratios and facilitated the transfer of deposits from government undertakings to 
the banks.534 The IMF assessed the impact of the crisis on KSA’s banking system, using 
solvency and liquidity stress tests, as shown in the following subsection. 
 
5.3.1.1 Solvency and Liquidity Tests 
 
The IMF used the balance sheet data of December 2016 from 12 banks that were nationally 
licensed at the time, representing 97% of the banking system’s assets. The tests were based 
on Basel III’s minimum capital requirements, which have been fully implemented in KSA, 
and the Basel standardised approach adopted by SAMA.535 The solvency test included single 
factor shocks and macro-economic scenario-based tests. The single factor shocks related to 
credit risk over a period of three years. However, the single factor sensitivities did not include 
any Islamic regulation or product, which attests to the fact that there was no identifiable 
idiosyncratic risk embedded in Islamic products or transactions. The macro-economic 
scenario-based tests assessed all aspects of the banks’ operations in several scenarios.536 This 
test was designed by the Treasury and Federal Reserve of the United States for the testing of 
financial institutions, ascertaining the amount of capital required to restore their financial 
health.537 Banks quantify what might happen to their portfolios - including mortgages and 
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credit cards - in a financial crisis. Thus, the scenarios take into account the risks that threaten 
banks or stress their unique exposure and potential areas of vulnerability in the financial 
system. The threats to KSA’s banks and financial system included the sharp fall in oil prices; 
the attendant impact of this on GDP growth and banks’ asset quality; the discontinuance of 
the practice of expeditious bad loan write-offs, and the increase in the number of non-
performing loans.538 
The results of the IMF’s solvency test indicated that the capital adequacy ratios of all 12 
licensed banks exceeded the minimum requirements in the projected period of 2016-2019.539 
In the adverse scenario of a financial crisis, the total capital adequacy ratios for KSA’s 
financial system were reduced by only 2%, with 10 out of the 12 licensed banks still meeting 
the minimum requirements. Notwithstanding the above, the aggregate capital shortfall of the 
two banks that failed to meet the minimum requirements only made up around 0.03% of 
KSA’s GDP in 2016. As such, it may be concluded that KSA’s banking system is resilient to 
severe financial crises. It also confirms the results of a previous test conducted by SAMA, 
which showed that KSA’s main banks are safe.540 Moreover, the fact that the only two banks 
that did not meet the minimum requirements were conventional banks implies that Islamic 
banks generally performed better. 
The test also revealed a limited credit concentration risk. In the event of default by the three 
largest borrowers (who are not sovereign funds) from each bank, the aggregate capital 
adequacy ratio fell by 7% and 7 out of the 12 banks were unable to meet the minimum 
requirements.541 Given that most banks in KSA trade with sovereign borrowers, it may be 
contended that the risk is very limited. Moreover, 5 of the 12 banks were still resilient to the 
prevailing risk. The IMF even noted that banks in KSA are more resilient to this risk than 
banks in other countries, where similar tests have been conducted.542 This resilience is 
attributed to strong initial buffers. 
The above-mentioned test also revealed that all 12 banks in KSA were resilient to severe 
liquidity shocks; they all met the standard Basel III liquidity coverage ratio requirement and 
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passed the maturity-mismatch test. Moreover, they all passed a more severe liquidity test, 
with run-off rates that were 20% higher than those proposed by Basel III. The IMF attributed 
this to the banks’ large liquid asset holdings and the efficient operation of the money 
market.543 This is because the money market permits the reliable communication of credible 
information to participants and regulators; enables the effective implementation of 
regulations, and allows the efficient allocation of liquidity, in such manner that it is 
effectively channelled into the real economy.544 However, liquidity management has room for 
improvement, because it is still focussed on the absorption of liquidity, with little emphasis 
on instruments to reallocate liquidity in the system. Moreover, the interbank market is still 
very limited and accounts for less than 4% of banks’ total liabilities. Nonetheless, as noted 
above, this may be explained by the prohibition of interest and trading of loans. Thus, Islamic 
banks do not generally engage in interbank lending. However, contrary to the IMF’s 
conclusion, this is not a shortcoming of KSA’s banking system, but rather the nature of 
Islamic banking itself, which largely relies on deposits to fund lending. Moreover, the 
secondary markets for Islamic products are also limited; they are naturally challenged by 
sudden shifts in deposits and rely on the Central Bank, as shown in Chapter 4. 
5.3.2 The Crisis of 2007-09 
5.3.2.1 Individual Measure of Soundness 
 
Ghassan and Fachin assessed the quarterly data of a sample of KSA’s banks during the 
financial crisis of 2007-09.545 The sample comprised four conventional banks546 and two 
Islamic banks.547 The above authors measured the soundness of these banks using a z-score, 
focused on accounting information. They argued that this method was superior to other 
measures, such as stress tests and value-at-risk, because its results are not affected by the 
nature of a bank’s activities.548 Hence, it may be used to measure the stability of banks that 
use conventional accounting methods, as well as banks which use methods that are unique to 
Islamic financial institutions. Ghassan and Fachin also argued that the z-score assesses 
                                                
543 Ibid, 15-16. 
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insolvency risk, rather than liquidity risk alone, as is the case with stress tests. This explains 
why the IMF, cited above, used both a solvency and stress test. It is important to assess 
insolvency risk, because some illiquid banks are solvent, given that most of the assets held by 
them are long-term financial or real assets. Thus, in order to determine whether a bank is 
resilient to a crisis, it is important to determine whether its liabilities exceed the value of its 
assets. 
Ghassan and Fachin used z-scores to compare the risk of default in different groups of the six 
banks. The banks’ insolvency risk was measured on the basis of their adjusted return on 
assets (ROA) and adjusted return on equity (ROE). Although the institutions managed 
different levels of financial assets, Ghassan and Fachin found that the distribution of z-scores 
was negatively skewed for all the conventional banks, but positively skewed for the Islamic 
banks.549 Additionally, the products and activities of conventional banks carried more risks 
than those of Islamic banks. In fact, the conventional banks that were active in international 
financial markets confronted even more risks. The Islamic banks in the sample operated only 
within KSA or GCC markets and the assets of Al-Rajhi Bank, the larger of the two, were 
more diversified and mainly consisted of loans, with a quasi-symmetric distribution of risks. 
Nonetheless, Riyad Bank, the largest bank in KSA, had the highest median z-score, 
indicating more variability than the other banks. Moreover, only one conventional bank, 
Saudi British Bank, failed to keep its z-scores stationary around a desired level between 2005 
and 2011. The above authors subsequently argued that this supports the notion of 
conventional banks being comparatively less stable than Islamic banks. However, they also 
noted that, based on long-run average z-scores, the individual heterogeneity of each bank was 
a more important factor than its Islamic or conventional nature. Furthermore, each bank had a 
specific risk management strategy that determined how it identified and mitigated risk. 
 
5.3.2.2 The Dodd-Frank Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) Test 
 
Haddad and Hakim used the Comprehensive Capital Analysis Review (CCAR) test, 
enshrined in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, to 
assess the balance sheets of three of the largest banks in the GCC.550 These consisted of 
                                                
549 Ibid, 11-13. 
550 MM Haddad and S Hakim, ‘Can Gulf Banks Pass the CCAR Stress Tests?’ (2017) 19 Journal of Applied 
Business and Economics 44, 44-58.  
 
 
143 
KSA’s Riyad Bank, the National Bank of Kuwait, and the Qatar National Bank. The Dodd-
Frank Act was passed in the wake of the 2007-09 financial crisis, in order to enhance 
financial regulation in the US. To ensure comprehensive regulation, the Act specifies the 
stress-testing of each bank’s capital structure within the CCAR framework. This will 
determine whether the bank possesses adequate capital, whether its capital structure is stable 
in different stress-test scenarios, and whether any planned capital distributions are legitimate 
and viable with regard to the statutory minimum capital requirements. Thus, the CCAR 
enables the Federal Reserve to determine whether a bank with consolidated assets of more 
than USD 50 billion has sufficient capital to operate during financial crises and appropriate 
strategies for managing its idiosyncratic risks.551 
Haddad and Hakim selected the CCAR stress test, because no other test was tailored to the 
economic conditions of the Middle East and North African (MENA) region.552 Hence, 
different banks in different parts of this region use variants of the stress test, whereby they are 
simply required to comply with capital adequacy rules under Basel II and Basel III, as shown 
above. Moreover, there is no regulatory requirement to publish the results of the test. Thus, it 
is uncertain which stress scenarios are used by individual banks, whether they are sufficiently 
severe, or which capital buffer is required to resist a severe shock.553 Among the several 
potential types of stress-testing methodology, the River Driver Stressing Model was used in 
the above-mentioned case. This involves estimating parameters (such as the probability of 
default) on the basis of the stress values of risk drivers. Haddad and Hakim adopted a top-
down approach by assessing the impact of movement in macro-economic indicators on ROA, 
loan-loss provision, and the capital ratio of each bank. The results showed that KSA’s Riyad 
Bank and the Qatar National Bank resisted the most severe financial shocks.554 In the worst 
scenarios, oil prices fell by 53.2% and the stock market index dropped 62.6% on a year-to-
year basis. However, both banks maintained a capital-to-asset ratio that was equal to or above 
7% in all 13 projected quarters. 
In light of the above, it may be contended that Islamic banks are comparatively more resilient 
to financial crises than conventional banks, even when the same regulations are applied to all 
banks. Although they constituted a minority in the study samples mentioned above, the 
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Islamic banks in each case exceeded the minimum requirements. Meanwhile, the few banks 
that failed to remain profitable during the crises were conventional banks. Moreover, as 
stated earlier, the IMF noted margins remaining high in KSA during the crisis, because large 
proportions of deposits and loans were Shariah-compliant and did not accrue interest. It may 
therefore be contended that Islamic banks offering interest-free products through PLS 
schemes are not only more resilient to financial crises but are also less likely to trigger a 
crisis. The next section seeks to determine whether Islamic banks using PLS modes of 
financing would have helped prevent the 2007-09  crisis in the US. 
 
5.4 Would Profit-and-loss Sharing (PLS) Have Made a Difference in the 
US? 
 
The scholarship on the financial crisis of 2007-09  is sufficiently broad for any researcher to 
identify a myriad of causes. This is why some commentators have argued that several causes 
converged to create a perfect storm.555 However, if it was a perfect storm, then regulators 
could not have foreseen the severe shock. One of the main causes of the crisis was the 
deregulation of financial institutions in the US.556 In evaluating the creditworthiness of 
borrowers, the institutions were allowed to give high adjustable interest rate mortgages to 
riskier borrowers. Also, mortgage originators (intermediaries) did not have deposits given 
that their finance came directly from the capital markets, and they were not supervised by the 
central bank, the Federal Reserve. This may be explained by the shift towards reduced 
regulation of private markets in the decades preceding the crisis.557 Hence, the subprime 
mortgages that are at the genesis of the crisis were originated by intermediaries (unaffiliated 
with any bank) that were outside the purview of the extant regulation. It may be argued that if 
US banks had used PLS modes of financing as described in Chapter 4, most of these causes 
would either have been inoperative or mitigated through early intervention by the regulator. 
For example, unlike in the US, the Islamic regulator would have noticed that the 
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securitisation of mortgage assets had gone beyond the point of value. Thus, the regulator 
would have immediately known that assets were overvalued and warned on the risks 
embedded in the assets. Also, derivatives would not have been used in the transactions, 
whether over the counter or on the exchange. 
 
The US context is therefore relevant to the current study because it helps to determine 
whether the use of asset-based PLS modes of financing by US banks rather than risk-based 
modes would have made the country’s system more resilient to the financial crisis. This 
corresponds to what was outlined earlier, where it was shown that Islamic banks can be 
accommodated within the same legal and regulatory framework as conventional banks but 
perform better in terms of risk management and resilience. 
It has been argued that the financial crisis was caused by an inordinate increase in hybrid sub-
prime mortgages and the spread of a variable rate, which motivated excessive risk-taking 
following a rise in interest rates.558 It has also been argued that it was caused by speculation 
on rapidly increasing house prices,559 excessive amounts of short-term wholesale funding,560 
and too few high-quality liquid assets.561 Although these may be considered as symptoms, 
rather than significant proximate causes, they would not have become operative, had the 
banks complied with Shariah rules to prohibit interest, speculation and uncertainty. 
Additionally, excessive risk-taking can create a moral hazard.562 It was noted in Chapter 4 
that excessive risk-taking is mitigated in Islamic banking through the use of equity-based 
PLS agreements, which are essentially ubberimae fidei contracts.563 Given that the bank and 
the client enter into a partnership or joint venture, it may be difficult for either party to 
undertake excessively risky investments. With regard to high-quality assets, it is indicated 
above that studies conducted on banks in KSA reveal the high quality of their loan portfolios. 
In light of these, it may further be contended that where Islamic banks are concerned, a 
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financial crisis can only be caused by a major confluence of different factors, none of which 
would be systemic in themselves. This implies regulatory failure, since Islamic financial 
systems have a regulator (usually the Central Bank) that is often tasked with consolidated 
supervision and oversees systemic risk.  Unlike the UK, where the regulatory reform 
following the financial crisis of 2008 largely consisted of enhancing macro-prudential 
regulation by strengthening the Bank of England,564 in the KSA, the central bank was already 
the main regulator prior to the crisis. SAMA was therefore in a position to assess correlations 
and common exposures across banks in order to calibrate prudential controls.  
Where circumstances in the competitive market are not ideal, the regulator is required to 
intervene to enhance efficiency or equity. Elements of such intervention are well-accepted in 
most societies. A good example of this is regulation that seeks to prevent or mitigate systemic 
externalities and ensure the soundness of the banking system. It follows that where 
intervention was necessary in the 2007-09  crisis, the regulator failed to intervene.565 Thus, 
regulation is effective when it renders the need for  intervention less likely. However, 
although there are various reasons why markets may become less efficient or fail to produce 
socially desirable outcomes, the government is in a position to impose regulations that dictate 
conduct and prevent harmful behaviour. It is therefore very difficult to overlook the causal 
link between the failure of regulation and negative spill-overs or externalities. Prudential 
regulation is consequently more important than the nature of the banking or financing 
activity. The regulator may for example require participants in the market to disclose key 
information about their performance, which it may then use to assess their resilience. A good 
example is SAMA, as shown above. After a series of corporate scandals in the US at the 
beginning of this century, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed in 2002. However, this Act 
failed to address stock options, thereby providing incentives to dishonest managers to 
disclose information to shareholders that led to higher share prices.566 Such off-balance-sheet 
conduct also played an important role in fomenting the financial crisis of 2007-09.567 
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The lack of effective regulation therefore promotes perverse incentives, which in turn fuel 
excessive risk-taking. It explains why there is some degree of consensus over regulatory 
failure being one of the root causes of the 2007-09 financial crisis in the US. However, there 
is one question related to this contention that remains unanswered. It was posed by Stiglitz: 
“Even if we have good regulations, how do we ensure that they will be enforced?”568 Stiglitz 
observed that the US government had, through the Dodd-Frank Act, adopted the correct 
approach, which involved oversight from multiple sources and a system of checks and 
balances at different levels.569 Nevertheless, this view is certainly not prevalent, given that, as 
noted above, the Financial Choice Act has streamlined the stress test under the Dodd-Frank 
Act. The effect of this is that it only needs to be conducted once a year by the Federal 
Reserve and Bank, rather than twice yearly, as required by the Dodd-Frank Act: a mid-cycle 
stress test by the bank and an end-of-year test by the Federal Reserve. Other solutions 
proposed by Stiglitz include a focus on inclusive growth and the objectives of social 
justice.570 However, the limitations of government constitute a formidable obstacle to 
achieving such goals through regulatory intervention alone. Jenkins therefore argues that 
regulation is only effective against financial contagion, when it internalises the systemic costs 
of financial intermediation to reduce moral hazards.571  
It is submitted here that the use of PLS modes of financing, as shown in Chapter 4, provides a 
unique opportunity in this regard. Here and in other studies, although Islamic banks are not 
more profitable and liquid than conventional banks, they are more stable and have a higher 
capitalisation ratio.572 It has been proposed that this may be attributed to the use of PLS 
modes of financing by Islamic banks.573 Chapter 2 revealed how many Islamic scholars argue 
that the appeal of Islamic banking lies in its use of PLS modes. For example, Khoutem and 
Nedra note that these modes enable Islamic banks to provide better mobilisation of savings 
and savings rates, while mitigating risk more effectively by resolving information 
asymmetry.574 Moreover, Iqbal and Chapra argue that PLS modes ensure macro-economic 
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stability.575 Thus, while, conventional modes of financing based on Riba are subject to 
repetitive crises and losses, Islamic banks are able to avoid the adverse effects of crises 
through PLS agreements. 
In the same vein, Ali et al. affirm that PLS plays a crucial role in maintaining the net worth of 
banks under varying macro-economic conditions; it is pivotal in helping Islamic banks to 
avoid balance-sheet deterioration and significantly enhances their overall solidity.576 Iqbal 
and Chapra also note that this could be a key reason why Islamic banks were more resilient 
than conventional banks throughout the global financial crisis of 2007-09. However, it was 
shown in Chapter 4 that the above arguments are only true to the extent that Islamic banks are 
able to:  
1) Provide capital and generate profits using PLS equity-based schemes, with a low total risk 
load, and  
2) Use sales-based and lease assets-based contracts to mitigate the liquidity risk, market risk 
and credit risk emerging from equity-based schemes.  
Hence, it follows that banks in the US could enhance their resistance to shock, if they adopted 
this mode of financing and use it as prescribed in Chapter 4. It would be a means of ensuring 
the enforcement of effective regulations. Notwithstanding the above, it is shown in the next 
subsection that a few adjustments are necessary for Islamic banks to operate in the US. 
5.4.1 Accommodating Islamic Banks in the US Legal Framework 
 
Islamic banks are required to comply with Shariah rules that prohibit interest, the trading of 
loans and derivatives, and investment in haram products, such as gambling and prostitution. 
This implies that a financial institution providing Islamic products in the US must comply 
with Shariah rules, as well as State and Federal regulations. However, this can be highly 
problematic. For example, section 29 of the National Bank Act of 1864 forbids national 
banking associations from purchasing or holding the legal title or possession of real estate to 
secure debts due to it for a period exceeding five years. This automatically makes many 
Islamic home finance products illegal, where the bank will hold a legal title for more than 
five years. In fact, it is impossible to use sales-based or lease asset-based contracts to mitigate 
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the liquidity risk, market risk and credit risk in equity-based schemes, as shown in Chapter 4, 
given that the most reliable asset class on which most of these transactions are based is real 
estate. However, section 29 also provides that a national banking association may apply to the 
Comptroller of the Currency to approve the possession of real estate by the association for a 
period in excess of five years, where disposal within the five-year period would be 
detrimental to the association. It is easy for an Islamic bank to show that disposal within five 
years of purchasing real estate under an Ijara or Murabahah agreement would adversely 
affect its earnings. Nonetheless, the Comptroller’s approval may only extend the period by an 
additional five years. This implies that the Islamic bank entering into a home finance 
agreement may only hold the legal title for 10 years. 
Interestingly, the Office of the Comptroller has issued two letters, apparently indicating wider 
margins provided by the law, within which Islamic banks may enter into an asset-based PLS 
agreement.577 The first letter approved an application by an Islamic bank in 1997, for the use 
of the lease-based asset, Ijara. It had entered into a lease-to-own agreement with a client, 
whereby the latter was required to pay a down-payment for the purchase of a family home. 
The bank paid the remainder of the purchase price and became the legal owner. Both parties 
then entered into another net lease agreement. Although the bank’s application was approved, 
it was required by the Comptroller to record its profit in the same way as conventional banks 
record their interest in a property under a traditional family-home mortgage. The monthly 
payments made by the client covered the principal and pre-determined profit, as well as 
insurance and taxes. The bank simply needed to transfer the legal title to the client after the 
final payment. It must be noted that the Comptroller recorded the payment of the pre-
determined profit as interest.578 However, given that this is Riba, the bank referred to it as 
profit, which shows that there are differences between Islamic finance and conventional 
finance that are pro forma, rather than substantive. What the bank described as profit was 
money paid regularly for delaying the repayment of debt, which is in fact interest. 
Two years later, the Comptroller approved another application by an Islamic bank allowing 
the latter to use a sales-based contract, Murabahah, to finance the acquisition and 
construction of a mosque, community centre and Islamic school. The client agreed on the 
purchase prices of the property and equipment with the sellers and then sought financing 
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from an Islamic bank. The client and bank entered into a Murabahah agreement, whereby the 
bank purchased the property and equipment and immediately leased them to the client at cost-
plus mark-up. The Comptroller noted that the transaction was similar to secured lending and 
posed the same risks as a traditional home mortgage loan.579 In addition, the bank’s 
underwriting standards determined its decision to accept the client and credit risk and was 
required to have the same remedies as a non-recourse mortgage. With regard to the five-year 
period set by section 29 of the National Bank Act of 1864, the Comptroller stated that it was 
a matter of interpretation and it would be unfair to focus on the plain meaning of the words 
used by the legislator.580 The Comptroller recognised the fact that the Islamic bank’s legal 
title in these transactions is largely cosmetic and the client or lessee holds the indicia of 
ownership. This is because the client pays the taxes, insurance and maintenance costs, as well 
as operating the property, conducting repairs and assuming responsibility for any accidents 
occurring at the property.581 
The Comptroller’s flexibility and broad interpretation of the National Bank Act shows how 
Islamic banking may be accommodated within the US regulatory framework; the important 
thing is that regard be given to the intention of the legislature. It has also been shown that the 
structure and operations of financial institutions, such as savings associations and credit 
unions, are similar to those of Islamic banks.582 Credit unions are owned and controlled by 
customers. They place an emphasis on providing credit at very competitive rates and 
promoting thrift, because the depositors are the owners. Savings associations are in fact also 
referred to as thrift institutions; they accept deposits and savings, issue loans and make 
mortgage loans on residential property. This implies that Islamic banks may be set up in the 
US in the same way as credit unions or savings associations, receiving savings from 
customers and using the funds to make mortgage loans on residential property.  
Nonetheless, as shown in Chapter 4, Islamic banks perform better when they use sale-based 
contracts and lease asset-based contracts to effectively mitigate the risks embedded in PLS 
equity-based contracts. This may be problematic, because under a PLS agreement, the client 
or depositor shares in the losses with the financial institution. In the US, the bank must 
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guarantee to return the invested principal583 and so the deposit principal must be certain. The 
Islamic bank may then be compelled to structure the PLS agreement in such a way that the 
client or depositor only shares in the profit and not in the loss. However, the client is likely to 
violate Shariah rules, if he accepts the full repayment of the principal in the event of the bank 
suffering a loss. Moreover, banks in the US are required to invest only in interest-bearing 
securities and fixed income, in order to minimise exposure to risk. In contrast, interest is 
prohibited by Shariah. It must also be noted that although it is shown above that the Office of 
the Comptroller approved one Ijara agreement and Murabahah contract, some states may 
require the institution financing the purchase of real estate or car to be an auto-lender or 
licensed leasing company. 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
It is demonstrated in this chapter that Islamic banks may be accommodated within the same 
legal and regulatory framework as conventional banks but perform better with regard to risk 
management and resilience. Although they constitute a minority in the samples of the various 
studies cited here, all the Islamic banks in these studies exceeded the minimum regulatory 
requirements. The few banks that failed to remain profitable during the crises were 
conventional banks. Moreover, it was stated in this chapter that the IMF noted margins 
remained high in the KSA during the 2007-09 global crisis, because a large proportion of 
deposits and loans were Shariah-compliant and did not accrue interest.  
It has also been shown here that the causes of the financial crisis in the US, as identified in 
the literature, would not have occurred, if banks had complied with Shariah rules prohibiting 
interest, speculation and uncertainty, and used equity-based PLS agreements that are 
essentially ubberimae fidei contracts. It was then observed that flexibility in the interpretation 
of statutes may enable Islamic banking to be accommodated within the US regulatory 
framework. Additionally, the structure and operations of financial institutions, such as 
savings associations and credit unions, are similar to those of Islamic banks.  
Notwithstanding the above, in order for Islamic banks to perform better within a given 
regulatory environment, it is important for the regulator to tailor laws to suit the unique risks 
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embedded in Islamic products and services. This may involve the imposition of stricter 
measures, as evidenced by SAMA’s honing of Basel Standards and approaches. For example, 
Basel II (para. 651) encourages banks using the basic indicator approach to comply with 
these principles, but SAMA imposes compliance on all banks in KSA. SAMA also requires 
all banks to comply with Principle 13 of the Sound Principles and disclose liquidity-related 
information to the public on a regular basis. However, it does not allow banks to use Level 
2B assets for their liquidity coverage ratio. Unlike Basel II (para. 56), SAMA considers 
international organisations, such as the BIS, ECB and IMF as sovereign funds and does not 
necessarily risk-weight them at 0% - only GCC sovereign funds are risk-weighted at this 
level. The stricter measures adopted by SAMA may explain why there has been no deviation 
from Basel Standards by banks in KSA.  
Irrespective of the above, it has been highlighted in this chapter that each bank has a specific 
risk management strategy, which determines how it identifies and manages risk. Moreover, 
the bank’s underwriting standards will determine its decision to accept client and credit risk. 
Thus, the individual heterogeneity of each bank and effective prudential regulation are more 
important than the nature of the banking or financing activity. It follows that it is important to 
ascertain whether Islamic banks in KSA have actually developed specific risk management 
strategies, which take into account the unique risks embedded in their products. It could also 
be important to determine whether the stricter measures adopted by SAMA in implementing 
Basel Standards and approaches have made Islamic banks more resilient. The next Chapter 
therefore examines the risk management strategies of four KSA banks, as well as the way in 
which their resilience has been affected by SAMA’s implementation of Basel Standards. 
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Chapter 6 
 Compliance Risk Management and Resilience: A Comparative Case Study 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter adopts the heuristic approach of comparative case study in order to delimit the 
object of study to four banks in the KSA. It critically examines their risk management 
strategies and attempts to determine whether the Islamic banks of the sample manage risk 
better and are more resilient to financial crises than the conventional banks. For this purpose 
emphasis is placed on compliance risk. It is argued that compliance risk includes other 
categories of risk such as reputation risk, liquidity risk, credit risk and market risk given that 
there is a legal obligation in the KSA to manage these risks, and a bank may fail to fulfil the 
obligation. It is also contended that the number of laws, regulations and compulsory 
standards that banks in the KSA must comply with are so large that compliance risk is 
arguably the most important risk confronted by banks in the KSA. This Chapter therefore 
begins with a brief analysis of the concept of compliance risk. This is followed by a 
discussion of the features and expectations of the compliance function. It is then shown how 
the four banks use risk management processes that involve identifying, monitoring, managing 
and reporting the risks.  
 
Given that the annual reports of the four banks paint positive pictures of their ability to 
withstand adverse conditions, an attempt was made to look beyond the annual reports by 
conducting a survey of the stress tests carried out by the banks. Stress testing is increasingly 
recommended as the primary tool to identify risks and determine the adequate capital levels 
to resist shock. The importance of stress testing and the recommendations of SAMA and the 
Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) are highlighted. Although the four banks were asked 
eleven questions, their responses are examined across three key areas, namely Board of 
Director and senior management engagement, the integration of stress testing in the risk 
management strategy, and the hypothetical scenarios and portfolios on which they were 
modelled. The results of the survey of the stress tests conducted by the four banks are then 
discussed. The survey data provides a benchmark for assessing and comparing the banks’ 
views on the sources and nature of stress or material risks and their use of the tests in risk 
management.  
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6.2 The Concept of Compliance Risk  
 
As noted in Chapter 3, compliance risk is a broad concept that may or may not include or be 
part of legal risk and may or may not be part of operational risk. It is simply a matter of 
perspective.584 However, there is a structural similarity between compliance risk, legal risk 
and operational risk. The BCBS defines compliance risk as follows: 
 
[T]he risk of legal or regulatory sanctions, material financial loss, or loss to reputation 
a bank may suffer as a result of its failure to comply with laws, regulations, rules, 
related self-regulatory organisation standards, and codes of conduct applicable to its 
banking activities (together, “compliance laws, rules and standards”).585 
 
It is therefore submitted that commentators who use the terms compliance risk and legal risk 
interchangeably are not necessarily wrong when understood within the relevant context. This 
explains why there is no precise definition of compliance risk. In the same vein, McCormick 
notes that legal risk management is neither well-defined nor well-established and is generally 
of a proactive nature.586 Unfortunately, he did not attempt to provide a concise definition. It 
has nonetheless been suggested that it is not helpful to produce a standard definition since 
legal risk overlaps with other forms of risk.587 Moreover, compliance, risk management, and 
corporate governance serve a common purpose. That purpose in this context is to ensure that 
the bank complies with all laws, regulations and compulsory standards. Thus, what is 
important is how the bank responds to legal or compliance risk and associated risks, and 
whether Islamic banks manage these risks better in the KSA. 
 
The emphasis on laws, regulations and standards is meant to show that compliance risk 
covers issues related to standards of market conduct, treatment of customers, and 
management of conflicts of interest. Hence, a bank is exposed to compliance risk where it is 
knowingly involved in transactions that customers intend to use to evade tax liabilities or 
avoid regulatory requirements.588 It follows that there are many sources of compliance rules 
and standards, including primary statute, regulations and standards issued by legislators and 
                                                
584 See S Ramakrishna, Enterprise Compliance Risk Management (John Wiley & Sons 2015) 55-56. 
585 BCBS, Compliance and the Compliance Function in Banks (BCBS 2005) 7. 
586 R McCormick, Legal Risk in the Financial Markets (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2010) 105-113. 
587 A Whittaker, ‘Lawyers as Risk Managers’ (2003) Butterworths Journal of International Banking and 
Financial Law 5, 5. 
588 Ibid. 
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supervisors, codes of conduct published by industry associations, and internal codes of 
conduct issued by the senior management of the bank. The analysis in this chapter does not 
extend to internal codes of conduct given that they are not formally recognised as binding by 
the regulator or legislator. Nonetheless, it may be said that compliance risk involves legal 
risk, as well as operational risk. This is because it goes beyond the requirements of the laws 
(statutes) and includes compulsory standards imposed by the regulator. Also, as noted in 
Chapter 3, the compliance or legal risk includes reputation risk since the failure to comply 
with the relevant laws and regulations may damage a bank’s reputation; as well as liquidity 
risk, credit risk and market risk given that SAMA has imposed the broad Basel standards on 
banks in the KSA. Circular No BCS 5611, for example, requires banks of the KSA to comply 
with Basel III’s rules on the point of non-viability. This means that banks that seek to issue 
any additional Tier 1 or Tier 2 capital instruments are required by law to adopt a contractual 
loss absorption mechanism that may be activated by their non-viability or trigger events. 
Banks are therefore compelled by law (Circulars by SAMA) to manage liquidity risk, and the 
failure to comply with this law is a compliance risk. Banks in the KSA are also compelled by 
SAMA to implement the Basel III internal ratings-based approach for credit risk. The fact 
there is a legal obligation to manage credit risk in this light creates a compliance or legal risk 
because a bank may fail to comply with SAMA’s Circular. In fact, the number of laws, 
regulations and compulsory standards that banks in the KSA must comply with are so large 
that it may be contended that compliance risk is the most important risk confronted by banks 
in the KSA. A non-exhaustive list of the laws, regulations and standards provided by SAMA 
includes the following: 
 
‘The Banking Control Law (BCL) and rules for its enforcement  
Anti-Money Laundering Law and its implementing regulations 
Currency Law  
Anti-Forgery Law 
Guidelines and Instructions related to bank operations, financial returns,  
Circulars related to safety and security  
Anti-Money Laundering Rules Manual  
SAMA Rules Governing the Opening of Bank Accounts and General Rules for their 
Operation 
Anti-Fraud and Financial Embezzlement Law 
Internal Control Guidance Manual 
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Accounting Standards for Commercial Banks 
Audit Committee Regulating Rules Manual and its Guidance Manual for Regulating Audit 
Committees, and Manual of Operational Risk through an appropriate insurance system,  
The Guide of Secure Online Banking Services  
Requirements for Appointment in Senior Positions 
Requirements for Regulating Money laundering Units 
Controls for Addressing Complaints 
Controls Regulating Consumer Finance 
Currency Reproduction Controls in Saudi Arabia 
The Bank Services Charges 
Credit Card Guidelines 
Outsourcing Rules 
Laws, Regulations and Rules issued by other competent Government authorities such as the 
Companies Law, Labour Laws, Capital Market Law, and Foreign Investments Law and 
Regulations 
Internal compliance policies and procedures consistent with this “Compliance Manual” as set 
forth in Chapter 3 of this Manual which contains a “Framework of Compliance Manual” 
Principles issued by the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision pertaining to Setting up 
Compliance Units at banks, any other papers, reports, resolutions or recommendations issued 
by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) of which banks were informed in the past or to 
be informed in the future.’589 
 
The above list provides a snapshot of the complexity of the compliance function in banks. 
Nonetheless, what is important is that these laws, regulations and compulsory standards are 
adhered to. The failure to adhere to them entitles the government to intervene in order to 
prevent others from suffering the consequences of the failure.590 Also, adhering to them 
facilitates the regulation of the financial sector and prevents serious financial loss.591 This is 
especially the case in the KSA where the failure to comply with SAMA’s directions on 
capital adequacy implies that the bank does not hold enough capital to cover risks. Thus, it 
may be argued that banks that manage risk better are more resilient to financial crises. 
However, it is only at the end of the 20th century that compliance with risk management 
                                                
589 SAMA, Compliance Manual for Banks Working in Saudi Arabia (SAMA 2008) para 9. 
590 TP Duane, ‘Regulation’s Rationale: Learning from the California Energy Crisis’ (2002) 19 Yale Journal on 
Regulation 471, 481-482. 
591 BCBS, note 578 above, 7. 
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developed as a distinct risk discipline.592 In order to comply with the law, organisations use a 
risk management process that involves identifying, monitoring, managing and reporting the 
risk. With the increasing appeal of convergence, lawmakers adopt or reproduce international 
instruments based on best practice such as the Circulars of SAMA based on the standards 
recommended by BCBS or Circulars of CMA regarding the transition to International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). 
 
The above, notwithstanding the concept of compliance in the KSA, is problematic because of 
the operation of different legal systems. As noted in Chapter 5, Article 1 of the Basic Law of 
Governance (BSL) provides that the Shariah as derived from the Quran and the Sunnah of the 
Prophet Muhammad, is the fundamental law. However, SAMA has equally reproduced 
international standards such as those of Basel. Hence, all banks in the KSA must comply with 
the Sharia, and the Circulars issued by SAMA. This shows that there is a lingering 
uncertainty as regards compliance with the principles of the Shariah. Conventional banks in 
the KSA are allowed to buy and sell products that are not Shariah-compliant but are required 
to comply with the Circulars issued by SAMA. However, Islamic banks on the other hand are 
required to comply with the rules of the Shariah as well as the Circulars. One may therefore 
ask why only Islamic banks are compelled to confront the Shariah risk although the Shariah 
is the fundamental law of the KSA. Moreover, each bank has a Shariah Board that may 
determine on the basis of subjective criteria whether the bank’s Islamic products and 
transactions are Shariah-compliant or not. The Shariah Board of one bank may endorse a 
product that is considered by the Shariah Board of another bank as non-compliant. This raises 
the question of the true scope of the Shariah risk in the KSA, given that SAMA or CMA does 
not impose any penalty or sanction for non-compliance with the principles of the Shariah.  
 
Nonetheless, if compliance risk is a component of legal risk, then it may be said that 
conventional banks and Islamic banks confront different facets of the same legal risk. On the 
one hand, all banks confront the risk that the law (BCL, Circulars) may give rise to an 
outcome that is unplanned and undesirable. This may be due to amendments or new 
interpretations of an old law. The Banking Disputes Settlement Committee SAMA may for 
example affirm that a conventional bank in a dispute before the Committee is required to 
comply with the principles of the Shariah, given that the Shariah is the fundamental law of 
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the land. This would then imply that the conventional banks would cease to trade in products 
and services that are not compliant with the Shariah. On the other hand, only Islamic banks 
face the risk that they may be found to have carried out transactions in violation of the 
principles of the Shariah. Given that Islamic banking is not expressly recognized in the 
applicable laws and regulations in the KSA, Islamic banks are compelled to confront the 
Shariah risk only because they hold themselves out as Shariah-compliant banks. The 
assumption should therefore be that the operational risk controls of Islamic banks must be 
more sophisticated than those of conventional banks since Islamic banks must respond to a 
much wider variety of legal issues than conventional banks. However, it is shown below that 
this assumption is unfounded given that there is no legal motivation to comply with the 
principles of the Shariah. Conventional banks also operate Islamic windows and rely on their 
own Shariah Boards to determine whether their Islamic products and transactions are 
Shariah-compliant.  
 
This chapter places emphasis on what is done in banks in the KSA to manage compliance 
risk, and related operational, liquidity, credit, and market risks, in accordance with the law, 
and whether Islamic banks manage risk better because of the nature of Islamic banking. Thus, 
the focus is on compliance risk management. Given the wide variety of risks that are must be 
controlled, it may be argued that this is similar to enterprise risk management. This is because 
it is not simply a question of developing a compliance plan to enable the bank to comply with 
the law, but it is also about controlling the specific risks in the manner prescribed by the 
law.593 This is most likely unique to the KSA and other jurisdictions where there is a strong 
focus on micro prudential regulations that seek to regulate individual banks. An attempt is 
also made below to determine whether this regulatory approach actually impacts the risk 
management processes of banks of the KSA, and whether it contributes to their resilience. 
 
6.3 The Compliance Function 
 
Assessing the compliance function is important in determining whether the bank is 
effectively managing exposure.594 The compliance function comprises the staff who are 
tasked with compliance responsibilities. Every bank naturally has its own organisational 
                                                
593 Cf KJ Johnson and ZW Anson, ‘Quantifying Legal Risk: A Method for Managing Legal Risk’ (2007) 9 
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structure that reflects its environment. In the same vein, the compliance function staff may be 
located in one department or within the operating business lines, depending on the bank’s 
exposure and risk management strategy. Islamic banks and conventional banks that operate 
an Islamic window generally have a Shariah Board or Shariah Committee that oversees the 
Shariah compliance and research functions. However, its role is limited to Shariah 
compliance risk management, although they cooperate with other functions within the bank 
to ensure that the same standards on compliance are maintained in all units of the bank. 
Nonetheless, many Islamic governments have issued specific rules guiding the role and 
operation of the Shariah Board or Advisor.595 Given that SAMA does not specifically 
regulate Shariah risk, Islamic banks or conventional banks operating an Islamic window in 
the KSA are expected to self-regulate with regard to this specific risk. 
 
Nonetheless, as shown below, the compliance function of Islamic banks and conventional 
banks is required to be independent and provided with resources necessary for effective 
operation. It should equally be subject to independent review on a regular basis by the 
internal audit function. This will ensure that the compliance function’s management of 
compliance risk is consistent with the bank’s risk management strategy. 
 
The next section critically assesses specific compliance risk management strategies and 
structures of the two Islamic banks and two conventional banks in the KSA. The comparison 
is made on the basis of principles of compliance risk and the compliance function in banks 
issued by the BCBS, and the principles of corporate governance for banks in the KSA issued 
by SAMA. The rationale for using these principles as the basis for comparison is that the 
BCBS seeks to promote convergence toward common standards and approaches. Thus, its 
guidelines must be particularly helpful in a jurisdiction where Islamic banks and conventional 
banks are required to comply to the same laws and regulations. As shown in Chapter 5, 
SAMA has adopted the BCBS’s supervisory standards and guidelines because of their 
neutrality. This also explains why the principles of corporate governance for banks issued by 
SAMA largely reflects the principles of compliance risk and the compliance function in 
banks issued by the BCBS. 
It must be noted that organisations, whether Islamic or conventional, approach compliance 
holistically. They evaluate compliance practices by taking into account the total cost of 
                                                
595 See J Ercanbrack, The Transformation of Islamic Law in Global Financial Markets (Cambridge University 
Press 2015) 258. 
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compliance as well as the benefits of compliance efforts in order to plan for the long term. 
Cost-benefit analyses have been examined in depth across several disciplines in diverse 
contexts. However, they generally centre on the assessment of strengths and weaknesses of 
alternatives. In the context of compliance, the alternatives include estimating the costs of 
observing the relevant rules and regulations, as well as the cost of non-compliance. 
Organisations may be reluctant to comply with the law where the cost of non-compliance is 
less than the cost of complying. Nonetheless, this may be true only in cases where the costs 
and benefits can be monetised or quantified. It may be difficult or sometimes impossible to 
monetise or quantify the cost and benefits of managing compliance risk.596 The costs are 
sometimes complex and very difficult to estimate. They may include costs incurred by both 
regulators and banks due to changes to oversight and enforcement in addition to the human 
resources and time required. Nonetheless, Robert Hahn noted that the cost-benefit analysis 
‘does not require that costs and benefits be expressed in the same units or that agencies 
monetize benefits that may not be quantifiable.’597 He then stated that the analysis should 
simply ‘be careful to reflect those uncertainties and account for qualitative factors.’598 As 
such, the cost-benefit analysis is important because it helps to specify baselines and 
alternatives within the compliance function, enabling organisations to determine, at least 
conceptually, the costs and benefits of compliance by relying on evidence rather than 
intuitive judgement solely.599 What is important is that organisations can use the cost-benefit 
analysis on a voluntary basis, without any form of legal compulsion. 
 
6.4 Assessing the Compliance Risk Management of Banks in the KSA 
 
The supporting guidance issued by the BCBS is intended to assist individual banks to manage 
and mitigate compliance risk.600 However, all banks licensed by SAMA to carry out banking 
business in the KSA and their foreign branches must apply the principles issued by SAMA. 
They are not mere guidelines. The regulator notes that the principles “complement the 
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regulations, rules and circulars” it has issued, as well as regulations issued by the CMA.601 
Thus, a bank licensed in the KSA may not follow practices other than those outlined in the 
guidance issued by SAMA. This is because this is the way this regulator determines whether 
the compliance function of a bank is effective. As noted above, the fact that SAMA has 
imposed these best practices on banks in the KSA implies that the compliance or legal risk 
may also involve liquidity risk, credit risk and market risk. Thus, this section also assesses the 
management of these risks by the four banks named above in order to determine whether they 
comply with the regulations or are likely to suffer financial loss due to non-compliance. 
Nonetheless, it is only logical to take into account the fact that the nature of the bank’s 
activity, as well as its size and complexity determines the way in which the principles are 
implemented. The four banks that were part of the survey include Al Rajhi Bank, Albilad 
Bank, National Commercial Bank (NCB), and Samba Financial Group. 
 
Al Rajhi Bank, previously known as Al Rajhi Banking and Investment Corporation, was 
ranked the largest fully Shariah-compliant bank in the world by capital in 2015.602 Thus, it 
has the largest market for Shariah-compliant bank products. In order to ensure compliance 
with the Shariah, it has established a Shariah Authority that reviews the products and 
activities. Its first branch was opened in 1957 and it became a joint stock company under 
Royal Decree No. M/59 of June 29, 1987 and Article 6 of the Council of Ministers’ 
Resolution No. 245 of June 23, 1987. The following year, it was established as a share 
holding company of the KSA. It is also one of the largest joint stock companies in the KSA. 
It is traded on the Saudi Arabian Stock Exchange, Tadawul, and has branches in Jordan and 
Kuwait, and a subsidiary, the Al Rajhi Corporation Ltd in Malaysia. 
 
Albilad Bank, a much smaller fully Shariah-compliant bank, was established as a joint stock 
company in the KSA under Royal Decree No. M/48 of November 4, 2004. It operates 
through several segments that are fully Shariah-compliant, including retail, corporate, 
treasury, investment, and brokerage. It has branches and exchange and remittance centres in 
the KSA. 
 
NCB, also known as Al Ahli Bank, is the largest bank in the KSA by asset and the first 
licensed local bank of the KSA. It was established following the Royal Decree of December 
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26, 1953. In 1999, the government through the Public Investment of Fund of the Ministry of 
Finance acquired a majority holding of the bank. In March 2014, the bank made an Initial 
Public Offering for 15 per cent of its share capital, and 10 per cent of its share capital was 
allocated to the Public Pension Agency. Since then, the bank’s shares have been trading on 
the Tadawul. It is also one of the first modern banks to offer Islamic products. It is a 
conventional bank that operates an Islamic window, although there are plans to make the 
bank fully Shariah-compliant in the next five years.  
 
Lastly, Samba Financial Group was previously a branch of Citibank, established in Jeddah in 
1955. It became a separate company in 1980 following a Royal Decree. It was then known as 
the Saudi American Bank. In 1999, it merged with the United Saudi Bank, and in 2003, its 
name was changed to Samba Financial Group when the technical management agreement 
with Citibank ended. Like most conventional banks in the KSA, it also offers a mix of 
conventional and fully Shariah-compliant products and services. It has a branch in the UK, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, as well as a subsidiary with 28 branches across 
Pakistan. 
 
6.5 Responsibilities of the Board of Directors and Senior Management 
 
The BCBS assumes that banks generally have a governance structure that comprises a Board 
of Directors and senior management.603 The corporate governance structures of the banks in 
the KSA match this description. However, SAMA requires that the members of the Board of 
Directors be qualified to perform their tasks. It further requires the Board to disclose the CVs 
of all its members in order for investors and shareholders to assess their competence and 
ability to perform the respective tasks assigned to them.604 Also, the Board must disclose the 
mechanism it uses to monitor the performance and evaluate the integrity of its members.605 
However, there are no guidelines on the acceptable level of integrity and how the 
effectiveness of the mechanism may be assessed. The BCBS recommends that the Board of 
Directors should be tasked with ensuring that a suitable policy is implemented to manage 
compliance risk, as well as other categories of risk. The Board and senior management should 
then oversee the implementation of this policy and coordinate with the compliance function 
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to resolve all compliance issues in an expeditious manner.606 In the same vein, SAMA 
requires the Board to clearly set out lines of accountability and responsibility at all levels. 
The Board must then approve and oversee the implementation of an appropriate risk strategy, 
ensure the soundness and solvency of the bank, as well as the compliance of the senior 
management and all employees with relevant policies and procedures.607 The Board must also 
guarantee the independence of auditors, internal and external, and ensure the fulfilment of 
requirements of transparency and disclosure regarding financial reports.608 Interestingly, the 
Board has an obligation to inform SAMA about any penalty or sanction within five days of 
the date of the penalty or sanction that any other regulatory, supervisory or judicial body has 
imposed on the Board.609 Although SAMA does not state the consequence of this penalty or 
sanction from its regulatory perspective, the penalty or sanction is evidence of the failure of 
the compliance function and compliance risk management in the bank. Thus, an attempt is 
also made to determine the penalties or sanctions that have been imposed on the respective 
banks. 
 
6.5.1Al Rajhi Bank 
  
As noted above, this is the largest fully Shariah-compliant bank in the world by capital. Thus, 
it has developed a wide range of Islamic products in an attempt to develop diversity in 
Islamic finance. It follows that the Shariah risk confronted by the bank is even bigger. 
However, given that the only authority that assesses its Shariah products is the bank’s Shariah 
Board, it may be argued that the bank does not confront Shariah risk per se. It is nonetheless 
uncertain whether the same rules that apply to the Board of Directors should apply to the 
Shariah Board.  
 
The Board of Directors of the bank comprises eleven individuals elected every three years by 
the General Assembly. However, only a very brief account of six members’ education and 
qualifications is provided on the bank’s website. Nothing is provided in the annual reports of 
2007, 2014 and 2016 that were examined for this study. Thus, this bank does not comply with 
SAMA’s requirement that the Board must disclose the CVs of all its members in order for the 
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investors and shareholders to assess their competence and ability to perform the respective 
tasks assigned to them. Also, the bank does not comply with SAMA’s requirement to disclose 
the mechanism that it uses to assess the integrity and performance of the members of the 
Board of Directors. It is therefore uncertain whether the bank has been sufficiently diligent 
not to nominate a member who has been convicted of a crime that involves moral turpitude.  
 
Notwithstanding, the Board of Directors develops or approves policies governing risk 
management,610 as required by SAMA. Risk management is essentially performed by a 
separate unit called the Credit and Risk Management Group. The Board and senior 
management ensure that the risks identified are mitigated. The Board has for example set 
limits on the level of mismatch of commission, as well as commission rate gal limits for 
specific periods to ensure that positions are maintained within the limits to mitigate the profit 
rate risk.611 It is however uncertain whether the Board oversees the implementation of an 
appropriate risk strategy by the Credit and Risk Management Group, as well as whether it is 
the duty of the Board to ensure the soundness and solvency of the bank. 
 
6.5.2Albilad Bank 
 
This smaller Islamic bank operates through several segments that are fully Shariah-compliant 
and has a much more independent Shariah Board that assesses all products and transactions. 
The bank’s Board of Directors comprises eleven members. Unlike Al Rajhi Bank, this bank 
complies with SAMA’s requirement that the Board must disclose the CVs of all its members 
in order for the investors and shareholders to assess their competence. Thus, the CV of each 
member is provided on the company’s website. However, there is no information on the 
mechanism used to monitor the performance and evaluate the integrity of the members. The 
Board approves and certifies risk measurement mechanisms and procedures, and the senior 
management reports exposures and violations to the Board and the Asset and Liabilities 
Committee on a regular basis.612 The Board nominates members of the Risk Committee and 
assigns tasks to the Committee. The Board and the Asset and Liabilities Committee review 
periodic reports on risk management. Thus, beyond reviewing and approving broad risk 
strategies, it is uncertain whether the Board effectively oversees the implementation of the 
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strategies. It is also uncertain which measures are taken by the Board and senior management 
to ensure the soundness and solvency of the bank, as well as the compliance of the senior 
management and all employees with relevant policies and procedures. On the other hand, the 
Shariah Board is more involved in the mitigation of Shariah risk. It is for example 
empowered to compel the bank to exclude revenues obtained in contravention of the 
principles of the Shariah.613 
 
6.5.3NCB 
 
The Board of Directors of this conventional bank comprises nine members appointed by the 
General Assembly every three years. Like Al Rajhi Bank, only a very brief account of nine 
members’ education and qualifications is provided on the bank’s website. Hence, it does not 
comply with SAMA’s requirement that the Board of Directors must disclose the CVs of all 
its members in order for the investors and shareholders to assess their competence and ability 
to perform the respective tasks assigned to them. However, it complies with SAMA’s 
requirement to disclose the mechanism that is used to assess the integrity and performance of 
these members. In 2015, it published a document briefly outlining the policies, standards and 
procedures for nominating members of the Board of Directors.614 It also subsequently noted 
that it has adopted SAMA’s guidelines on corporate governance.615 Thus, the Board oversees 
the operation of the internal controls system. It has several sub-committees with defined roles 
and responsibilities. They generally support the senior management in monitoring and 
managing the wide range of risks to which the bank is exposed. The Board also conducts 
periodic reviews of the reports on the internal audit, internal control, and risk management. 
This enables the Board to determine the effectiveness of the internal control system.616 
 
Unlike the Islamic banks discussed above, the Board of the NCB plays a more active role in 
overseeing the implementation of the risk strategy and ensuring the soundness of the Bank. 
This is because the Board has a Risk Committee that ensures that the senior management 
understands and manages the significant risks to which the bank is exposed. This Committee 
also ensures that the bank’s policies and procedures to manage the risks comply with all 
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relevant laws and regulations.617 Also, the Board has overall authority for developing market 
risk management policies and reviews their implementation by the Risk Group on a daily 
basis.618 The Board may equally set limits on positions by currency in order to mitigate 
currency risk.619  
 
Given that it operates an increasingly large Islamic window and intends to become a fully 
Shariah-compliant bank in the near future, it has a Shariah Board with similar extensive 
powers as the Shariah Boards of the Islamic banks discussed above. The Shariah Board for 
example confirmed that subscription for the bank’s shares traded on the Tadawul is Shariah-
compliant.620 However, there is no information on the criteria that were used to determine the 
conformity to the principles of the Shariah. Also, as will be shown below, there is no 
information on how the portfolio of Shariah-compliant stocks will fare during a financial 
crisis. 
6.5.4 Samba Financial Group 
 
This conventional bank’s Board of Directors also comprises nine members appointed by the 
General Assembly every three years. Like Al Rajhi and NCB, only a very brief account of 
nine members’ education and qualifications is provided on the bank’s website. Hence, it does 
not comply with SAMA’s requirement that the Board must disclose the CVs of all its 
members in order for the investors and shareholders to assess their competence and ability to 
perform the respective tasks assigned to them. Also, like in all the banks discussed above, the 
Board of Directors is directly responsible for the risk management function. Its structure is 
very similar to that of NCB’s Board given that it comprises sub-committees that manage 
different risks within the overall policies approved by the Board.621 The relevant committees 
in this regard include the Country Risk and Compliance Committee, the Management Credit 
Committee, the Asset and Liability Committee, and the Integrated Risk Management 
Committee. The Board and senior management also play a very active role in overseeing the 
implementation of the risk strategy by setting maximum exposure limits for obligors and in 
terms of portfolio composition in order to mitigate credit risk and avoid excessive 
                                                
617 Ibid, 46. 
618 Ibid, 115. 
619 Ibid, 119. 
620 Ibid, 38. 
621 N Schoon, Islamic Banking and Finance (Spiramus 2010) 92. 
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concentration. They also set standards for the origination and maintenance of extensions of 
credit.622 
 
Interestingly, this bank operates an Islamic window, but the buying and selling of Islamic 
products is considered by the Board of Directors to be a separate financial and operational 
system. The Board is therefore not directly involved in the management of Shariah risk. This 
task has been assigned to the Shariah Supervisory Board which has extensive duties and more 
powers than the Shariah Boards of the other banks discussed above. It operates like a Shariah 
Board of Directors. Nonetheless, as noted above, it is difficult to contend that this bank faces 
the Shariah risk since it is up to the Shariah Supervisory Board to determine whether the bank 
is compliant with the principles of the Shariah. 
6.6 Compliance Function in the KSA 
 
The BCBS recommends that the compliance function of the bank must have formal status and 
be independent.623 It also recommends the appointment of a head of compliance or group 
compliance officer who is tasked with managing the overall compliance risk of the bank. 
Also, neither the compliance officer nor the compliance staff should be placed in a position 
where there is a potential conflict of interest between their compliance duties and other duties 
or commitments. The Board must then ensure that they have access to information necessary 
to perform their duties. In the same vein, SAMA requires all banks to have a compliance 
function, in addition to the internal audit function, risk management function, and a Chief 
Risk Officer.624 It also requires the Board to ensure that the heads of these functions are 
independent and have sufficient resources to perform their tasks. Their independence may be 
undermined where their remuneration is tied to the performance of the business. The Board 
must also have a written policy governing conflicts of interests.625 The policy must outline 
ways of identifying possible conflicts of interests. SAMA notes that conflicts of interests may 
arise where the bank routinely communicates and shares information with its holding 
company or subsidiaries. Where related party transactions are carried out,626 the Board must 
ensure that they are fair and neither party is subject to any pressure from the other party. 
                                                
622 Ibid, 93. 
623 BCBS, note 578 above, 10. 
624 SAMA, note 590 above, para 44. 
625 Ibid, para 49. 
626 For an analysis of related party transactions and agency problems that might occur, See Hiller et al, 
Corporate Finance (2nd edn, McGraw-Hill Education 2013) 34-35. 
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Where the transaction is not at such an arm’s length basis, the Board must disclose the 
transaction to SAMA within two business days.627 
 
However, it must be noted that the banks need not necessarily have a designated compliance 
unit or compliance department. Compliance duties may be carried out by personnel in 
different units. The legal department may for example be tasked with assisting the senior 
management in managing compliance risk. Members of this department may also monitor 
compliance with the relevant policies and regulations and report to management. However, 
what is important is the lines of responsibility and accountability are clearly drawn, and the 
bank complies with the relevant laws and regulations. 
 
The BCBS also recommends that the compliance function should identify and assess the 
compliance risks that are embedded in the activities of the bank.628 As noted above, these 
risks include Shariah risk, liquidity risk, credit risk, operational risk, and market risk. This is 
because SAMA imposes duties on banks to manage these risks. Hence, the compliance 
function must for example identify and document risks associated with the development of 
products or adoption of innovative business practices, the change of the nature of customer 
relationships, whether the bank meets the Basel III standard liquidity coverage ratio, adopts a 
contractual loss absorption mechanism that may be activated by their non-viability or trigger 
events where it seeks to issue any additional Tier 1 or Tier 2 capital instruments, and builds 
up a capital conservation buffer of 2.5 per cent (comprised of Common Equity Tier 1) outside 
of periods of stress.629 These are only some of the Basel standards that SAMA has imposed 
on banks in the KSA, to the effect that failure to comply with the standards attracts corrective 
measures or fines. 
 
It is therefore important that the compliance function should be able to use performance 
indicators or other indicators to measure compliance risk. The measurements enhance risk 
assessment. The compliance function should also evaluate the compliance procedures and 
guidelines on a regular basis, and swiftly mend any deficiencies identified or make suitable 
                                                
627 SAMA, note 590 above, para 52. 
628 BCBS, note 578 above, 14. 
629 The compliance function must therefore be adopted to each bank. See A Ergys Mishal, ‘The Compliance 
Function in Banks and the Need for Increasing and Strengthening its Role – Lessons Learned from Practice’ 
(2016) 5 European Journal of Sustainable Development 171, 178; Jonathan Edwards and Simon Wolfe, ‘The 
Compliance Function in Banks’ (2004) 12 Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance 216, 216-224; Emil 
Asenov, ‘Characteristics of Compliance Risk in Banking’ (2015) 4 Economic Alternatives 20, 24-28. 
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proposals to the senior management and the Board. The effective management of compliance 
risk also requires regular compliance monitoring and testing. The head of compliance must 
always report the results of the tests to the Board and senior management. The report must 
also include any changes in the bank’s risk profile on the basis of relevant measurements. The 
compliance function must then liaise with the regulator when required by the law. 
 
Interestingly, SAMA does not impose any test on banks in the KSA. It simply requires the 
compliance department to continuously monitor and test compliance and establish a periodic 
review programme of test controls that correspond with the level of potential risks to which 
the bank is exposed.630 As noted in Chapter 5, unlike the Dodd-Frank Act that imposes the 
stress testing of each bank’s capital structure in the United States, there is no regulatory stress 
testing in the KSA. Hence, different banks are free to use variants of the stress test since they 
are simply required to comply with the capital adequacy rules under Basel II and Basel III. 
Also, there is no regulatory requirement to publish the results of the test. This creates much 
uncertainty as regards the stress scenarios used by individual banks, whether they are 
sufficiently severe, what the true bank capital level is, and which capital buffer is needed to 
resist a severe shock. 
 
The next section critically examines the regulatory functions of the four banks introduced 
above. It seeks to determine the extent to which the banks have followed the 
recommendations of the BCBS and SAMA, and whether they comply with the relevant laws, 
regulations and compulsory standards. 
 
6.6.1 Al Rajhi Bank 
 
As a fully-fledged Islamic bank, it has a dual compliance function. This is because it is 
foremost required to comply with the principles of the Shariah, and then with the laws, 
standards, rules, and regulations outlined above. The staff who have the skill to assess how 
the principles of the Shariah and new interpretations may affect the bank do not necessarily 
have the expertise regarding conventional laws and regulations. Thus, Al Rajhi Bank has a 
Shariah Authority that assesses all the bank’s products and activities with regard to their 
compliance with the principles of the Shariah. The bank has a separate risk management 
                                                
630 See SAMA, note 590 above, paras 7-8. 
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function and compliance function. The risk management is performed by the Credit and Risk 
Management Group. It is tasked with identifying and assessing financial risks. The bank 
notes that the most important financial risks to which it is exposed include market risk 
(currency risk, profit rate risk, and price risk), operational risk, liquidity risk, and credit 
risk.631 
 
The compliance function is the preserve of the Compliance Group established in 2005.632 The 
bank notes that the Group monitors and assesses compliance risks and reputation risk. 
Emphasis is placed on the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing. However, it 
seems the Group’s duties do not extend to financial risks, although they constitute 
compliance risks in the KSA as shown above. Nonetheless, given that the Group seeks to 
prevent legal or administrative penalties and damage to the bank’s reputation caused by the 
failure to comply with relevant laws, rules and regulations, it may be assumed that its 
activities are closely coordinated with those of the Credit and Risk Management Group. This 
is because SAMA imposes penalties for the failure to manage financial risks in specific ways. 
 
The Compliance Group supports the Board and the senior management in managing and 
mitigating the impact of compliance risks. Thus, the Chief Compliance Officer reports to the 
Chief Executive Officer, as well as the Audit Compliance Committee. There is no 
information about the independence of the Chief Compliance Officer, only general guidelines 
on compliance empowerment and independency in the implementation of the compliance 
programme. There is equally no information about the remuneration of staff in the 
Compliance Group in order to assess their independence, as well as no written policy 
governing conflicts of interests. Regarding the risk-based approach used by the bank, they 
place emphasis on monitoring and analysing risks of money laundering and terrorism 
financing. The bank also has a monitoring and testing program. However, due to the fact that 
it is not required to publish information about the tests, it is difficult to access accurate and 
verifiable information about stress scenarios and capital buffers for example. It is shown 
below that this study was compelled to rely on qualitative data obtained from questionnaires.  
 
                                                
631 Al Rajhi Bank, note 599 above, para 26. 
632 Information about the Compliance Group and the Chief Compliance Officer is only found on the bank’s 
website. There is no information on these in the bank’s annual reports. 
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The bank did not report any fine imposed on it in 2007, 2014 or 2016. However, the New 
York Department of Financial Services imposed a fine of $255 million on Habib Bank for 
facilitating billions of dollars in transactions with Al Rajhi Bank without any appropriate 
safeguards to prevent money laundering or terrorism financing.633 Al Rajhi Bank has no 
operations in the United States. It is uncertain whether it would have been fined as well if it 
had any operations in the United States. Nonetheless, the fine was not imposed for money 
laundering or terrorism financing but for the failure to establish appropriate safeguards. In 
light of the above, it is unlikely that Al Rajhi Bank would have been fined. It is also 
important to note that the Supreme Court of the United States dismissed a suit as Al Rajhi 
Bank, holding that the civil remedy provision of the Anti-Terrorism Act does not support 
claims against the bank based on theories of secondary liability, and the plaintiffs had failed 
to establish that the bank provided support to the terrorist organisation that attacked the 
United States in 2011.634 Box VI.I below provides a snapshot of the bank’s compliance 
programme as presented on its site. 
 
Box VI.I: Al Rajhi’s Compliance Programme 
 
                                                
633 Glen Blain, ‘Pakistan-based Habib Bank Slapped with $225 Million Fine’ (2017) New York Daily News. 
Available at: http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/habib-bank-slapped-225m-fine-forced-shutter-nyc-
branch-article-1.3478389  [04 December 2017]. 
634 See O’Neill et al v Al Rajhi Bank, 134 S.Ct. 2870 (2014). A similar suit has been filed by several insurance 
companies in the New York Southern District Court. See The Charter Oak Fire Insurance Co et al v Al Rajhi 
Bank et al (Case No. 1:17-cv-02651). 
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Source: Al Rajhi Bank635 
 
6.6.2 Albilad Bank 
 
As a fully compliant Islamic bank, it also has a dual compliance function. Thus, the bank has 
an independent Shariah Board that ensures that all products, activities, agreements, and 
decisions are in compliance with the principles of the Shariah. It also provides training on 
Shariah compliance. It must be noted that the decisions of the Shariah Board bind the bank 
and cannot be overruled by the senior management and Board of Directors. The Shariah 
Board has a Preparatory Committee that assesses the legality of new products and examines 
enquiries from the bank’s employees and customers. The Shariah Board also works with the 
Shariah Group that comprises 11 employees from the Shariah Board Secretariat Department, 
the Shariah Audit Department, and the Research and Development Department. 
 
The compliance function is also performed by the Risk Committee and the Compliance and 
Governance Committee of the Board of Directors. There is no independent compliance 
function. The role of the Compliance and Anti-Financial Crime Division is quite limited and 
almost ceremonious. It is generally required to assess the bank’s compliance with laws, 
regulations, directives, mandatory guidelines, and policies.636 It must also ensure that the 
policies and procedures of the bank, as well as work programmes are updated on a regular 
basis. It is expected that all departments and the Senior Executive Management, can repair 
deficiencies in the controls system identified by the auditors. Surely, this ought to be the task 
of the head of compliance or group compliance officer as recommended by BCBS and 
SAMA. The ultimate responsibility for assessing and managing overall compliance risk is 
with the Compliance and Governance Committee of the Board of Directors. Although two of 
the three members are independent external experts, the Chairperson and third member of the 
Committee is also a member of the Board of Directors.637 This raises questions about 
independence and conflict of interest. This Committee develops the risk strategy, makes risk 
management decisions, and monitors the risk level. The latter tasks should have been 
delegated to the Compliance and Anti-Financial Crime Division. 
                                                
635 See http://www.alrajhibank.com.sa/en/investor-relations/about-us/pages/anti-money-laundering.aspx  [08 
January 2018]. 
636 Albilad Bank, note 601 above, 18. 
637 Ibid, 19. 
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Also, the senior management, and not any of the units the perform the compliance function, is 
responsible for monitoring the maturity portfolio and ensuring adequate liquidity. Although 
the bank notes that it conducts stress tests on a regular basis to monitor its liquidity 
positions,638 it is uncertain which unit conducts the tests. There is no information about the 
multiple scenarios used and the results of the tests. The bank simply states that the stress tests 
are conducted through the Internal Capital Adequacy Assessing Procedures (ICAAP) to 
ensure capital adequacy in stressful economic conditions.639 Nonetheless, the Assets and 
Liabilities Committee reviews all policies related to liquidity.  
 
It must be noted that in the year of 2015 alone, 134 fines were imposed on the bank by 
SAMA, CMA, and the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs and the General Authority for 
Civil Aviation. The total amount the bank paid in fines was SAR 649,200, which is roughly 
£128,000. In 2014, 98 fines were imposed on the bank by SAMA and the Ministry of 
Municipal and Rural Affairs.640 The bank did not specify the reasons for the fines. 
Nonetheless, given its size, this demonstrates a high risk of non-compliance, given that the 
much larger Al Rajhi Bank received no fine during the same period.  
6.6.3 NCB 
 
Although this bank is not fully Shariah-compliant, it has an independent Shariah Board that 
assesses the products provided through its Islamic window. Nonetheless, the bank states that 
all its services comply with the Shariah.641 Thus, its Shariah Board performs the compliance 
function almost as much as the Shariah Authority of Al Rajhi Bank and the Shariah Board of 
Albilad Bank.  
 
Given the size and importance of this bank, it is surprising that the compliance function does 
not have a formal status within the bank. Also, there is no group compliance officer or head 
of compliance who is tasked with coordinating the management of the institution’s 
compliance risk.  This task has been assigned to the Audit Committee of the Board of 
                                                
638 Ibid, 4. 
639 Ibid, 5, 7, 13. 
640 Albilad Bank, Annual Report 2014 (Albilad Bank 2014) 64. 
641 NCB, note 604 above, 11. 
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Directors.642 Although the Committee comprises at least three non-executive members, the 
Chairman is a member of the Board of Directors. This raises questions about the Committee’s 
independence. Also, the Committee coordinates compliance risk management with the 
Internal Audit Division and the Compliance Division.643 It is uncertain what the latter unit 
actually does, apart from host the staff that assist the Audit Committee. All material findings 
are reported to the Committee which ensures that risks identified are managed and internal 
control system remains efficient. However, it is uncertain whether the Committee’s four 
members constitute sufficient resources to ensure that a bank of this size and complexity 
complies with all relevant laws, regulations and standards. 
 
The bank then notes that due to the limitations of the value at risk (VaR) technique as regards 
sensitivity structures and concentration risks in each trading book,644 it supplements the tool 
with stress tests.645  These enable the bank to ascertain the financial impact of extraordinary 
market scenarios on the bank’s trading position. The liquidity position is also assessed using 
these tests. However, as Al Rajhi Bank and Albilad Bank, NCB does not provide information 
about the variety of scenarios and stress factors that it employs. Also, there is no information 
about the results of the tests. 
 
With regard to fines and penalties, in 2016 alone, NCB exceptionally received 31 fines from 
SAMA amounting to SAR 14,104,660 (roughly £2,700,000).646 Some of the fines include 1 
fine for non-maintenance of the minimum liquidity reserve ratio of deposit liabilities, 14 fines 
for supplying false banknotes, 5 fines for non-compliance with anti-money laundering rules, 
and 1 fine for providing SAMA with false information in the follow-up report regarding 
comprehensive examination observations in 2013.647 In 2014, a total of 8 fines were imposed 
by SAMA, including a fine for using false banknotes and a fine for failing to report 
suspicious activity.648 This shows a comparatively high level of non-compliance which is 
understandable given the fact that the bank’s conventional compliance function does not have 
a formal status, and the unit and person in charge of the overall management of compliance 
risk is not independent. On the other hand, the Shariah compliance function has a formal 
                                                
642 Ibid, 45. 
643 Ibid, 19. 
644 Some of the limitations of VaR are discussed in Chapter 3. 
645 NCB, note 604 above, 117. 
646 Ibid, 29. 
647 Ibid. 
648 NCB, Annual Report 2014 (NCB 2014) 22. 
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status and the Shariah Board is independent. Nonetheless, it is not thanks to the Shariah 
Board that none of the 31 fines relates to non-compliance with the principles of the Shariah. 
It is simply because the regulators do not enforce the principles of the Shariah.  
6.6.4 Samba Financial Group 
 
The Shariah Supervisory Board is not only independent, but it directs activities relating to 
Islamic banking. As noted above, Board of Directors is ultimately responsible for risk 
management, and has created several sub-committees to formulate overall policies and 
oversee the process, including the Integrated Risk Management Committee and the Country 
Risk and Compliance Committee. The senior management of this bank is responsible for 
ensuring that adequate controls are maintained, and all operations are efficient and comply 
with the relevant laws, regulations, and standards.649 The compliance function is performed 
by the Board of Directors, the Compliance and Operations Risk Management Department 
(ORMD), and the Audit and Risk Review. The Board of Directors has issued the Code of 
Corporate Governance in order to comply with the requirements of the Pakistan Stock 
Exchange Limited (Rule No. 5.19) where the Samba Group is listed. The Board of Directors 
is responsible for ensuring that all departments apply the Code. It further issued a Statement 
of Compliance showing how the departments comply with the Code’s provisions. The Audit 
and Risk Review and ORMD monitor compliance with all regulatory requirements, and 
together with the Risk Management Group, review processes and operations to identify and 
manage compliance risks.650 They have also identified key risk indicators for different control 
areas with tolerance limits. 
 
Samba Financial Group uses more tools to measure risk factors than the other banks. These 
include factor sensitivities, gap analysis, market access report, volatility and correlation 
calculations, VaR, liquidity ratio, back testing and stress testing.651 The risk management 
function reviews the methodologies and ensures that they are reasonable and consistent. 
Nonetheless, no information is provided on the results of the analyses carried out by the bank. 
It is therefore uncertain whether they are used in a manner that is effective with regard to 
establishing standards for measuring and reporting risks. 
 
                                                
649 Samba Financial Group, Annual Report 2016 (Samba Financial Group 2016) 30. 
650 Ibid, 31. 
651 Ibid, 102-104. 
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Regarding penalties or sanctions, this bank has not incurred as many penalties as NCB or 
even Albilad Bank. However, in 2015, the CMA imposed a fine of SAR10,000 (roughly 
£2000) on the bank for failure to issue a Corporate Governance Code approved by the Board 
of Directors before June 30, 2013. This was in violation of Article 10(c) of the Corporate 
Governance Regulations. 
 
6.7 Risk Management and Resilience  
 
The four banks have a governance structure that comprises a Board of Directors and senior 
management. Although there is always further scope for closer cooperation between the 
various units, they are largely integrated, and it seems their collaboration is functional. The 
Board of Directors are tasked with ensuring that policies are implemented to manage 
compliance risk, as well as other related categories of risk. The Board and senior 
management in all the banks, except Al Rajhi Bank, generally oversee the implementation of 
these policies and coordinate with the compliance function to resolve all compliance issues in 
an expeditious manner. The role of the Board of Directors of Al Rajhi is unclear in this 
regard. Also, of all four banks, only Albilad Bank complies with SAMA’s requirement that 
the Board must disclose the CVs of all its members in order for the investors and 
shareholders to assess their competence and ability to perform the respective tasks assigned 
to them. Also, only NCB complies with SAMA’s requirement to disclose the mechanism that 
it uses to assess the integrity and performance of the members of the Board of Directors. It is 
therefore generally uncertain whether these banks are sufficiently diligent in nominating 
members of their respective Boards. 
 
With regard to the compliance function, all the banks, except NCB, have a clearly designated 
head of compliance or group compliance officer who is tasked with managing the overall 
compliance risk of the bank. In NCB, the compliance function does not have a formal status 
within the bank and the management of the institution’s compliance risk has been assigned to 
the Audit Committee of the Board of Directors. Al Rajhi Bank has the most sophisticated 
compliance programme with lines of accountability and responsibility and targets clearly set 
out at all levels, as shown in Box 5.1. However, like the other banks, its compliance function 
is not independent. Although there is not sufficient information about remuneration to 
determine whether the compliance officer and staff confront a potential conflict of interest 
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between their compliance duties and promoting the bank, they mostly work with the Board of 
Directors and cannot conduct an independent review in such circumstances. Hence, the role 
of the Board of Directors in these banks is execution rather than monitoring and oversight. 
Interestingly, the Islamic compliance function performed by the Shariah Authority or Boards 
of all four banks is effectively independent. The Shariah Boards assess the legality of new 
products and mitigate the Sharia risk, and they cannot be overruled by the senior management 
and Board of Directors. However, although the Islamic banks offer only Islamic products, 
they do not necessarily have better compliance risk management systems. This is because 
none of the banks actually confront a Shariah risk. This is because the regulators in the KSA 
do not enforce the principles of the Shariah against the banks. Hence, the only authority that 
assesses a bank’s Shariah products is the bank’s Shariah Board. It follows that the 
compliance risk management of Islamic banks is assessed in light of how the banks comply 
with the laws, regulations and standards that apply to all banks, regardless of the nature of 
their activities. In this light, it is difficult to contend that Islamic banks manage risk better 
than conventional banks. As shown above, Al Rajhi Bank, an Islamic bank, and Samba 
Financial Group, a conventional bank, did not receive any penalties or sanctions in 2007, 
2014 and 2016. On the other hand, NCB (conventional bank) and Albilad Bank (Islamic 
bank) demonstrated relatively high levels of non-compliance with several fines imposed by 
the regulators.  
 
What is also surprising is the dearth of information about the management of risk embedded 
in PLS modes of financing in the reports of the banks. They all offer Islamic products and 
enter into these transactions, and two of the banks are fully Shariah-compliant. NCB intends 
to become fully Shariah-compliant in the near future. However, there is very little 
information about how these banks use PLS modes of financing to mitigate compliance risk. 
In fact, Al Rajhi Bank, which is fully Shariah-compliant treats Mudarabah transactions as 
restricted investments and off-balance sheet items.652 This implies that Mudarabah funds can 
be used only for a limited number of transactions, and they are not included in its balance 
sheet. Albalid Bank, another fully Shariah-compliant bank, states that Murabaha transactions 
are not collateralised and usage of purchased protection to insure purchases remains 
negligible.653 In the report of Samba Financial Group, which operates an Islamic window, 
                                                
652 Al Rajhi Bank, Annual Report 2014 (Al Rajhi Bank 2014) 20. 
653 Albilad Bank, note 609 above, 159. 
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Murabaha investments are so small that they are simply included ‘other investments held at 
amortised cost.’654 
 
6.8 The Stress Test 
 
The question of what constitutes a stress test may be answered in different ways depending 
on the context. From a regulatory context, it is a simulation technique that is used to gauge 
how certain stressors or hypothetical financial situations will affect certain asset and liability 
portfolios in order to enable banks to formulate contingency plans to mitigate risk.655 Stress 
testing is therefore a conceptual fit for financial regulation. Regulators are mainly concerned 
with financial failure, the insolvency of important financial institutions or inability of the 
market to perform in a reliable manner.656 They seek to prevent both institutional and 
systemic failures. Effective supervision helps to limit the use of government guarantees such 
as state insurance guaranty funds and deposit insurance. Hence, stress testing is endorsed by 
many regulators because it enables the senior management and Board of Directors to engage 
directly with the failure.657 Where banks have not experienced a failure, events that may 
cause the failure are created and their impact assessed. Regulators usually require banks to 
focus on the failures that result in them seeking help from the safety nets of government.  
 
Banks may use the stress test to determine how specific future events may impact on their 
balance sheets or simply determine outcomes that may cause serious harm to the banks.658 
However, SAMA recommends the stress tests only for large banks because of their complex 
operations and the ripple effect of their failures.659 The regulator notes that efficient large 
banks must provide quantitative measures of the effect of disruptions.660 The senior 
management of banks in the KSA are therefore guided towards developing and using stress 
tests to support their management of operational, market and credit risks. SAMA places 
                                                
654 Samba Financial Group, note 638 above, 17. 
655 See Richard S Carnell, Jonathan R Macy and Geoffrey Miller, The Law of Banking and Financial Institutions 
(Wolters Kluwer 2009) 53-61. 
656 JP Sabourin, ‘The Deposit Insurer’s Role in Maintaining Financial Stability’ in Douglas D Evanoff and 
George C Kaufman (eds), Systemic Financial Crises: Resolving Large Bank Insolvencies (World Scientific 
2005) 59. 
657 Robert Weber, ‘A Theory for Deliberation-Oriented Stress Testing Regulation’ (2014) 98 Minnesota Law 
Review 2236, 2249-2250. 
658 Jimmy Skoglund and Wei Chen, Financial Risk Management (John Wiley & Sons 2015) 522. 
659 SAMA, Guideline Document on the Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Plan (SAMA 2008) 11. 
660 Ibid. 
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emphasis on the references under Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 of the Basel II guidelines.661 The 
objective as noted above is to determine appropriate ways of responding to and coping with 
important stressors. Stress tests should therefore enhance a bank’s resilience to financial 
crises. Given the importance of the test, SAMA expects banks in the KSA to build stress 
testing into their risk management strategies. This is equally the case with regulators in many 
countries.662 That is why it is part of the Basel II guidelines.  
 
Banks which meet the minimum conditions and disclosure requirements of the internal 
ratings-based approach (IRB) are required to ‘put in place sound stress testing processes for 
use in the assessment of capital adequacy.’663 It is noted further that examples of scenarios 
include economic or industry downturn, market risk events and liquidity conditions. The 
scenarios may be historical, involving large losses experienced by the banks; historical with 
simulation, involving simulations of crises; and effects of events on individual portfolio 
characteristics of the banks (sensitivity). The banks are required to perform credit risk stress 
tests to determine the impact of specific outcomes on their IRB regulatory capital 
requirements. The stress test may for example consider the impact of a mild recession 
scenario such as determining how two quarters of no growth may impact their probability of 
default, exposure at default, and loss given default.664 The latter are risk parameters used to 
calculate capital requirements of bank exposures.  
 
SAMA does not issue further guidance on the design of stress tests apart from the Pillar 1 and 
Pillar 2 guidance and the recommendations contained in Section B.5 of the Basel Market 
Risk Amendment of 1996.665 Thus, the large banks in the KSA which are required to conduct 
stress tests must meet the following qualitative criteria: 
 
• Establish a comprehensive stress testing programme  
• The programme should cover all relevant factors which can create exceptional losses 
or gains in trading portfolios 
                                                
661 Ibid, 21-23. 
662 Lynn C Thomas, Consumer Credit Models: Pricing, Profit and Portfolios (Oxford University Press 2009) 
349. 
663 SAMA, note 648 above 21.  
664 Ibid. 
665 Ibid. 
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• The programme should seek to assess the bank’s capacity to absorb potential large 
losses and identify steps for reducing risk and conserve capital 
• The results of the tests should be communicated to the senior management and Board 
of Directors frequently 
• Policies should be formulated, and limits set in light of the results 
• The senior management must undertake prompt action such as hedging or reducing 
the size of exposures to mitigate the risks identified 
SAMA reviews the Pillar 1 stress testing requirement for credit and market risk under the 
supervisory review process. However, it also recommends the large banks of the KSA to 
adopt the recommendations contained in Pillar 2. These include the following:666 
 
• The management of the bank is primarily responsible for ensuring that the bank has 
sufficient capital to support the risks identified, as well as the trading function 
• The bank should manage market risk with its own standardised approach or measure 
of value-at-risk 
• The bank should frequently conduct stress tests of its major credit risk concentrations 
in order to identify potential changes in market conditions that may impact its 
performance in an adverse manner. 
• The bank may conduct stress tests to determine pool performance and take 
appropriate action to respond to unanticipated changes. 
The stress test may also include general stress testing, specific credit risk test and liquidity 
test, and scenario analysis.667 The test may be classified as either a sensitivity test or scenario 
test.668 The sensitivity test focuses on the impact of large variations of portfolio values 
regardless of the causes of the variations. The scenario test involves developing adverse 
macroeconomic scenarios on the basis of concentrations in their portfolios and the risks to 
which the banks are exposed.  
 
                                                
666 Ibid, 22-23. 
667 David Murphy, Understanding Risk: The Theory and Practice of Financial Risk Management (Taylor & 
Francis 2008) 233. 
668 Dimitris N Chorafas, Stress Testing for Risk Control Under Basel II (Elsevier 2007) 48. 
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SAMA assesses the extent to which the credit risk concentrations are considered in the bank’s 
internal assessment of capital adequacy, and the regulator may take appropriate action if it 
considers that the policies adopted by a bank is not adequate. It may therefore review the 
bank’s stress results and require that the bank obtains a dedicated liquidity line or raises early 
amortisation credit conversion factor in order to increase its capital requirements. SAMA 
may also require that tasks are allocated fairly to avoid putting a strain on any unit, and the 
bank uses competent employees to perform the tasks.669 
 
6.8.1 Stress Testing by Islamic Banks 
 
As noted above, SAMA expects all large banks in the KSA to build stress testing into their 
risk management strategies. It guides towards developing and using stress tests to support 
their management of operational, market and credit risks, and places emphasis on the 
references under Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 of the Basel II guidelines. Although SAMA does not 
impose a methodology on banks in the KSA, Chapter 5 shows that the regulator has generally 
reproduced and imposed on the banks the Basel II (as amended) and Basel III requirements to 
enhance the management of credit risk, market risk, operational risk, and liquidity risk. Thus, 
all banks are legally obliged to apply the standards of Basel II (as amended) and Basel III. 
Also, it is noted that Islamic banks in the KSA, including Al Rajhi Bank and Albilad Bank, 
have not challenged SAMA on the grounds that these standards are not tailored to Islamic 
finance. In the same vein, SAMA recommends stress testing to all large banks in the KSA 
without regard to whether the banks are Shariah-compliant or not. 
 
Nonetheless, it is logical to expect Islamic banks to develop scenarios that capture the Sharia 
risk and compliance risk. However, this depends on whether there are specific adverse 
scenarios that may affect the resilience of Islamic banks and not conventional banks. Given 
that SAMA uses the same structured process to compare banks operating in the KSA, it may 
logically fail to capture some of the specificities that emerge from Islamic banking. That is 
why a detailed oriented internal risk management is crucial for Islamic banks in the KSA. 
Reverse stress testing and risk integration may for example help to identify the peculiarities 
of Islamic banks. Reverse stress testing begins from an adverse outcome in the past and 
deduces scenarios that could lead to such an outcome in the future. This informs the bank’s 
                                                
669 Discussions between the researcher and an official at SAMA. 
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risk mitigation programme. Adverse outcomes include losses that compel? depositors to 
withdraw their funds before the agreed-upon maturity date. Such outcomes are particularly 
devastating for Islamic banks given that they largely rely on PLS schemes. They must 
therefore anticipate withdrawals and manage the liquidity risk associated with withdrawals.670 
A change in the behaviour of depositors may increase the probability of default, especially 
where the banks have no protection against a bank run.671  
 
The IFSB recently observed that stress testing is among the most underdeveloped areas of 
Islamic banking.672 It equally recommended the development of techniques that are unique to 
Islamic banking given that the operational, market and credit risk profiles of Islamic banks 
are markedly different from those of conventional banks.673 Also, Islamic banks are 
exceptionally exposed to rate of return risk and equity investment risk and have limited 
access to short-term funding that is compliant with the Shariah. 
 
Thus, it is important that stress testing is tailored to the nature of Islamic banking because it 
enables Islamic banks to demonstrate the strength of their unique risk management strategies, 
and also that they have adequate capital to absorb losses that may be caused by shocks that 
impact on their activities more than those of conventional banks. However, expectations of 
effective stress testing methodologies have increased around the world since the financial 
crisis of 2007-09.674 In this light, Pillar 1 of the Basel II framework focuses on the use of the 
internal models and the IRB approach to assess market, credit and operational risks. They 
were summed to determine a bank’s overall risk weighted assets. In order to assess additional 
capital buffers, Pillar 2 (supervisory review process) requires the supervisor to assess the 
bank’s management of residual risk, which includes all other risks apart from credit, 
operational and market risks that are quantifiable for Pillar 1. SAMA therefore requires 
Islamic banks to also employ the IRB approach to assess their internal capital adequacy by 
                                                
670 Wassim Rajhi and Slim Ahmed Hassairi, ‘Unconventional Banking System in Distress’ (2011) 3 
International Journal of Economics and Finance 70, 73. See also, Muhamad Abduh, Jarita Duasa and Mohd 
Azmi Omar, ‘Factors that Influence Depositors’ Withdrawal in Islamic Banks: A Theory of Reasoned Action’ 
(2011) 5 International Journal of Economics and Management Engineering 813, 813-814. 
671 See Stuart Greenbaum, Anjan V Thakor and Amoud Boot, Contemporary Financial Intermediation (3rd edn, 
Academic Press 2016) 287. 
672 IFSB, Technical Note on Stress Testing for Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services (IFSB 2016) 2. 
673 Ibid. 
674 Pavel Kapinos et al, ‘Stress Testing Banks: Whence and Wither?’ (2015) Working Paper Series, Center for 
Financial Research, FDIC CFR WP 2015-07. Available at: 
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/cfr/2015/wp2015/2015-07.pdf  [05 January 2018] 13-15. 
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conducting capital stress tests under the Individual Capital Adequacy Assessment Process 
(ICAAP).  
 
It is important to note that, despite the fact that SAMA has adopted Basel standards, banks in 
the KSA are still allowed to use their own stress models to assess their capital needs. 
Accordingly, Islamic banks in the KSA can design stress tests that reflect the unique risks 
that they confront. Also, there is little evidence that the global financial crisis of 2007-09 and 
the oil crisis of 2014 changed regulatory expectations of the stress testing capabilities of 
banks in the KSA. This may be attributed to the fact that the impact of the crisis in the KSA 
was not as severe as in other countries.675 Nonetheless, it is uncertain why SAMA does not 
require regular and comprehensive stress testing of all banks despite the importance of 
determining whether specific future events may cause serious harm to the banks and the 
market. It has adopted Basel standards and reinforced them in order to ensure that all banks in 
the KSA, including and especially the Islamic banks, identify and mitigate risks in an 
efficient manner. It is submitted here that it may in the same vein adopt the Comprehensive 
Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) of the United States676 or the Comprehensive 
Assessment by the ECB or the European Banking Authority (EBA) and modify them to suit 
the local industry, taking into account the unique challenges confronted by Islamic banks.  
  
It has been established that an effective asset quality, risk assessment and stress testing 
regime may improve transparency over the balance sheets of banks.677 This is especially 
important in Islamic countries where there is an unfounded comfort from the rules governing 
Islamic banking. As shown in Chapter 2, many commentators hold that Islamic banks 
manage risk better and are more resilient to financial crises. However, there is no unique tool 
used by Islamic banks to identify emerging risks and set adequate bank capital levels. The 
Islamic banks in the KSA equally use the stress testing technique.  
 
As such a survey was conducted of two Islamic Banks and two conventional banks to assess 
how Islamic banks model scenarios across Islamic portfolios or evaluate the sensitivity of 
                                                
675 See Laura El-Katiri, ‘Vulnerability, Resilience and Reform: The GCC and Oil Price Crisis 2014-2016’ 
(2016) Center on Global Energy Policy. Available at: 
http://energypolicy.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/Vulnerability,%20Resilience%20and%20Reform%3A%20T
he%20GCC%20and%20the%20Oil%20Price%20Crisis.pdf  [03 May 2018] 7-11. 
676 See section 5.3.2.2 above. 
677 Li Lian Ong and Ceyla Pazarbasioglu, ‘Credibility and Crisis Stress Testing’ (2014) 2 International Journal 
of Financial Studies 15, 50-53. 
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portfolios compared to conventional banks. The results of this survey, discussed in the next 
section, provide a unique insight into the resilience of Islamic banks in the KSA. The 
objective is to determine whether Islamic banks in the KSA have developed specific stress 
tests and risk management strategies that take into account the unique risks embedded in their 
products.  
 
6.8.2 The Survey 
 
The survey was conducted in November 2017 in the KSA. Data was collected in a 
standardised form using a questionnaire.678 It was designed to enable the researcher to capture 
a snapshot of how things were at the participating banks at the specific time.679 The responses 
were submitted on a no-name basis to the researcher. They were then merged into a common 
database. All four banks that participated in the survey report to SAMA. Thus, it was also 
important to obtain information from SAMA about how it gauges the potential vulnerability 
of banks in the KSA to exceptional but plausible financial crises. The surveyed banks 
include, Al Rajhi Bank, the largest fully Shariah-compliant bank in the world by capital, 
Albilad Bank, a fully Shariah-compliant bank that has operated since 2004, NBC or Al Ahli 
Bank, the largest bank in the KSA by asset and the first licensed local bank of the KSA, and 
Samba Financial Group which as operated as a conventional financial institution since 1955.  
The questions of the survey sought to assess and compare how Islamic banks and 
conventional banks in the KSA determine risk exposures and use common scenarios to learn 
about a specific risk or combination of risks. It also seeks to determine whether the stress 
testing conducted by Islamic banks may provide SAMA with sufficient information to 
implement pre-emptive measures to avoid systemic crises. In this light, the questions were 
focused on the engagement of the Board of Directors and senior management, and the 
integration of stress testing in the risk management strategies of the banks. 
It must be noted that some respondents did not answer all the survey questions. In order to 
determine the impact of the survey nonresponse, an attempt was made to measure the 
nonresponse and the effects of the nonresponse.680 The researcher did not abandon all the 
                                                
678 See Appendix I. 
679 Kate Kelley et al, ‘Good Practice in the Conduct and Reporting of Survey Research’ (2003) 14 International 
Journal for Quality in Health Care 261, 261. 
 
680 In dealing with partial nonresponse, the analysis was guided by S Fisher et al, ‘A Qualitative Study of 
Nonresponse Factors Affecting BLS Establishment Surveys: Results’ (2008) Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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partially filled entries. Instead, the answered fields in these entries were analysed. Prior to 
that, the differences in the item non-response rate across the group of respondents was 
determined. The average item nonresponse rate was 5-10 per cent. The item nonresponse rate 
was higher regarding questions that required information on specific strategies used by the 
banks to mitigate the risks in Islamic portfolios and how these portfolios fare during the 
periods of financial crises. The positions of the respondents varied from bank to bank. In 
some banks, the compliance officers had access to more information or had already 
conducted the required analysis and had specific answers to the questions before the survey 
was conducted. Thus, all the respondents did not have the same level of authority, capacity 
(access to data) as well as motivation.681 The nonresponse may therefore be due to the fact 
that these questions may have required more information and assessments than the 
respondents envisaged. Hence, some respondents were unable to synthesise the data available 
to them and provide concise answers in the time allowed for answering the questions. It 
follows that the group differences in the likelihood of response could be explained by the 
time burden.682  
 
 
6.8.2.1 Board and Senior Management Engagement 
 
It is noted above that SAMA requires the Board of Directors of each bank to clearly set out 
lines of accountability and responsibility at all levels. The Board must then approve and 
oversee the implementation of an appropriate risk strategy, ensure the soundness and 
solvency of the bank, as well as the compliance of the senior management and all employees 
with relevant policies and procedures. Also, the analysis of the annual reports of the four 
banks in the survey revealed that their Boards oversee the implementation of their risk 
management strategies. Thus, the survey sought to determine whether the Boards and senior 
management were involved in the use of stress testing as a management and supervisory 
instrument and were engaged with the results. It is important that they are involved in the 
design of the scenario and formulation of the actions in response to the stress testing. The 
                                                                                                                                                  
Available at: https://www.bls.gov/osmr/abstract/st/st030230.htm  [20 November 2018]; ED De Leeuw, J Hox 
and M Huisman, ‘Prevention and Treatment of Item Nonresponse’ (2003) 19(2) Journal of Official Statistics 
153, 157-158. 
681 D Tomaskovic-Devey, J Leiter and S Thompson, ‘Organizational Survey Nonresponse’ (1994) 39 
Administrative Science Quarterly 439, 339-454. 
682 Regarding the link between time burden on item nonresponse, see AL Miller and AD Lambert, ‘Open-Ended 
Survey Questions: Item Nonresponse Nightmare or Qualitative Data Dream?’ (2014) 7(5) Survey Practice 1, 11. 
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IFSB states that the commitment of the Board and senior management to stress testing sends 
an important signal that it is an important management tool and taken seriously in the bank.683 
The IFSB also noted that the Board of Directors should establish an integrated and 
comprehensive stress testing exercise and the senior management should keep internal 
summaries of the test results.684 The summaries should be available to the regulator which 
should document them and propose follow-up actions. 
 
The participants were asked to indicate the involvement of the Board of Directors and senior 
management in the scenario design, modelling, management actions and the analysis of the 
results. Their responses are summarised in Table VI.II. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table VI.II: Board and Senior Management Engagement of Banks in the KSA 
Stages Al Rajhi  Albilad NCB (Al Ahli) Samba Group 
Scenarios High Very High Low Very Low 
Modelling High Very High Low Very Low 
Management 
actions 
High Very High High High 
Results High Very High High Very High 
 
All four banks have comprehensive stress testing regimes and recognise the importance of the 
regime. However, they are not all consistent with the perspectives of SAMA and the IFSB 
regarding the engagement of the Board of Directors and the senior management. The Board 
of Directors and senior management of the Islamic banks are actively involved in the scenario 
design, modelling, management actions and the analysis of the results, while the Board of 
Directors and senior management of the conventional banks are not. In NCB, the 
involvement of Board of Directors and senior management is rated as low in scenario design 
                                                
683 IFSB, note 661 above, 6. 
684 Ibid, 7. 
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and modelling, while in the Samba Group, it is very low. This may explain why in Al Rajhi 
Bank (Islamic bank), the Credit and Risk Management Group that reports directly to the 
Board of Directors is responsible for stress testing programme, and in Albilad Bank (Islamic 
bank), it is the Basel Unit of the Risk Committee nominated by the Board. In NCB, the 
respondent noted that it is the responsibility of the Chief Executive Officer, while in the 
Samba Group, it is the legal department that is tasked with conducting the tests. Thus, the 
Islamic banks have a more collaborative approach and the Boards are directly involved in the 
process.  
 
The failure of conventional banks to meet expectations may be due to the fact that SAMA 
does not challenge the stress testing processes of banks in the KSA. Thus, there are no 
bilateral interactions between SAMA and the banks in designing appropriate scenarios and 
modelling. Given that Islamic banks confront unique risks and the Basel standards that were 
imported by SAMA are based on conventional banking, Islamic banks are more likely to 
conduct stress testing on a regular basis to determine risk exposures and the sensitivity of 
their portfolios. 
 
6.8.2.2 The Integration of Stress Testing in the Risk Management Strategy 
 
SAMA also recommends that the banks should integrate stress testing in their risk 
management strategies. An attempt was therefore made to determine the extent to which the 
four banks integrated stress testing processes with other disciplines, including internal risk 
management, contingency or recovery planning, resolution planning, and reverse stress 
testing. The responses of the banks are shown in Table VI.III. 
 
Table VI.III: Integration of Stress Testing 
Disciplines Al Rajhi Albilad   NCB Samba Group 
Internal risk 
management 
Integrated Integrated Partially-
integrated 
Integrated 
Contingency or 
recovery planning 
Partially-
integrated 
Integrated Partially-
integrated 
Partially-
integrated 
Resolution planning Separate Integrated Partially- Partially-
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integrated integrated 
Reverse stress 
testing 
Integrated Integrated Separate Partially-
integrated 
 
The results show that unlike the stress tests conducted by the Islamic banks, the stress tests 
conducted by conventional banks are siloed processes. In NCB, stress testing is only partially 
aligned with disciplines such as internal risk management, contingency or recovery planning, 
and resolution planning. It is also separate from reverse stress testing in spite of the 
similarities between the processes. On the other hand, in Albilad, they are closely aligned. It 
may also be contended that the conventional banks do not meet expectations because SAMA 
does not impose a methodology on all banks, and Islamic banks confront unique risks that are 
not necessarily reflected in the Basel standards that were imported by SAMA.  
 
6.8.2.3 The Portfolios and Scenarios 
 
Despite the stark differences in the stress tests of the Islamic banks and conventional banks, 
the respondents of all four banks indicated similar hypothetical scenarios or plausible events 
that may impact on the balance sheets of the banks. The table below categorises the scenarios 
reported. 
 
Table VI.IV: Portfolios and Scenarios 
Traded 
Market 
Portfolio 
Al Rajhi  Albilad NCB Samba Group 
Commodities  Commodity 
price shock 
Commodity 
price shock  
Commodity 
price shock 
Commodity price 
shock 
Interest rates Upward 
interest rate 
shift 
N/A Sharp rise in 
long-term 
interest rate 
Interest rate rise 
with economic 
downturn 
Equities Decline in 
equity prices 
Sharp increase 
in equity 
market 
Plummeting 
equity prices 
Equity investment 
losses 
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volatility 
Exchange 
rates 
Changes in 
foreign 
exchange rates 
N/A Changes in 
foreign 
exchange rates 
Changes in 
foreign exchange 
rates 
Deposits Increased 
withdrawals 
No rolling over 
of short-term 
deposits 
N/A N/A 
Islamic 
Portfolios 
Decline of 
house prices 
and 
commercial 
real estate 
prices 
Reduction in 
anticipated 
returns on 
equity 
exposures 
Substantial 
decline in the 
market values of 
Sukuk 
investments 
Fall in the value 
of assets used for 
PLS schemes 
 
The four banks submitted seventeen stress test scenarios that focused on standardised 
variations of related risk factors. TableIV shows the scenarios. There is little difference 
between the focus of Islamic banks and the focus of conventional banks. The banks were 
asked to list the trading portfolios that may be affected by crisis scenarios and changes in 
underlying parameters. They listed the portfolios in the order of importance, starting with the 
most important. The importance was based on financial impact. Thus, the banks would be 
more exposed where the traded market portfolio was affected. Their responses enabled the 
researcher to determine which trading portfolios may be grouped together in regard to which 
are most affected by the hypothetical scenarios. The description of the trading portfolios also 
includes the risk factor and the magnitude of the risk factor shock.  
 
The above portfolios were the subject of stress testing because their market prices change on 
a regular basis, and disruptions in their markets may harm the balance sheets of banks. The 
commodity price risk for example is the potential loss that may be caused by changes in the 
market prices of the assets and liabilities of the bank due to commodity price changes.685 This 
risk impacts on the loan portfolios of the banks where their borrowers increasingly become 
unable to repay their debts as a result of shocks to commodity prices. This is very important 
                                                
685 Maria Peria et al, Stress Testing of Financial Systems: An Overview of Issues, Methodologies (IMF 2001) 34-
35 
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because banks in the KSA lend to importers of commodities and exporters of commodities. 
The commodities include inter alia gold, silver, crude palm oil, natural gas and crude oil. 
 
Surprisingly, all of the banks placed Islamic portfolios at the bottom of their lists, despite the 
fact that all four banks offer Islamic products, and two of the four banks offer only Shariah-
compliant products. Thus, the risks embedded in Islamic instruments such as the commodity 
Murabaha transactions were comparatively low despite the fact that it is often used to 
structure financing products that are not secured for clients and they face high instances of 
non-performance in stress events. 
 
It is shown in Chapter 3 that theoretically, it is not probable for a crisis related to interest 
rate risk (IRR) to be triggered by Islamic financial institutions because the Shariah 
prohibits Riba or the charging of interest, and debt is permitted only when it is related to 
real transactions, and not used for speculative purposes. It is also difficult for the 
regulator to ensure that banks are motivated to engage in excessive risk-taking due to 
low interest rates. Nonetheless, both? the conventional banks and Al Rajhi Bank, the 
largest Islamic bank, conduct stress testing on interest rates. This is because although Al 
Rajhi Bank does not have interest income, its balance sheet may be affected by 
significant changes in the market interest rates. The reduction in earnings caused by 
interest rate fluctuations affects the bank’s customers and partners who are compelled to 
cut back on spending. Also, stock prices generally fall when interest rates rise. This 
explains why Al Rajhi Bank is concerned about IRR. It is listed on the Tadawul and 
more than 75 per cent of its shares are publicly owned, unlike the other Islamic bank in 
the survey, Albilad Bank, which has only a small percentage of publicly owned shares.686 
The conventional banks logically stress test the interest rate because their capital and 
risk-weighted assets are affected by interest rate rise and reduction of net interest 
income. 
 
The stress testing also focuses on the impact of declining equity prices or a stock market 
crash caused by high equity market valuations. This is very important for the banks given that 
                                                
686 In 2012, 36% of Albilad Bank’s shares are owned by two families. Fahad Al-Majed, A Conceptual 
Framework for Reforming the Corporate Governance of Saudi Publicly Held Companies (Unpublished PhD 
Dissertation, University of Manchester 2012) 302. At the time, the Al Rajhi family held 44% of the shares of Al 
Rajhi Bank, but this dropped to 25% by 2017. 
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the Tadawul is the largest and most liquid stock market in the Middle East, and foreign 
investors in GCC countries are increasingly investing in companies of the KSA via derivative 
instruments and exchange-traded funds. All four banks equally run equity crash scenarios 
especially when equity market valuations are historically high. Also, they seek to determine 
how they will be impacted by a global equity crash that is accompanied by strong 
comovements in equity prices in the major markets around the world.  
 
All the banks, except Albilad Bank, conduct foreign exchange rate stress tests. They all run 
weak dollar, euro, and pounds sterling scenarios due to the risk of widening credit spread 
caused by the depreciation or appreciation of these currencies. However, the scenarios are 
regional. They focus on the impact on foreign exchange rate movements due to rising interest 
in the GCC. They calibrate the shock that may be caused by currency depreciation and 
determine how their capital and risk-weighted assets are affected by the shock. They also 
assess their net position in foreign exchange in order to determine whether it is long or short. 
Lastly, unlike the conventional banks, the Islamic banks place emphasis on deposit 
placements. This is because they are used by Islamic banks to raise funds and in many cases, 
they are based on Mudaraba contracts. When the deposits reduce, they adversely affect the 
banks’ funding position. It follows from the problematic nature of the Shariah-compliant 
deposit insurance schemes. Also, deposits often run-off on maturity and have short tenors and 
require the depositor to specifically consent to the rolling over of the deposit. Thus, the tests 
enable the banks to determine whether they have a sufficient and constituent supply of liquid 
assets of high quality. 
 
It may be noted that stress testing is a standard risk management tool for all the banks in the 
survey. The running of the tests, formulation of scenarios, and interpretation of the results are 
however based on the banks’ position in the market and strategies for managing identified 
risks. They use it to understand their risk profile and determine limits. Nonetheless, none of 
the banks indicated that the results of the tests guide the senior management or Board of 
Directors to set limits. None of them indicated that the tests are used for capital allocation or 
unwinding or hedging certain positions. They all state that the decisions are made on the basis 
of the circumstances of each case. Also, the tests are not run as part often. They all run them 
on monthly and quarterly bases. This may be attributed to the cost of running the tests.  
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6.9 Do Islamic Banks Manage Risk Better? 
 
An analysis of the stress test scenarios used by the banks in the survey reveals that there is a 
perceived asymmetry in risks with regard to conventional banks. They were more likely than 
the Islamic banks to run tests on crashes that result in sharp rises of equity prices, as well as 
increases in IRRs and credit spreads. This may be due to asymmetric exposures. The 
conventional banks in the survey are exposed to IRR and more exposed to declining equity 
prices, as well as widening credit spreads. Also, historical experience of shocks may explain 
the stress testing by conventional banks given that the global financial crisis of 2007-09 and 
the crisis of 2014 had a stronger adverse impact on conventional banks than Islamic banks. 
 
However, the Islamic banks in the survey give more importance to stress tests although the 
risks embedded in Islamic products may be inadequately determined by statistical risk 
measures.  The Board of Directors and senior management of the Islamic banks are actively 
involved in the scenario design, modelling, management actions and the analysis of the 
results, while the Board of Directors and senior management of the conventional banks are 
not. Equally, stress testing is more integrated in the risk management strategies of Islamic 
banks than conventional banks. This does not imply that Islamic banks manage risk better. 
The Islamic banks did not indicate any major changes in policy that could be attributed to the 
results of stress testing. Given the lack of standardised risk measures, as well as the difficulty 
of estimating exposures, it would be more logical for Islamic banks to rely on stress tests. 
Nonetheless, they place Islamic portfolios at the bottom of the list of traded portfolios 
impacted by adverse scenarios. Also, the responses of the banks did not enable the researcher 
to determine the sensitivity of each portfolio to changes given that they are complex. 
 
Notwithstanding, it must be noted that the stress tests run by Islamic and conventional banks 
are very similar, despite their different historical experiences. For example, they all run tests 
on commodities in order to assess the ability of their borrowers to repay their debts as a result 
of shocks to commodity prices. Also, they all seek to determine the impact of declining 
equity prices or a stock market crash caused by high equity market valuations. Then they 
place Islamic portfolios at the bottom of list of portfolios impacted by unexpected events. In 
fact, Al Rajhi Bank’s stress tests are more similar to those conducted by the conventional 
banks than the tests conducted by the other Islamic bank, Albilad Bank. Nonetheless, it is 
surprising that the Shariah Boards are not involved in or do not conduct specific stress tests. 
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Also, SAMA has no policy of examining the internal summaries of stress test results 
conducted by even the large banks, as well as documenting the nature and extent of the stress 
testing activities of the banks and outcomes as recommended by the IFSB. It is therefore 
uncertain whether SAMA regularly proposes follow-up actions. SAMA did not give any 
examples of proposed follow-up actions in correspondence with the researcher. 
 
It may be important for SAMA to impose tougher stress testing rather than simply import 
Basel standards. SAMA noted in correspondence with the researcher that banks in the KSA 
need to dedicate more resources to stress testing than they currently do.687 SAMA must 
require the Boards and senior management of all banks in the KSA to change the operating 
model and ensure that stress testing in full integrated with strategic planning. The models 
used to project risk data under stress ought to meet a higher standard of reliability, and the 
same rigorous controls of financial reporting should apply to the stress testing process. It is 
only then that analyses of the stress tests and their results would enable researchers to 
determine whether one bank manages risk better than another.  
 
6.10 Conclusion 
 
In light of the above, it is difficult to determine whether the Islamic banks studied are easier 
to regulate and more resilient to financial crises. All four banks are very confident about 
meeting the regulatory requirements reasonably well, despite the volume and complexity of 
the laws, regulations and standards. Nonetheless, an assessment of their annual reports of 
2007, 2014 and 2016 reveals that they effectively meet some requirements, while they are 
seriously lagging with regard to others. Also, there is generally no difference in approach to 
measuring risk between the conventional banks and the Islamic banks. Also, with regard to 
Shariah risk, the Boards of Directors rely on the Shariah Boards and staff, although there is 
little information about the tools used to measure Shariah risk.   
 
It also seems that all four banks report about risk measuring tools as a formality. It is 
uncertain whether they actually do what is required to effectively use these tools. That is why 
they do not disclose detailed information about the use of these tools, including the results of 
tests. It is noted in Chapter 5 that since there is no regulatory requirement to publish the 
                                                
687 The questions submitted to SAMA are shown in Appendix B. 
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results of stress tests for example, it is generally uncertain which stress scenarios are used by 
individual banks, and whether the capital buffers used by the banks can actually resist a 
severe shock. The analysis of the annual reports of the four banks confirms this statement. It 
is also uncertain whether the banks have revised their compliance risk management strategies 
or reinforced the compliance function in response to the results of these tests. Prior to this 
study, the researcher expected that these banks should have developed appropriate stress 
models and carried out specific assessments of their capital levels during and after the 
financial crises of 2007-09 and 2014. However, the annual reports of 2007 and 2014 do not 
reveal any particular emphasis on developing appropriate stress models. 
 
It is therefore submitted that the disclosure and transparency requirement by SAMA688 should 
be interpreted broadly to the effect that banks have an obligation to publish all information 
about the stress tests they conduct, including the results of the tests. SAMA notes that the 
disclosure and transparency principle applies to all operations and activities of the bank, and 
the Board of Directors is required to publish all financial and non-financial information 
which concerns investors, depositors, shareholders, and market dealers. The information 
should be disclosed in the annual report of the bank, website or other appropriate channel. 
There is no doubt that information about stress tests conducted by banks could assist the 
above stakeholders in identifying the bank’s strategic plans and future trends. It is important 
to know which scenarios were modelled on which portfolios. In order to determine whether 
Islamic banks are more resilient to financial crises, it is also important to determine how the 
portfolio of Shariah-compliant assets fare during a financial crisis. 
 
Also, it is interesting that only a small number of staff are dedicated to the use of these tools. 
Hence, small teams generally measure risks and conduct stress tests and report to a sub-
committee of the Board of Directors of the banks. The resources allocated by banks using 
stress tests such as the Comprehensive Capital Analysis Review (CCAR) are much greater 
than what the four banks have.689 This demonstrates a certain lack of commitment given that 
in other jurisdictions such as the United States, the banks use significantly more personnel.690 
The increasing number of regulations imposed by SAMA and CMA, and the standards 
                                                
688 SAMA, note 590 above, paras 84-86. 
689 See MM Haddad and S Hakim, ‘Can Gulf Banks Pass the CCAR Stress Tests?’ (2017) 19 Journal of Applied 
Business and Economics 44, 44-58.  
690 Ibid. 
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recommended by these regulators require banks of the KSA to significantly increase 
regulatory staff levels. 
 
Although the banks use a variety of tools to measure risk factors, stress testing is increasingly 
recommended as the primary tool to identify risks and determine the adequate capital levels 
to resist shock. In fact, since the introduction of Pillar 2 of Basel II, the results of such tests 
are increasingly linked to the trust of banks and the financial system. stress testing is a 
conceptual fit for financial regulation given that regulators are mainly concerned with 
financial failure, and stress testing is a simulation technique that enables banks to engage 
directly with the failure by formulating contingency plans to mitigate risk. However, SAMA 
recommends the stress tests only for large banks in the KSA because of their complex 
operations and the ripple effect of their failures. Also, they meet the minimum conditions and 
disclosure requirements of the IRB. As such, large banks in the KSA must for example 
perform credit risk stress tests to determine the impact of specific outcomes on their IRB 
regulatory capital requirements. SAMA expects these banks to build stress testing into their 
risk management strategies and places emphasis on the references under Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 
of the Basel II guidelines. It is problematic that the regulator does not issue further guidance 
on the design of stress tests apart from the Basel II guidelines and the recommendations 
contained in Section B.5 of the Basel Market Risk Amendment of 1996. Given that banks in 
the KSA are legally obliged to apply standards of Basel II and Basel III, it may be contended 
that they have a legal obligation to conduct stress tests, although they allowed to use their 
own stress models to assess their capital needs. Since there is nothing in the annual reports of 
the four banks to support the positive outlook regarding their existing capabilities to resist 
financial crises, more detailed information was obtained from the banks directly. Thus, 
qualitative data was obtained from compliance officers and staff in the compliance units of 
the four banks.  
 
It is interesting that SAMA recommends stress testing to all large banks in the KSA without 
regard to whether the banks are Shariah-compliant or not. The freedom to choose the 
appropriate methodology or stress models implies that Islamic banks may develop scenarios 
that capture the Sharia risk and compliance risk. The IFSB has observed that stress testing is 
among the most underdeveloped areas of Islamic banking. It equally recommends the 
development of techniques that are unique to Islamic banking given that the operational, 
market and credit risk profiles of Islamic banks are markedly different from those of 
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conventional banks. Nonetheless, given that SAMA uses the same structured process to 
compare banks operating in the KSA, this also implies that the regulator may logically fail to 
capture some of the specificities that emerge from Islamic banking. 
 
The above notwithstanding, the survey revealed that all four large banks have an overarching 
stress testing framework, although they acknowledge that enhancements are required. SAMA 
also notes that banks in the KSA ought to invest further in stress testing to meet expectations. 
Despite the fact that a picture emerges of banks setting a low bar, the frameworks of the 
conventional banks may be rated worse than those of Islamic banks. The Board of Directors 
and senior management of the Islamic banks are actively involved in the scenario design, 
modelling, management actions and the analysis of the results, while the engagement of 
Board of Directors and senior management of the conventional banks is more limited. The 
stress tests conducted by conventional banks are siloed processes while the tests of Islamic 
banks are more integrated in their risk management strategies. However, this does not imply 
that Islamic banks manage risk better and are more resilient to financial crises. Given the lack 
of standardised risk measures, as well as the difficulty of estimating exposures of Islamic 
banks, it would be more logical for these banks to place reliance on stress tests. Interestingly, 
all four banks place Islamic portfolios at the bottom of the list of traded portfolios impacted 
by adverse scenarios. Also, the responses of the banks did not enable the researcher to 
determine the sensitivity of each portfolio to changes given that the latter are complex. It was 
therefore not possible to determine how the portfolio of Shariah-compliant assets fare during 
adverse scenarios. Also, the banks did not show how the results of the stress tests have wider 
use in informing and running the business. Lastly, it is quite surprising that the Shariah 
Boards of the banks are not involved in or do not conduct specific stress tests. It is therefore 
important that SAMA should formulate a policy of examining the internal summaries of 
stress test results conducted by all the large banks, as well as documenting the nature and 
extent of the stress testing activities of the banks and outcomes as recommended by the IFSB. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusions 
 
7.1 Introduction and Scope  
 
Following the global financial crisis of 2007-09, many questions were asked about the 
effectiveness of the regulatory and supervisory approaches adopted in the affected countries. 
These were followed by questions about how to strengthen the resilience of banks. Many 
studies examined bank resilience within specific jurisdictions, while others considered ways 
in which international standards may promote financial stability at the national and 
international levels. However, surprisingly, the researcher was unable to find any study that 
sought to determine whether the adoption of Islamic banking models may strengthen the 
resilience of conventional banking systems. This is pertinent given that an impressive number 
of studies have concluded that Islamic banks are more resilient to financial crises than 
conventional banks. This study therefore seeks to fill that gap in the extant literature.  
 
At first instance, this thesis has sought to determine whether the contention that Islamic banks 
are more resilient is justified. A critical review of the literature in Chapter 2 reveals that the 
contention is not justified given that the studies do not demonstrate that Islamic banks match 
the profile of institutions that are generally resilient to financial crises. However, it also 
reveals that resilience is a function of how banks manage risks. An assessment of the risk 
management strategies in Chapter 3 further reveals that Islamic banks are less likely to trigger 
instability through the accumulation of risks because the financing structures they use carry 
lower risks. In Chapter 4, a critical assessment of the financing structures of Islamic banks 
using PLS schemes shows that they match the profile of institutions that are generally more 
resilient to financial crises. However, they are not regulated by any tangible standards based 
on common interpretations of the principles of the Shariah. Also, only a small proportion of 
the assets of most Islamic banks constitute equity. Thus, many Islamic banks were not 
affected by the financial crisis of 2007-09  due to limited exposure. These findings are 
confirmed in Chapters, 5, 6 and Chapter 7 following the analysis of the regulation of Islamic 
banks in the KSA and the assessment of the risk management strategies and techniques used 
by four Saudi banks to determine their ability to deal with financial crises. 
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This Chapter concludes by offering a brief summary of these findings. It also shows how the 
research aim and objectives have been achieved, discusses limitations of the study, and 
makes recommendations for further studies. 
7.2 Summary of the Results 
 
It is noted in Chapter 2 that despite the depth of scholarship in Islamic finance, it remains 
uncertain why many commentators contend that Islamic banks are more efficient, robust, 
stable and reliable than conventional banks. A critical review was conducted of studies that 
examine the differences between Islamic banking and conventional banking, and the impact 
of financial crises on Islamic banks and conventional banks. A synthesises was then made of 
the findings of these studies. The objectives were to identify and integrate factors that 
account for the efficiency, robustness, stability and reliability of Islamic banks, and determine 
whether there are Islamic banking principles and standards that may be used to strengthen the 
resilience of conventional banks. This systematic review therefore also establishes the extent 
to which existing studies have progressed towards clarifying the link between the Shariah-
compliant banking and resilience to financial crises.691 It also helps to formulate a new 
conceptualisation that accounts for the resilience of Islamic banks. 
 
Table VII.1 is a digest of the methodologies and findings of the key studies on the differences 
between Islamic banking and conventional banking and the impact of financial crises. The 
methodologies are identified here in order to show that the methodology used may account 
for some of the contradictory findings. Nonetheless, what is important is that the review 
shows that factors identified in the literature do not sufficiently demonstrate the link between 
Islamic banking and resilience to financial crises. They submit diverse reasons for the 
resiliency of Islamic banking, making it difficult to determine what specific features of 
Islamic financial institutions may explain under normal circumstances their resilience to 
financial crises when compared to conventional institutions. Although Islamic banks in a 
specific sample may have performed better than conventional banks, it does necessarily 
imply that the principles of the Shariah are causally linked to performance of financial 
institutions. In the jurisdictions examined by the studies, regulations (which are not solely 
                                                
691 See HM Cooper, ‘Editorial’ (2003) 129 Psychological Bulletin 3, 3-9; RF Baumeister and MR Leary, 
‘Writing Narrative Literature Reviews’ (1997) 3 Review of General Psychology 311, 311-320. 
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based on the principles of the Shariah) determine how the financial institutions operate and 
manage risks, and therefore ensure their safety and soundness.  
 
Hence, the studies that conclude that Islamic banks are more efficient and reliable than 
conventional banks do not demonstrate that where Islamic banks and conventional banks 
operate within the same jurisdiction, the regulator may strengthen the resilience of 
conventional banks by requiring the latter to offer Shariah-compliant products and services. 
In other words, they do not provide any cogent answer to the question of whether the 
adoption of Shariah-compliant standards may promote financial stability. 
 
Table VII.1: Key Studies on the Resilience of Islamic Banks 
Author(s) and year Methodology Findings 
Cihak and Hesse, 2010 Z-score was used as a primary 
dependent variable to measure 
individual bank risk and soundness 
Small Islamic banks are more stable 
than large Islamic banks and 
conventional banks. However, 
conventional banks are more stable 
than large Islamic banks. 
Hasan & Dridi, 2010 Analysis of bank-level data 
collected from Islamic and 
conventional banks  
Certain factors related to the Islamic 
business model such as adherence to 
the Shariah principles preclude 
Islamic banks from investing in 
instruments that triggered the global 
crisis in 2007. 
Shafique, Faheem and Abdullah, 
2012 
Literature review Islamic banks performed better 
during the global financial crisis of 
2008 than conventional banks due to 
the interest free nature of Islamic 
banking. 
Boumediene and Caby, 2012 Measure the level of stability of 12 
Islamic banks and 71 conventional 
banks in Indonesia using the z-score 
indicator 
Large Islamic banks generally have 
a lower degree of stability compared 
to conventional banks. But during 
the global financial crisis, they had 
the same degree of stability. 
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Imam and Kpodar, 2010 Assessed the diffusion of Islamic 
banking using two proxies: the 
number of Islamic banks, and the 
share of the assets of Islamic banks 
in the entire banking system. They 
also use econometric estimation 
techniques to model the way Islamic 
banking diffuses. 
Rising interest rates compromise the 
diffusion of Islamic banking 
because they increase the 
opportunity costs for potential non-
Muslim customers.  
Islamic banking simply 
complements conventional banking 
by providing devout Muslims with 
Islamic products that conventional 
banks do not offer. 
Hassan, Mohamed and Bader, 2009 They use the Stochastic Frontier 
Approach to measure and compare 
the cost and profit efficiency of 37 
conventional banks and 43 Islamic 
banks in OIC countries.  
There are no significant differences 
between the overall efficiency 
results of Islamic and conventional 
banks. 
Abduh, Omar and Duasa, 2011 
 
Cointegration test and vector error 
correction model are used to 
ascertain the relationship between 
macroeconomic variables and 
financial crises 
Depositors trust Islamic banking to 
be more resilient to financial crises. 
Thus, deposits to Islamic banks 
were not affected by the global 
financial crisis of 2008 
Zarrouk, 2012 Literature review and analysis of 
annual reports 
The global financial crisis of 2008 
only significantly affected adversely 
the performance of Islamic banks 
when the crisis hit real economic 
activity. 
Abdulle and Kassim, 2012 Ratio analysis of six Islamic banks 
and nine conventional banks 
between 2006 and 2010 using three 
performance indicators: 
profitability, liquidity, and credit 
risk 
There is no significant difference in 
the way the financial crisis affected 
the profitability of Islamic and 
conventional banks. 
Islamic banks are less exposed to 
the liquidity risks created by the 
crisis because they hold more liquid 
assets than conventional banks 
Tabash and Dhankar, 2014 Trend analysis is used to determine 
the liquidity ratios and capital 
adequacy ratios of Shariah-
compliant banks in the KSA 
Islamic banking sector is more 
stable regarding the capital 
adequacy and liquidity. 
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It may be difficult to generalise the findings of the key studies in the above table given that 
the researchers use studied specific Islamic banks in particular contexts. Thus, it may be 
submitted that the researchers were misguided in generalising their findings. Also, the margin 
of variability for the various findings is beyond that tolerated in qualitative research as it is 
unlikely that the methodologies used will consistently yield data that are similar.692 It follows 
that small Islamic banks may be more stable than large Islamic banks and conventional banks 
in certain contexts and not in others. Also, conventional banks may be more stable than large 
Islamic banks in another context, implying that financial stability is not necessarily causally 
related to compliance with the principles of the Shariah.  
 
One study concluded that Islamic banks performed better during the global financial crisis of 
2008 than conventional banks due to the interest free nature of Islamic banking. Another 
study found that rising interest rates compromise the diffusion of Islamic banking because 
they increase the opportunity costs for potential non-Muslim customers. Hence, the banks 
that suffered more losses during the financial crisis are those that had higher levels of capital 
and were more likely to invest in riskier transactions with higher interest rates, thereby 
increasing the likelihood of defaults. The common thread that runs through the findings is 
therefore that Islamic banks have performed better than conventional banks because Islamic 
banks are less exposed to risks. This explains why small Islamic banks are more stable than 
large Islamic banks. It also explains why Islamic banks are less likely to have traded in 
instruments that triggered the global financial crisis in 2007. This may justify the trust of 
depositors in Islamic banks during the crisis, and the decision to maintain deposits in these 
banks while many conventional banks suffered runs at the same time. Thus, some studies 
found that Islamic banks were only significantly affected when the financial crisis hit the real 
economy. This is because Shariah-compliant banks are largely involved in the financing of 
investments in real assets. Also, since they mostly operate in Muslim countries with emerging 
economies, their intermediation role is associated with the financing of trade in goods and 
services. 
 
As such, although the studies cited in Table VII.1 hold that Islamic banks are more resilient 
to crises, they provide only approximative factors accounting for the efficiency, robustness, 
                                                
692 For assessing the reliability and generalisability of qualitative research, see DH Grossoehme, ‘Overview of 
Qualitative Research’ (2014) 20 Journal of Health Care Chaplaincy 109, 110-122; M Carcary, ‘The Research 
Audit Trail – Enhancing Trustworthiness in Qualitative Inquiry’ (2009) 7 The Electronic Journal of Business 
Research Methods 11, 11-24. 
 
 
202 
stability and reliability of Islamic banks. The fact that in one study Islamic banks are 
relatively more stable than conventional banks only when they operate on a small scale surely 
implies that Shariah-compliance banking does not strengthen resilience. It is true that 
adherence to the Shariah principles precludes Islamic banks from investing in instruments 
embedded with systemic risks; as well as the fact that the interest free nature of Islamic 
banking reduces exposure to some liquidity risks such as those related to funding from 
foreign Shariah non-compliant institutions. However, it remains that only Islamic banks with 
an important source of liquidity and effective risk management strategy would be able to 
resist shocks caused by systemic liquidity risks. In order to be more resilient, there must be 
evidence that Islamic banks operate a sounder gearing process, establish a better credit-risk 
environment, maintain, measure and monitor appropriate credit administration, and ensure 
better risk control. Also, there must be evidence that Islamic regulators have established 
stricter eligibility criteria for capital in Islamic banks. 
 
Logically, other studies reviewed have concluded that both Islamic banks and conventional 
banks are vulnerable to financial shocks, and what is important is the level of exposure of the 
individual bank, regardless of whether their products and services are Shariah-compliant or 
not. Three key studies with findings in this regard are cited in Table VII.2. 
 
Table VII.2: Key Studies on the Impact of the Financial Crisis 
Author(s) and Year Methodology Findings 
Parashar and Venkatesh, 2010 Compares Islamic banks and 
conventional banks in the GCC 
using five performance 
parameters, including capital 
adequacy, efficiency, liquidity, 
leverage and profitability. 
During the global financial crisis, 
Islamic banks suffered more than 
conventional banks regarding 
leverage, return on equity and 
capital ratio, while conventional 
banks suffered more regarding 
return on average assets and 
liquidity. 
Smolo and Mirakhor, 2010 Literature review The global financial crisis had a 
limited impact on Islamic banks 
because they were less exposed 
but there is not sufficient 
empirical data showing the true 
impact 
Turk, 2010 Uses the impulse response Both Islamic and conventional 
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function and VAR to analyse 
Malaysian data covering the 
financial crises of 1997 and 2008, 
and the non-crisis period in 
between, 
banks are vulnerable to financial 
shocks. What is important is the 
level of exposure of the individual 
bank. 
 
Table VII.2 shows further that the profitability and efficiency of banks during the financial 
crisis is not related to adherence with the principles of the Shariah. It follows that the 
regulator may not strengthen the resilience of conventional banks by requiring them to offer 
Shariah-compliant products and services.  
 
Given that the literature does not demonstrate that Islamic banks are more resilient to 
financial crises, an attempt was made to map the profile of the generic financial institution 
that is more resilient to financial crises. The objective was to determine whether it matches 
the profile of Islamic banks that are deemed by studies cited in Table VII.1 to be generally 
more resilient than conventional banks. It is also expected that this will guide the regulator in 
regard to determining how to strengthen the resilience of banks. 
 
Table VII.3: The Profile of the Generic Resilient Bank 
Features of Resilient Banks Explanation 
Securitisation Banks that are active in the securitisation 
market have been noted tot have better 
capitalisation, higher profitability and 
lower insolvency risk. Securitisation is also 
an important factor, because it helps banks 
offload loans from the asset side to finance 
their investments, unless it results in 
increased bank leverage and looser lending 
rates, which becomes systematically 
riskier. 
 
Capital Structure A bank with higher capital reserves has a 
stronger buffer to withstand losses. More 
capital means less leverage, which in turn 
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may reduce risk-shifting incentives towards 
excessively risky projects. Banks that 
exercise caution are more likely to 
maintain stronger buffers. 
 
Funding Banks that are able to raise large funds 
swiftly at a relatively low cost in the 
interbank market have better capitalisation 
and higher capital reserves. 
 
Diversified income sources A diversified portfolio is financially 
beneficial, although only for specific minor 
risks 
 
Table VII.3 shows that banks with higher capital reserves generally have a stronger buffer to 
withstand losses, thereby demonstrating once again that more capital means less leverage, 
which in turn reduces risk-shifting incentives towards excessively risky projects. However, 
this may sometimes be problematic where the banks are more likely to invest in riskier 
investments or in large numbers of different investments, thereby increasing their chance of 
experiencing defaults and suffering losses.  
It follows that the resilience of a bank is a function of the efficiency of its risk management 
strategy. This explains why the common thread through most of the studies reviewed in 
Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 is that the vulnerability of the financial institution or system depends 
on its exposure to risk. It follows that regulators and policymakers should place emphasis on 
risks concentrated in the most levered banks and the way they manage the risks. Thus, the 
important regulatory and supervisory challenges confronted by all regulators are related to 
ensuring that financial institutions are not overexposed to liquidity and credit risk, and over-
reliant on one source of funding. Given that Islamic financial institutions operate within the 
Shariah regulatory framework that requires the sharing (rather than transfer) of risk and 
essentially shuns toxic assets and derivatives, and also rely on retail funding within the 
domestic economy, it may be said that they are less exposed rather than more resilient to 
crises. . In other words, they do not manage risk better than conventional banks. The studies 
in the literature that hold that Islamic banks are more resilient do not suggest ways in which 
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the regulator can impose strategies employed by Islamic banks on conventional banks in 
order to strengthen the stability of the latter. What is clear is that Islamic and conventional 
banks play different roles in society, and the regulations ought to accommodate these 
different models in order to strengthen the stability of the system as a whole. Given that 
resilience is causally related to the management of risk rather than exposure, regulation ought 
to take into account the way in which Islamic banks manage the unique risks to which they 
are exposed. 
It is shown in Chapter 3 that Islamic banks confront special credit risk, including Mudarabah 
investments and Murabaha transactions. They allocate a greater amount of financing and 
loans which increases their exposure to this risk. They are also confronted with greater 
challenges when it comes to market risk management given that they are required to comply 
with the principles of the Shariah and are unable to use risk management tools such as 
hedging and credit derivatives. However, it is shown that the contention that Islamic banks 
are less likely to trigger instability through the accumulation of risks is justified because the 
financing structures used by Islamic banks generally carry lower risks. Hence, it is not a 
question of Islamic banks using better risk management techniques. Their financing 
structures carry relatively low credit risk because their assets are generally of debt nature 
following sale-based financing, while deposits are on a profit and loss sharing basis. This 
means that Islamic banks may simply shift the risk of debt default to investment depositors. 
Equally, restrictions are eased by the fact that the Gharar interdiction limits the goods and 
services that Islamic banks can offer, therefore diminishing the risk they face.  
 
As such, it is submitted that Islamic banks are not adversely affected by financial crises as 
conventional banks because Islamic banking is essentially based on different modes of PLS 
partnership that reduce the overall risk confronted by the financial institutions. Islamic banks 
are less exposed to risk but do not have better risk management strategies. Thus, they are less 
likely to trigger instability through the accumulation of risks, but they are not more resilient 
to financial crises. Also, each organisation, whether Islamic or conventional, has a risk 
management model that is based on how its managers foresee risks, assess impacts and define 
suitable responses. This implies that some Islamic banks manage risks better than others. 
Also, it is easier to compare the risk management strategies of banks where the regulator has 
created uniform standards for risk management. However, there are generally no uniform 
standards for Shariah governance. It is shown for example in Chapter 5 that international 
standards for accounting and auditing of Islamic banks are not mandatory, and SAMA does 
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not have specific regulations to cater to the unique risks of Islamic banking in the KSA. Also, 
the Shariah Board of each bank determines whether the bank’s products and services are 
Shariah-compliant. Thus, in order to clarify the link between the Shariah-compliant banking 
and resilience to financial crises and determine whether Islamic banks are more resilient than 
conventional banks, the risk management strategies of Islamic banks are analysed at three 
levels, namely a generic level (Chapter 4), the level of the State (Chapter 5), and the level of 
individual banks (Chapters 6). The results of the analysis are discussed in the next section.  
 
7.2.1 The Tripartite Analysis 
 
At a generic level, it is shown in Chapter 4 that theoretically, PLS operations may mitigate 
liquidity and credit risks due to a number of reasons. First, the operations are on both sides of 
the balance sheet; the depositors sharing the risk with the bank on the liabilities side absorb 
the shocks on the assets side. Secondly, the operations are based on mutual trust and good 
faith which mitigate moral hazard, agency, and information asymmetry risks. Thirdly, where 
the bank is the Mudarib, the operational risk is lower given that the bank has the skill, 
expertise and experience in managing similar projects within the specific legal environment. 
Lastly, other risks embedded in equity-based transactions may be mitigated by the use of 
sales-based instruments such as the Murabaha and assets-based instruments such as the Ijara. 
The PLS is therefore a scheme that should be promoted by regulators given that banks using 
the scheme may be able to provide capital and generate profits with a low total risk load. 
Moreover, Islamic banks using these schemes match the profile of institutions that are 
generally more resilient to financial crises as shown in Chapter 2. They are less exposed to 
liquidity and credit risk, averse to excessive risk taking, and can sell their assets (such as 
Sukuk) and obtain liquidity from local sources in order to return to target leverage. Under the 
equity-based PLS modes, the clients deposit money with the bank and receive no interests but 
are entitled to a predetermined share in the bank’s profits. What is important is that both 
parties agree on the sharing of the risk. The sharing of the risk establishes a moral difference 
between financing on PLS basis and loans or limited partnership modes of financed used by 
conventional banks.  
There is a dichotomy between theory and practice. Islamic banking is largely centred on 
replacing interest in bank lending with the PLS, thereby compelling the lender and 
intermediaries to share the risks of enterprise with the borrowers. However, in practice, 
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financial institutions using PLS have been unable to match the innovation that underpins 
conventional financial services.  
The most important flaw of the PLS equity-based schemes is the lack of ascertainable 
regulatory standards based on common interpretations of the principles of the Shariah. The 
uncertainty regarding the regulatory standards make it difficult to transpose these schemes to 
conventional banks, as well as other jurisdictions, especially non-Islamic jurisdictions. The 
uncertainty also makes it difficult for regulatory and supervisory authorities to compel all 
Islamic banks within their jurisdiction to conduct robust stress testing to identify and mitigate 
risks. 
 
Another shortcoming is that the use of equity-based schemes as shown above focuses on 
resolving short-term liquidity problems and creates long-term illiquidity problems due to low 
returns and absence of interest. This may explain why only a small proportion of the assets of 
most Islamic banks actually constitute equity. As such, it may once again be argued that 
many Islamic banks were not affected by the financial crisis of 2007-09 due to limited 
exposure, especially to foreign counterparties in PLS equity-based agreements. 
 
In order to assess the resilience of Islamic banking in practice, the risk management strategies 
of Islamic banks are analysed at the level of the State. It is shown in Chapter 5 that Islamic 
banks may be accommodated within the same legal and regulatory framework as 
conventional banks and perform better. Unlike conventional banks in the KSA, Islamic banks 
remained profitable during the global financial crisis. Also, the margins of Islamic banks 
remained high during the crisis because large proportions of deposits and loans were Shariah-
compliant and did not receive interest. It is also shown that the causes of the financial crisis in 
the United States identified in the literature would not be operative if the banks complied 
with the rules of the Shariah that prohibit interest, speculation, and uncertainty, and used 
equity-based PLS agreements which are essentially Ubberimae Fidei contracts. However, it 
is important to distinguish between resilience and profitability. This is because although the 
margins of Islamic banks remained high during the crisis, conventional banks generally had 
higher margins before and after the crisis. Hence, the fact that large proportions of deposits 
and loans are Shariah-compliant may make Islamic banking less profitable in certain 
instances and more profitable in others. Notwithstanding, this study focuses on resilience. 
Islamic banks may have remained profitable during the crisis, but they are not necessarily 
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more resilient. There is no evidence that the regulator can impose strategies employed by 
Islamic banks on conventional banks in order to strengthen the resilience of the latter. It is 
true that Islamic financial institutions are less exposed to risks because they operate within 
the Shariah regulatory framework that requires the sharing (rather than transfer) of risk and 
essentially shuns toxic assets and derivatives. Also, they largely rely on retail funding within 
the domestic economy. However, they do not manage risk better than conventional banks. 
Since resilience is causally related to the management of risk rather than exposure, the 
analysis at this level also shows that Islamic banks are not more resilient to financial crises 
than conventional banks. 
 
The resilience of Islamic banking in practice is also assessed at the level of the individual 
banks. The heuristic approach of the comparative case study is adopted in order to delimit the 
object of study to four banks in the KSA, two Islamic banks and two conventional banks. The 
risk management strategies of these four banks are then critically assessed in Chapter 6, and it 
is noted that it is difficult to determine whether the Islamic banks in the sample manage risks 
better and are therefore more resilient to financial crises. The analysis of their annual reports 
of 2007, 2014 and 2016 reveals that they effectively meet some requirements, while they are 
seriously lagging with regard to others. Nonetheless, it is noted that there is nothing in the 
annual reports of the four banks to support the positive outlook regarding their existing 
capabilities to resist financial crises. Hence, qualitative data was obtained directly from 
compliance officers and staff in the compliance units of the four banks. Emphasis was placed 
on stress testing which is increasingly recommended as the primary tool to identify risks and 
determine the adequate capital levels to resist shock.  
 
Given the lack of standardised risk measures, as well as the difficulty of estimating exposures 
of Islamic banks, it would be more logical for these banks to place more reliance on stress 
tests. Chapter 7 discusses the results of a survey of the stress tests conducted by the four 
banks. It reveals that all four large banks have an overarching stress testing framework, 
although they acknowledge that enhancements are required. However, the frameworks of the 
conventional banks may be rated worse than those of Islamic banks. The stress tests 
conducted by conventional banks are siloed processes while the tests of Islamic banks are 
more integrated in their risk management strategies. Nonetheless, the Shariah Boards of the 
banks are not involved in or do not conduct specific stress tests.  
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Although the stress test is the primary tool to identify risks and determine the adequate 
capital levels to resist shock and the frameworks of the two conventional banks may be rated 
worse than those of the two Islamic banks, it is uncertain whether this may be generalised to 
all Islamic and conventional banks. This is because the four banks did not show how the 
results of the stress tests have wider use in informing and running the business. Then, it is 
also important to consider the context. In the KSA, the regulator, SAMA, does not examine 
the internal summaries of stress test results conducted by banks, as well as document the 
nature and extent of the stress testing activities of the banks. The regulator in the KSA is 
therefore unable to determine which banks are more resilient on the basis of their stress test 
frameworks. 
7.3 Achievement of the Aim and Objectives 
 
This study has sought to determine whether the adoption of Shariah-compliant standards may 
strengthen resilience to financial crises promote financial stability. It shows that this is 
unlikely given that there is no evidence that Shariah-compliant banks are more resilient than 
conventional banks, where they operate within the same regulatory environment. However, 
the results discussed above suggest that Islamic banks are less adversely affected by financial 
crises than conventional banks. The fact that they are less exposed to risks does not imply 
that they manage risks better. Thus, although there is a causal link between financial crises 
and risk management, there is no cogent link between Islamic banking and more efficient risk 
management. In this regard, the results may further be summarised as follows: 
• The analysis at a generic level reveals that banks using the PLS scheme match the 
profile of institutions that are generally more resilient to financial crises, viz., they are 
less exposed to liquidity and credit risk, more averse to excessive risk taking, and 
often sell their assets and obtain liquidity from local sources in order to return to 
target leverage.  
• The analysis at the State level reveals that where Islamic banks are accommodated 
within the same legal and regulatory framework as conventional banks, the Islamic 
banks are more resistant to financial shock. Thus, Islamic banks in all the studies on 
risk management in the KSA exceeded the minimum requirements. The few banks 
that did not remain profitable during the crises in the KSA were conventional banks. 
The margins of Islamic banks remained high because large proportions of deposits 
and loans were Shariah-compliant and did not receive interest. 
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• The analysis at the level of individual banks reveals that the stress testing frameworks 
of the conventional banks may be rated as less effective than those of Islamic banks. 
 
7.3.1 Determining Whether Islamic Banks are More Resilient 
 
In light of the above, it may be difficult to submit that Islamic banks are generally more 
resilient than conventional banks. Islamic banks have been able to withstand shocks or 
significant stresses during financial crises because they are less exposed to risk. The limited 
exposure (especially to foreign counterparties in equity-based transactions) explains why 
Islamic banks are less prone to withdrawals during panics, their lending decisions are not 
sensitive to deposits, and intermediation is asset-based rather than debt-based. Thus, Islamic 
banks generally rely on retail funding within the domestic economy. The interest-free nature 
of their products and services further reduces exposure to some liquidity risks such as those 
related to funding from foreign Shariah non-compliant institutions. Then, the Shariah 
regulatory framework that requires the sharing of risk essentially shuns toxic assets and 
derivatives that are embedded with risks. Lastly, although Islamic banks confront special 
credit risk, including Mudarabah investments and Murabaha transactions, the enforcement of 
the duty of utmost good faith mitigates these risks. This finding is in line with those of many 
studies cited in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2. Nonetheless, it is submitted here that this finding 
does not demonstrate that Islamic banks manage risk better than conventional banks. This is 
because resilience is causally related to the management of risk rather than exposure.  
 
7.3.2 Clarifying the Links between Shariah-Compliant Banking and Resilience 
 
It is important to note that limited exposure does not have the same connotation as better risk 
management and resilience to financial crisis. Thus, the studies cited in Chapter 2 are 
inaccurate in holding that Islamic banks have better risk management strategies and are more 
resilient to financial crises because they are less exposed to risk. Resilience implies resistance 
to macroeconomic shocks. However, limited exposure implies limited bank specific shock. 
Moreover, a resilient bank should have amongst other things a larger capital buffer, higher 
quality and depth of regulatory review, and the ability to clearly distinguish between 
traditional banking activities and proprietary trading activities. Neither the above analysis nor 
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previous studies have shown that Islamic banks are better equipped in these areas than 
conventional banks. It is true that a bank may be less resistant to a financial shock where it 
has made itself vulnerable through overexposure to risks embedded in asset categories such 
as real estate and equities. Nonetheless, the bank would be adversely affected by the crisis 
due to the low interest rate policy implemented by the central bank of the State. This is 
because the low interest rates increase liquidity and credit risks and negatively affect margin 
and profitability.  
 
Hence, despite the fact that Islamic banks are not exposed to many risks due to the 
restrictions of the Shariah, they are often exposed to the specific asset categories of real estate 
and equities. Also, given that interest is prohibited, their margins and profitability simply 
remain constant during financial crises; that is until the crises spread to the real economy. 
Notwithstanding, what is important is the level of exposure of the individual bank, regardless 
of whether their products and services are Shariah-compliant or not. Regulators and 
policymakers should therefore place emphasis on risks concentrated in the most levered 
banks and the way they manage the risks. Thus, the important regulatory and supervisory 
challenges confronted by all regulators are related to ensuring that financial institutions, 
whether Islamic or conventional, are not overexposed to liquidity and credit risk. 
 
The failure of the studies cited in Chapter 2 to notice that the limited exposure of many 
Islamic banks is due to the fact that they still rely on retail funding within their domestic 
economies is unfortunate. Such banks would be as adversely affected by financial crises as 
conventional banks if they have the same level of exposure to foreign sources of funding. As 
such, the difference in performances during financial crises is not sufficiently strong to 
support the hypothesis that Islamic banks are more resilient to financial crises. 
7.3.3 Adopting Islamic Banking Standards to Strengthen Resilience  
 
Notwithstanding, it is submitted here that the Islamic bank that ideally uses the PLS mode of 
financing is more resilient to financial crises than conventional banks. This is the bank that 
matches the profile of institutions that are generally more resilient to financial crises. As 
such, from a theoretical perspective, the regulator may strengthen the stability of 
conventional banks by requiring them to use similar modes of financing. This may be easier 
to implement in jurisdictions such as the KSA where Islamic banks and conventional banks 
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are required to comply to the same laws and regulations. In this light, the limited partnership 
mode of financing used by conventional banks may simply be modified into a PLS scheme. 
They are quite similar. The only differences are that the PLS has a limited contractual period 
and the liability of the partners is limited to their capital contribution. Thus, the fundamental 
difference between Islamic and conventional banking should not prevent conventional banks 
from using the PLS modes to supplement interest financing for example. 
 
However, there is a disconnect between the above ideal and what obtains in reality. Due to 
the absence of regulatory standards based on common interpretations of the principles of the 
Shariah, it is uncertain whether some of the transactions in the PLS scheme are Shariah-
compliant. In many transactions, the investee bank neither possesses nor owns the underlying 
asset of the Murabaha while selling to another broker at cost. This raises questions about the 
legitimacy of the transactions. It is Gharar for a seller to offer a product it does not own. 
Also, it is difficult to distinguish between interest (which is prohibited) and the guaranteed 
profit that the financier collects from the Murabaha transactions. Then the legitimacy of Ijara 
Sukuk may be questioned given that in many cases the underlying assets are not readily 
available, implying that there is no real sale transaction and the Sukuk holder only has an 
unsecured debt claim against the originator. 
 
The analysis of the annual reports of the banks of the KSA in Chapter 6 shows that they 
provide very little information about the management of risks embedded in PLS modes of 
financing. The banks, Islamic and conventional, offer Islamic products and enter into these 
transactions, and two of the banks are fully Shariah-compliant. However, there is very little to 
suggest that they actually rely on PLS modes of financing to mitigate risks. In fact, one of 
fully Shariah-compliant banks treats Mudarabah transactions as restricted investments and 
off-balance sheet items. 
7.3.4 Best Practices from Both Systems 
 
It is shown in Chapter 5 that although Islamic banks are not more profitable and liquid than 
conventional banks, they are more stable and have a higher capitalisation ratio. It is argued 
that this may be attributed to the use of PLS modes of financing by Islamic banks. In Chapter 
2, many commentators are cited to the effect that the appeal of Islamic banking lies in its use 
of PLS modes. However, it is shown in Chapter 4 that this argument is only true to the extent 
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that Islamic banks are able to provide capital and generate profits using PLS equity-based 
schemes, with a low total risk load, and use sales-based and lease assets-based contracts to 
mitigate the liquidity risk, market risk and credit risk emerging from equity-based schemes.  
Also, in Chapter 5, many commentators are cited to the effect that the 2007-2009 financial 
crisis was caused by excessive risk-taking following a rise in interest rates, and speculation 
on rapidly increasing house prices, excessive amounts of short-term wholesale funding, and 
too few high-quality liquid assets. It is then argued that these causes would not have become 
operative had the banks complied with Shariah rules to prohibit interest, speculation and 
uncertainty. Additionally, excessive risk-taking can create a moral hazard. It is noted in 
Chapter 4 that excessive risk-taking is mitigated in Islamic banking through the use of equity-
based PLS agreements, which are essentially ubberimae fidei contracts. Given that the bank 
and the client enter into a partnership or joint venture, it may be difficult for either party to 
undertake excessively risky investments. 
 
Thus, where Islamic banks are concerned, a financial crisis can only be caused by a major 
confluence of different factors, none of which would be systemic in themselves. This would 
then imply regulatory failure. It is therefore important that the regulator should be tasked with 
consolidated supervision and is empowered to oversee systemic risk. Unlike in conventional 
systems such the UK, where the regulatory reform following the financial crisis largely 
consisted of enhancing macro-prudential regulation by strengthening the Bank of England, in 
Islamic systems such as the KSA, the central bank was already the main regulator prior to the 
crisis. SAMA was therefore in a position to assess correlations and common exposures across 
banks in order to calibrate prudential controls. As such, conventional banks could enhance 
their resistance to shock by adopting the PLS mode of financing (as prescribed in Chapter 4) 
within a system where the regulator is sufficiently equipped to identify and prevent or 
mitigate systemic externalities and ensure the soundness of the system.  
 
Nonetheless, this may be very problematic because the conventional institutions would be 
required to comply with Shariah rules that prohibit interest, the trading of loans and 
derivatives, and investment in haram products, such as gambling and prostitution. 
Conventional banks are generally required to invest only in interest-bearing securities and 
fixed income, in order to minimise exposure to risk. Also, it may be difficult for conventional 
banks to use sale-based contracts and lease asset-based contracts to effectively mitigate the 
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risks embedded in PLS equity-based contracts. Under a PLS agreement, the client or 
depositor shares in the losses with the financial institution. However, conventional banks 
must guarantee to return the invested principal. The deposit principal must be certain. Thus, 
the banks may be compelled to structure the PLS agreement in such a way that the client or 
depositor only shares in the profit and not in the loss. This would then deviate from the PLS 
mode of financing that is proposed as the suitable mode for strengthening the resilience of 
banks. 
 
However, there is a disconnect between the PLS mode of financing prescribed in Chapter 4 
and what obtains in reality. Due to the absence of regulatory standards based on common 
interpretations of the principles of the Shariah, it is uncertain whether some of the 
transactions in the PLS scheme are Shariah-compliant. For example, in many transactions, 
the investee bank neither possesses nor owns the underlying asset of the Murabaha while 
selling to another broker at cost. However, it is Gharar for a seller to offer a product it does 
not own. Also, it is difficult to distinguish between interest (which is prohibited) and the 
guaranteed profit that the financier collects from the Murabaha transactions. Unsurprisingly, 
there was little evidence to suggest that the two fully Shariah-compliant banks that were 
examined actually rely on PLS modes of financing to mitigate risks. 
 
In practice, financial institutions using PLS have been unable to match the innovation that 
underpins conventional financial services. It is still very difficult to replace interest in bank 
lending by compelling the lender and intermediaries to share the risks of enterprise with the 
borrowers. Also, there is no sophisticated market on which the shares of such institutions can 
be floated. The secondary markets on which Sukuk or Islamic bonds are traded cannot handle 
variable return bonds based on Mudarabah and Musharakah. The investors would be too 
exposed given that there is no guaranteed value on redemption. It may therefore be important 
for Islamic banking to be based on devising suitable means of using conventional banking 
principles and procedures to serve the objectives of the Shariah rather than the establishment 
of a separate banking system. This is a more honest assessment of what obtains in the KSA. It 
explains why SAMA has adopted and implemented Basel Standards and approaches, and 
there has been no deviation from the Standards by fully Shariah-compliant banks in KSA.  
 
Notwithstanding, each bank has a specific risk management strategy which determines how it 
identifies and manages risk. Also, the bank’s underwriting standards determine its decision to 
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accept client and credit risk. Thus, the individual heterogeneity of each bank coupled with 
effective prudential regulation is more important than the nature of the banking or financing 
activity. It follows that each bank ought to place emphasis on developing specific risk 
management strategies, which take into account the unique risks embedded in its products 
and services, whether they are Shariah-compliant or not.  
 
7.4 Limitations of the Study 
 
There are certain limitations on this research that should be taken into account. While the 
researcher maintains that these limitations do not affect the overall validity, reliability and 
generalisability of the results and suggested reforms derived from this research, these 
obstacles and their effects on certain areas of the collection and analysis of the data should be 
noted. 
 
One of the primary limitations of this study is the relatively little material written on this 
subject from the regulatory perspective. This study aims to understand how the banking 
regulations in both conventional and Islamic banking systems attempt to equip them with 
sufficient risk management procedures and effective tools for maintaining stability in the 
event of a financial crisis. However, the vast majority of existing studies on this topic are 
grounded in economic, financial, and political analyses, with little attention being given to the 
role of regulation in understanding the comparative outcomes. While this is also what makes 
this study a unique contribution to the literature, it leaves little to draw on outside of 
empirical and comparative analyses. 
 
The second limitation for this study are the broad categories of conventional and Islamic 
banking. These systems are in effect models of banking that can be used throughout the 
various countries that subscribe to them, but each country will implement and tailor them 
according to their particular needs. The space constraints of this study do not permit 
consideration and comparison of a significant number of countries, thus only the most 
exemplary countries of each system, such as the United States for a conventional model and 
Saudi Arabia for an Islamic model, are analysed to identify the relevant attributes of each 
system. Moreover, given that the focus is on the risk management strategies of Islamic banks, 
the analysis of regulations that apply in the United States is very limited. 
 
 
216 
 
A final limitation to this study relates to the statistical sampling used for the qualitative 
survey. While best practices were followed to generate the survey results within the sample 
population, the sample is limited to Saudi perspectives on Islamic versus conventional 
banking models. 
7.5 Recommendations for Further Studies 
 
The experience of the KSA shows that Islamic banks may be accommodated within the same 
legal and regulatory framework as conventional banks. However, it is uncertain what specific 
role Islamic banking plays, if any, in strengthening the stability of the financial system. In 
this light, it may be important to further elaborate the ideal PLS scheme of financing that may 
be used by both Islamic and conventional banks (modified form of limited partnership) to 
show how the promotion of this scheme in the KSA may strengthen the resilience of financial 
institutions. 
 
Despite the accommodation of Islamic banks, it is also uncertain the extent to which 
regulations reflect this accommodation. Since SAMA did not declare any intention to tailor 
regulations to suit the unique risks embedded in Islamic products and services, it may only be 
assumed that the honing of Basel standards and approaches was in a bid to achieve this result. 
Thus, although Base II encourages only banks using the basic indicator approach to comply 
with these principles, SAMA imposes compliance on all banks in the KSA, and requires all 
banks to comply with Principle 13 of the Sound Principles and disclose liquidity-related 
information to the public on a regular basis. Also, unlike Basel II, SAMA considers that only 
the sovereigns from the GCC should be risk-weighted at zero per cent. The stricter measures 
adopted by SAMA may explain why there has not been any deviation from the Basel 
standards by both Islamic and conventional banks in the KSA.  
 
However, it remains that the Basel standards were developed for conventional banks and 
SAMA has not avowed that it has attempted to ensure that the implementation of the 
standards in the KSA takes into account the unique nature of Islamic banking. Thus, it is 
important to determine how these standards may be modified to suit the specific needs of 
Islamic banks. For example, clarity is required regarding Islamic instruments that may qualify 
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as additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital, and how Islamic bonds may be granted the status of 
high quality liquid assets.  
 
Also, none of the banks in the KSA actually confront a Shariah risk. This is because the 
regulators in the KSA do not enforce the principles of the Shariah against the banks. Hence, 
the only authority that assesses a bank’s Shariah products is the bank’s Shariah Board. It 
follows that the compliance risk management of Islamic banks is assessed in light of how the 
banks comply with the laws, regulations and standards that apply to all banks, regardless of 
the nature of their activities. Thus, it is important to determine how the principles of the 
Shariah may effectively be enforced against Islamic banks in the KSA. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A: SHEET FOR QUALITATIVE SURVEY – BANKS IN THE KSA 
 
Title of Research Study: 
 
Are Islamic Banks More Resilient to Financial Crises? A Critical 
Analysis of Islamic and Conventional Banks with Particular 
Reference to Saudi Arabia 
 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
You are invited to take part in a research study that seeks to assess the risk management 
mechanisms used by banks in the KSA. I would be grateful if you complete the attached 
Questionnaire on stress tests carried out as part of your risk management. This research is 
part of my PhD research at University of Sussex.   
 
Before you decide whether to take part in the study, it is important that you understand what 
the research is for and what you will be asked to do. Please take time to read the following 
information and discuss it with others if you wish. It is up to you to decide whether or not to 
take part. If you decide to take part, you will be given this information sheet to keep. You can 
change your mind at any time and withdraw from the study without giving a reason. 
The standard of care you receive will not change whether or not you decide to participate in 
this study. You are welcome to phone me if you would like any further information. 
 
The purpose of the research study is to compare the risk management strategies of Islamic 
banks  and conventional banks in the KSA. I would like to ask questions about the tests you 
have conducted to gauge how certain stressors will affect your banking institution.  
 
You have been chosen because your employer is among the most reputable banking 
institutions in the KSA. The study will involve 4 banks in the KSA, who will all be required 
to complete the attached questionnaire. 
 
The information gained from this research will be used to make recommendations for best 
practices and offer insights into the tests conducted by the banks. The objective is to enhance 
the regulation of banks and their resilience to financial crises.. 
 
The questionnaires will be stored in a locked secure place at all times and the data will be 
protected from intrusion also. The questionnaires will be destroyed at the end of the study. 
Your response will be treated with full confidentiality, and anyone who takes part in the 
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research will be identified only by code numbers or false names. I will analyse the 
questionnaires. At the end of the research,. You can request a copy of the final report if you 
wish. No research participant will be identifiable from any publications. This study has been 
reviewed and approved by the Research Ethics Committee at University of Sussex.  
 
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you need further information 
 
Thanking you in anticipation,  
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
Bader Aldosari  
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QUALITATIVE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
Section 1 - General 
 
Identification of respondent 
 
Q1: Please indicate the name of the institution for which you are completing the 
questionnaire. 
 
 
 
 
Section 2 – Governance and Engagement 
 
Q2: Please indicate by Very Low, Low, High or Very High the level of involvement of the 
Committees of the Board of Directors and the Senior Management in each of the following 
stages of the regulatory stress testing process. 
Scenarios: 
 
 
Modelling:  
 
 
Management actions: 
 
 
Results:  
 
 
 
Q3: Which unit or person takes overall ownership of the regulatory stress testing process? 
 
 
 
 
Q4: Please indicate the extent to which regulatory stress testing is a separate exercise to the 
following: 
Internal risk management: 
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Contingency or recovery planning: 
 
  
Resolution planning:  
 
 
 Reverse stress testing:  
 
 
 Q5: Please indicate the hypothetical scenarios that are regularly tested: 
 
 
 
 
 
Q6: Please indicate by Yes or No whether these Islamic portfolios are used in the stress testing: 
 
Islamic bond (Sukuk): 
 
 
Stocks: 
 
 
Money market funds (Murabaha): 
 
 
 
Equity funds (Mudarabah and Musharakah): 
 
 
 
Alternative investment funds (forex funds, real estate funds, hedge funds): 
 
 
 
 
Q7: How did these Islamic Portfolios fare during the periods of financial crises? 
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Q8: Which hedging strategies were set to mitigate the risks in the Islamic portfolios? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q9: How do you evidence to regulators the reasonableness of the assumptions used in your 
regulatory stress tests? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q10: Please indicate by Low, High or Very High the extent to which additional operational staff 
are needed to complete regulatory stress tests: 
 
 
 
 
Q11: What type of risk control actions have you taken in response to regulatory stress testing 
results? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
242 
 
Appendix B: SHEET FOR QUALITATIVE SURVEY - SAMA 
 
 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS 
 
 
Dear Sir /Madam, 
 
You are invited to take part in a research study that seeks to assess the risk management 
mechanisms used by banks in the KSA. I would be grateful if you complete the attached 
Questionnaire on stress tests carried out as part of your risk management. This research is 
part of my PhD thesis at University of Sussex.  
 
Before you decide whether to take part in the study, it is important that you understand what 
the research is for and what you will be asked to do. Please take time to read the following 
information and discuss it with others if you wish. It is up to you to decide whether or not to 
take part. If you decide to take part, you will be given this information sheet to keep. You can 
change your mind at any time and withdraw from the study without giving a reason. 
The standard of care you receive will not change whether or not you decide to participate in 
this study. You are welcome to phone me if you would like any further information. 
 
The purpose of the research study is to compare the risk management strategies of Islamic 
banks and conventional banks in the KSA. I would like to ask questions about the tests you 
have conducted to gauge how certain stressors will affect your banking institution.  
 
The information gained from this research will be used to make recommendations for best 
practices and offer insights into the tests conducted by the banks. The objective is to enhance 
the regulation of banks and their resilience to financial crises. The results of the study may 
also lead onto further studies on the use of stress tests tailored to Islamic banking. 
 
The questionnaires will be stored in a locked secure place at all times and the data will be 
protected from intrusion also. The questionnaires will be destroyed at the end of the study. 
Your response will be treated with full confidentiality, and anyone who takes part in the 
research will be identified only by code numbers or false names. I will analyse the 
questionnaires. At the end of the research. You can request a copy of the final report if you 
wish. No research participant will be identifiable from any publications. This study has been 
reviewed and approved by the Research Ethics Committee at University of Sussex.  
 
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you need further information 
 
Thanking you in anticipation,  
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
Bader Aldosari 
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QUALITATIVE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
Q1: What type of risk control actions SAMA taken in response to regulatory stress 
testing conducted by banks? 
 
 
  
 
 
Q2: Has SAMA enacted any regulations that are tailored Islamic banking? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q3: Is SAMA concerned about the risks embedded in any specific Islamic products or 
schemes? 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Q4: Does SAMA believe that the Basel standards may be effectively implemented by 
Islamic banks? 
 
 
 
 
 
Q5: Does SAMA regulate the management of Shariah risk? 
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THANK YOU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
